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Abstract 
The Consumer Protection Act 68 (‘the CPA’) came into effect on 31 March 2011. In 
broad terms, the purpose of the CPA is to promote the social and economic welfare 
of consumers. Specific reference is made to reducing disadvantages suffered by 
vulnerable consumers. The question posed in this thesis is whether the scope of the 
application of the CPA in relation to transactions for goods is consistent with the 
purpose of the Act, but also how it compares to the approaches taken in the European 
Union, United Kingdom and Australia. It is argued that the application provisions 
are not always fair, rational, clear, efficient and consistent with reasonable 
expectations. The following issues relating to the application of the Act are 
addressed: the approach to the protection of small juristic persons, the omission of a 
exclusion based on the purposes for which the transaction is concluded, the onus of 
proof, the exclusion of transactions outside the ordinary course of business, the 
definition of ‘supplier’, whether transactions should be ‘for consideration’ in order 
for the consumer to qualify for protection, whether the whole supply chain should be 
liable and whether all goods should fall within the scope of the Act. 
Recommendations on these issues are made in light of rationales for consumer 
protection legislation, proposed criteria for evaluating such legislation (namely  
whether the legislation is fair, rational, clear, efficient and consistent with reasonable 
expectations) and comparative research. Suggested amendments to the wording of 
relevant sections in the Act are made in the final chapter.  
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1. Chapter 1: Background and methodology
1.1. Background 
The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (‘the CPA’) came into effect on 
31 March 2011. It resulted from the acknowledgment that there was an imbalance 
between consumers and suppliers, which had arisen 
because the traditional (or classical) law of contract applies regardless of the 
identity of the parties, their relationship to each other, the subject matter of the 
contract, and the social context of the contract.1 
The notion of protecting consumers through legislation is not new, nor is it unique 
to South Africa. The United Nations adopted guidelines for consumer protection in 
1985, which are internationally recognised as a minimum standard for consumer 
protection.2 Consumer protection legislation has been adopted all over the world.3 
The purpose of the CPA is to 
‘promote and advance the social and economic welfare of consumers in South 
Africa by–  
(a) establishing a legal framework for the achievement and maintenance
of a consumer market that is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable and
responsible for the benefit of consumers generally;
(b) reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages experienced in accessing
any supply of goods or services by consumer–
(i) who are low-income persons or persons comprising low-
income communities;
(ii) who live in remote, isolated or low-density population areas
or communities;
(iii) who are minors, seniors or other similarly vulnerable
consumers; or
(iv) whose ability to read and comprehend any advertisement,
agreement, mark, instruction, label, warning, notice or other
1 P N Stoop ‘The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 and procedural fairness in consumer contracts’ 
 (2015) 18(4) PELJ 1091 at 1092.  
2 United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection (as expanded in 1999) (Res 29/248). See David 
Harland ‘The United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection’ (1987) 10 Journal of Consumer 
Policy 245 at 245. 
3 For example in the European Union, the United Kingdom, sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, Asia, 
South America, North America and Australia.  See Monique L du Preez ‘The Consumer Protection 
Bill: A few preliminary comments’ (2009) 1 TSAR 58 at 62. 
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visual representation is limited by reason of low literacy, 
vision impairment or limited fluency in the language in which 
the representation is produced, published or presented; 
(c) promoting fair business practices;
(d) protecting consumers from–
(i) unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, unjust or otherwise
improper trade practices; and
(ii) deceptive, misleading, unfair or fraudulent conduct;
(e) improving consumer awareness and information and encouraging
responsible and informed consumer choice and behaviour;
(f) promoting consumer confidence, empowerment, and the development
of a culture of consumer responsibility, through individual and group
education, vigilance, advocacy and activism;
(g) providing for a consistent, accessible and efficient system of
consensual resolution of disputes arising from consumer transactions;
and
(h) providing for an accessible, consistent, harmonised, effective and
efficient system of redress for consumers’.
A great deal has been written about the CPA, but no comparative study relating to 
the scope of the application of the CPA has been undertaken.4 The question posed in 
this thesis is whether the scope of the application of the CPA in relation to 
transactions for goods is consistent with the purpose of the Act, but also how it 
compares to the approaches taken in foreign law.   
It will be argued that if the CPA is to have any hope of achieving its purpose, the 
scope of its application must be fair, rational, clear, efficient and consistent with 
reasonable expectations.5 Unfortunately, the current formulation gives rise to the 
following questions:  
a) The definition of ‘consumer’ in the CPA includes small ‘juristic persons’.
Should juristic persons be protected? If so, should the protection be extended
to all juristic persons or only small juristic persona, and how should size be
determined?
4 The most comprehensive discussion of the definitions and application provisions of the CPA is 
Elizabeth de Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Tjakie Naudé & Sieg Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer 
Protection Act (Original Service 2014) para 5125.  
5 These criteria for evaluating the law are discussed in chapter 2, para 2.5.   
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b) The CPA does not exclude transactions concluded for business purposes.
This relates to the fact that ‘juristic persons’ are also protected. Should the
CPA apply to transactions taking place for business purposes?
c) A complex definition of ‘consumer’ creates questions regarding the onus of
proof. Who will be burdened with proving whether a customer is a
consumer?
d) The definition of ‘supplier’ is limited to suppliers acting in the ‘ordinary
course of business’. Does this mean that suppliers are not responsible for
‘atypical’ transactions that do not form part of their core business? If so,
should that be the case?
e) The CPA requires that a transaction must be ‘for consideration’. Should this
requirement be introduced into South African law?
f) Liability flows up the supply chain in many instances. Are the definitions
establishing this clear enough? Does this impose unreasonable liability on
suppliers?
g) Should all goods be included in the scope of the legislation? The inclusion of
immovable, second-hand and intangible goods has been particularly
controversial.
These issues will be analysed compared to the approaches taken in foreign law, 
and alternatives will be proposed. The analysis will take place in the context of the 
sale of goods and the regulation of the quality of goods. This decision will be 
discussed in the next section. 
1.2. A note on methodology: Which statutory instruments will be 
compared? 
The developments in foreign and international law are relevant for two reasons. First, 
section 2(2) of the CPA provides that appropriate foreign and international law may 
be used when interpreting or applying the Act. Secondly, the experiences in other 
jurisdictions may provide valuable guidance in determining whether the protection 
afforded to consumers in South Africa is adequate; in other words, whether the 
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provisions of the CPA will be successful in protecting consumer rights, and whether 
legislative reform is needed to bolster this protection. 
Van der Walt6 makes the following statement with regard to the role of the 
analysis of foreign law: 
‘As a history of errors, comparative study shows us a range of fallacious 
doctrines, theories and arguments that have already been discredited and should 
be avoided. As a history of possibilities, comparative study shows us that 
certain doctrines, theories and arguments could still be used as possible 
explanations of or solutions for individual problems. As a history of examples, 
comparative study shows us the methods, techniques and approaches that are 
available to us. Like the historical study of law, the comparative study of law 
liberates us from what we need not do; it cannot and should not enslave us by 
telling us what we have to do.’ 
When embarking upon a comparative analysis of the CPA in order to determine 
whether the level of protection of the consumer’s right to quality goods is in keeping 
with international best practice, one must take heed of the words of Chaskalson in 
Makwanyane: 
‘[W]e must bear in mind that we are required to construe the South African 
Constitution, and not ... the constitution of some foreign country, and that this 
has to be done with due regard to our legal system, our history and 
circumstances, and the structure and language of our own Constitution. We can 
derive assistance from ... foreign case law, but we are in no way bound to 
follow it.’7 
These ‘warnings’ apply to both a substantive comparative analysis as well as the 
use of foreign law to interpret the CPA. In this, as in everything else, context is king, 
and the unique socio-economic circumstances in South Africa have to be taken into 
account when considering the scope of consumer protection measures.8  
For purposes of the comparative sections of this thesis, three principal 
jurisdictions were considered: the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK) 
and Australia. The selection of foreign consumer protection laws to use in this 
comparative study was challenging, as consumer protection legislation has become 
exceedingly common.9 The selection was informed by the fact that the European 
6 A J van der Walt The Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 38 as quoted in Lourens du Plessis Re-
interpretation of Statutes (2002) 273. 
7 S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).  
8 The identity or characteristics of the South African ‘consumer’ are discussed in para 2.2.  
9 Consumers International The State of Consumer Protection Around the World (2013) available at 
http://www.consumersinternational.org/news-and-media/resource-zone/state-of-consumer-protection, 
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Union, the United Kingdom and Australia have all undergone reviews in the past ten 
years. The analysis and revision of these instruments has generated useful source 
material. Practical considerations such as the accessibility of primary and secondary 
source material in English also played a role.  
Discussing the application of consumer protection legislation in the abstract may 
be impractical, as some categories of goods, services and contracts may require 
different approaches. The contract of sale is central to consumer protection law. In 
light of this, the issues will be discussed against the background of consumer laws 
with general application (as is the case with the CPA), the specific regulation of 
problems relating to the quality of goods and, to a lesser degree and with deference 
to the context, the regulation of unfair contract terms in contracts of sale and unfair 
business practices.   
The consumer protection laws (and, in certain cases, preparatory works) of the 
European Union that will be considered are primarily the Consumer Sales 
Directive,10 the Unfair Terms Directive,11 the Consumer Rights Directive12 and the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.13 Other instruments of the European Union 
accessed on 6 April 2016; Federal Trade Commission ‘Competition and consumer protection 
authorities worldwide’ available at https://www.ftc.gov/policy/international/competition-consumer-
protection-authorities-worldwide, accessed on 4 March 2016.   
10 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain 
aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees Official Journal L 171, 07/07/1999 
P. 0012 - 0016 (the Consumer Sales Directive) and the Proposal for a European Parliament and
Council Directive on the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees Official Journal C 307/8,
16/10/1996 P. 0008 (Proposal for a Consumer Sales Directive).
11 Directive 1993/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts Official Journal L
095, 21/04/1993 P. 0029 - 0034 (the Unfair Terms Directive).
12 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on
consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council Official Journal L 304/64, 22/11/2011 P.260 – 284 (the
Consumer Rights Directive), and the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on consumer rights 2008/0196 (COD) COM (2008) final. Initially, the Consumer Rights
Directive was intended to consolidate eight Directives, but only two (distance selling and doorstep
selling) were ultimately repealed. This was the result of the ‘political reality’. See Chantal Mak ‘EP
adopts CRD’ available at http://recent-ecl.blogspot.com/2011/06/ep-adopts-crd.html, accessed on
18 December 2013.
13 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council
Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council
Official Journal L 149/22, 11/6/2005 (the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive).
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that will be referred to are the Common European Sales Law14 and the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference.15 The choice of European contract law is informed by 
the fact that it underwent a relatively recent process of modernisation and 
harmonisation.16 First, the Consumer Acquis Review led to the publication of the 
Consumer Rights Directive.17 Secondly, the project of a Draft Frame of Reference 
resulted in the publication of a wealth of research and is intended to serve as 
inspiration ‘for suitable solutions for private law questions’, and it is hoped that ‘[i]t 
will have repercussions for reform projects within the European Union’.18 The Draft 
Common Frame of Reference was preceded by the Principles of European Contract 
Law and the Principles of European Law: Sales.19 Given this recent (and continuing) 
14 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European 
Sales Law COM (2011) 635 final (the CESL). This proposal was withdrawn on 16 December 2014 in 
the EU Commission’s Work Programme for 2015 to the European Parliament (see item 60 of Annex 
II of the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions Commission Work Programme 2015: A 
New Start COM (2014) 910 final). The reason for the withdrawal was that a ‘[m]odified proposal 
[was to be made] in order to fully unleash the potential of e-commerce in the Digital Single Market’. 
The Commission committed to publishing an amended proposal, which would include ‘a focused set 
of key mandatory EU contractual rights for domestic and cross-border online sales of tangible goods’ 
before the end of 2015 (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions A Digital Single Market 
Strategy for Europe COM (2015) 192 final 5). No new proposal has been tabled to date. However, the 
formulation suggested in the CESL remains instructive. Also see Out-Law ‘Common European Sales 
Law proposals to be replaced as new consultation is opened on online sales barriers’ available at 
http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/june/common-european-sales-law-proposals-to-be-
replaced-as-new-consultation-is-opened-on-online-sales-barriers/, accessed on 21 March 2016.   
15 The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) was prepared and presented to the European 
Commission by the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on Existing EC 
Private Law. One of the purposes is to serve as a draft for drawing up a ‘political’ Common Frame of 
Reference (CFR). The history of the CFR dates back to July 2001. See European Union Committee 
European Contract Law: The Draft Common Frame of Reference: Report with Evidence (12th Report 
of Session 2008-09 of the House of Lords) (2009) para 6. Its other purposes are to ‘promote 
knowledge of private law in the jurisdictions of the European Union’ and to ‘show how much national 
private laws resemble one another and have provided mutual stimulus for development’. In contrast, 
the DCFR is described as an academic text that originated ‘in an initiative of European legal scholars’ 
(Christian von Bar, Eric Clive & Hans Schulte-Nölke (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules 
of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (Outline Edition) (2009) 6). It 
contains principles, definitions and model rules of European private law. Books II and III of the 
DCFR contain rules derived from the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL). However, 
changes were made, in part, because the principles had to be broadened to address consumer 
protection issues (ibid at 30).  
16 See generally Geraint Howells & Reiner Schulze ‘Overview of the proposed Consumer Rights 
Directive’ and Hans Schulte-Nölke ‘Scope and role of the Horizontal Directive and its relationship to 
the CFR’ in Geraint Howells & Reiner Schulze (eds) Modernising and Harmonising Consumer 
Contract Law (2009).  
17 Acquis Group (eds) Principles of the Existing EC Contract Law (2007); Green Paper on the Review 
of the Consumer Acquis, COM (2006) 744, final, 30, Official Journal 2007 C 61/1; European 
Parliament resolution of 6 September 2007 on the Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer 
Acquis 2007/2010 (INI), A-0281/2007.  
18 Von Bar, Clive & Schulte-Nölke DCFR (Outline Edition) op cit note 15. 
19 Prepared by Hondius, Heutger, Jeloschek, Sivesand & Wiewiorowska. 
7 
process of modernisation and harmonisation, a comparative analysis of the European 
law in relation to the scope of the application of consumer protection may provide a 
‘history of examples’ alluded to by Van der Walt.20 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(the CISG) will also be discussed.21 While it does not apply to consumer sales,22 it 
remains a relevant and necessary point of comparison, as many of the provisions of 
the Consumer Sales Directive are based on it, and the formulation of the exclusion of 
consumer sales is revealing.23 
The Consumer Sales Directive is a minimum harmonisation directive, which 
means that while member states must see to it that the necessary laws are enacted to 
ensure that the national rules comply with the Directive,24 nothing prevents member 
states from maintaining or enacting laws that are more stringent — in other words, 
laws that provide more consumer protection.25 The consumer rights that result from 
the Directive apply concurrently with any rights created in terms of national 
legislation.26 The United Kingdom, for example, had no legislation governing 
consumer sales contracts specifically, but rather relied on a legislative framework 
20 The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the Consumer Sales Directive and the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive (along with other Directives) are currently undergoing a ‘fitness check’. European 
Commission ‘Review of EU Consumer Law (Fitness Check)’ available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_rights/ review/index_en.htm, accessed on 25 May 2016. 
21 As its name suggests, the CISG applies to ‘contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places 
of business are in different states’ (art 1(1)). The CISG aims to ‘contribute to the removal of legal 
barriers in international trade and promote the development of international trade’ (see the preamble). 
It does this by providing uniform rules to govern the international sale of goods. To date, 80 countries 
have ratified the convention (UNCITRAL ‘Status – United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980)’ available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html, accessed on 
2 December 2013).  
22 Article 2(a). 
23 David Oughton & Chris Willett ‘Quality Regulation in European Private Law’ (2002) 25 Journal of 
Consumer Policy 299 at 306; T Krummel & R D’Sa ‘Sale of consumer goods and associated 
guarantees: A minimalist approach to harmonised European Union consumer protection’ (2001) 26 
European Law Review 312 at 316; Dirk Staudenmayer ‘The Directive on the Sale of Consumer Goods 
and Associated Guarantees — a milestone in the European consumer and private law’ (2000) 4 
European Review of Private Law 547 at 551; Sonja A Kruisinga ‘What do consumer and commercial 
sales law have in common? A comparison of the EC Directive on Consumer Sales Law and the UN 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (2001) 2&3 European Review of 
Private Law 177 at 179. 
24 Article 11(1). This is referred to as the transposition of the Directive.  
25 Article 8(2).  
26 Article 7(1).  
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covering all sales.27 In the United Kingdom, the process of transposition of the 
Consumer Sales Directive took place through the Sale and Supply of Goods to 
Consumers Regulations 2002,28 which amended the UK Sale of Goods Act.29 
However, the regime was seen as too complicated,30 and this led to the Law 
Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission publishing 
their Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods: A Joint Consultation Paper in 
November 2008.31 The UK SoGA provided the consumer with the remedies of 
rejection of goods and termination of the contract, and it was felt that the 
introduction of new remedies by way of the Sales Directive was unsuccessful.32  
These criticisms and reviews resulted in the enactment of the Consumer Rights 
Act,33 which came into effect on 1 October 2015. Amongst other things, it governs 
the sale of goods and unfair contract terms.  
The last jurisdiction that will be considered is Australia. The Competition and 
Consumer Act34 is similar to the UK SoGA, but the departures from its UK roots 
provide insight into alternative approaches to the protection of consumers. Australian 
Consumer Law has undergone a review and ‘a major overhaul’ since 2009, which 
ultimately led to reforms to the Competition and Consumer Act. The review and 
reform has led to the publication of various studies on the consumer policy 
framework, which provide valuable insights into the scope of consumer legislation.35 
27 There are other member states that deviate from these instruments. Valuable insight can be gleaned 
from these jurisdictions, and they have therefore been taken into account where this is the case. 
28 SI 2002/3045. The regulations came into force on 31 March 2003. 
29 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c. 54) (the UK SoGA). The application provisions of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 (c. 50) (the Unfair Contract Terms Act) will also be discussed.  
30 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods: A Summary 
of Responses (2009) available at http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/2812/7877/5993/ 
dp139_responses_summary.pdf, accessed on 15 April 2016 at 1. 
31 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission (Law Com Consultation Paper No 188 and Scot 
Law Com Discussion Paper No 139) Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods: A Joint Consultation 
Paper (2008). 
32 See generally Christian Twigg-Flesner ‘Fit for Purpose? The Proposals on Sales’ in Geraint 
Howells & Reiner Schulze (eds) Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (2009) 147. 
33 Consumer Rights Act 2015 (c. 15).  
34 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Schedule 2 of this Act is also referred to as the Australian 
Consumer Law). 
35 Productivity Committee Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework (2008) available at 
http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/consumer-policy/report, accessed on 20 July 2015; 
Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council Consumer Rights: Reforming Statutory Implied 
Conditions and Warranties (October 2009) available at http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/ 
1682/PDF/Report_CCAAC_091029.pdf, accessed on 13 March 2016; National Education and 
Information Advisory Taskforce National Baseline Study on Warranties and Refunds (Research 
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The Australian Consumer Law is currently under review and a final report is due in 
March 2017.36 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
Discussing the application of consumer protection legislation in the abstract is 
impractical. In this thesis, the scope of application of such legislation is discussed 
(primarily) against the backdrop of problems relating to the quality of goods, as the 
approach to the consumer contract of sale can be used as a model for the general 
rules governing consumer law. There may be instances where the type of problem 
with which the consumer is faced will dictate a different approach to the application 
of the legislation. Apart from unfair contract terms, however, those are the exception 
rather than the rule. 
This thesis is limited to a discussion of the typical provisions that determine the 
scope of legislation: the ‘definitions’ and ‘application’ sections. It is of course 
possible to determine the scope of legislation in other ways, such as including 
limitations in certain sections. There are two examples of this in the CPA. The 
section on fixed-term contracts (s 14) ‘does not apply to transactions between juristic 
persons regardless of their annual turnover or asset value’. Another example is 
reg 44, which contains the so-called ‘grey-listed’ terms presumed to be unfair.37 The 
application of the regulation is limited to agreements between ‘a supplier operating 
on a for-profit basis and acting wholly or mainly for purposes related to his or her 
business or profession’ and ‘an individual consumer or individual consumers who 
entered into it for purposes wholly or mainly unrelated to his or her business or 
profession’. This provides some fodder for arguments that the provisions regulating 
the content of consumer contracts should be contained in separate legislation. While 
there is some discussion of the scope of application of regulations relating to 
consumer contracts, the question of whether it ought to be regulated separately, and 
whether the application of such a separate instrument should be different from other 
consumer protection laws, is not discussed in detail.  
Paper No 2) (October 2009) available at http://apo.org.au/resource/national-baseline-study-
warranties-and-refunds, accessed on 13 March 2016. 
36 Consumer Affairs Australia and New Zealand Australian Consumer Law Review: Issues Paper 
(2016) available at http://consumerlaw.gov.au/files/2016/03/ACLreview_issues_paper.pdf, last 
accessed on 6 August 2016. 
37 Regulation 44 in GN 293 GG 34180 of 1 April 2011.  
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This thesis does not address the application of the CPA to services or the 
combination of goods and services. This was done to limit the scope of the thesis. 
The policy considerations that underpin the application of consumer protection 
measures to specific types of services may be less ‘universal’ than those 
underpinning the sale of goods. In other words, the type of service is more likely to 
influence the scope (and often the substance) of the protection measures. This is 
evidenced by the fact that consumer protection measures for services tend to be 
industry-specific.38  
In order to make consistent and rational recommendations, it is not enough to 
look at foreign jurisdictions. It is equally important to understand the theoretical 
underpinnings of consumer protections. The answer to ‘how’ consumers should be 
protected relates to ‘why’ the legislative intervention is necessary in the first place. 
This will be discussed in chapter 2. 
The questions regarding the current formulation of the CPA referred to in 
paragraph 1.1 will be outlined in chapter 3. The approach taken by the South African 
legislature will be analysed in comparison with the approaches taken by the 
European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia and some international instruments. 
The aim of the comparative study is to make recommendations on how the relevant 
provisions of the CPA can be improved and suggest alternative formulations, which 
is done in chapter 4.   
38 In South Africa, banking, consumer credit, insurance, medical schemes, electronic communications 
and advertising are just some of the industries that are either regulated by legislation or self-regulated. 
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2. Chapter 2: A theoretical perspective on consumer protection
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter will provide a theoretical perspective on the scope of consumer 
protection. It is necessary to consider the identity of the ‘consumer’ in consumer 
protection, and to determine what motivates consumers’ decisions, as this should be 
the backdrop against which lawmakers make decisions about the scope of consumer 
protection. Put differently, the study of the theories that inform legislative control 
over the relationship between consumers and suppliers reveals why legislative 
control is necessary in the first place, and what the scope of that intervention ought 
to be.  
This chapter starts with a discussion of the characteristics and vulnerabilities of 
the ‘consumer’. This is followed by a discussion of the two major (and often 
competing) theories that inform consumer protection policy: the neoclassical 
(rational choice) theory and the theory grounded in behavioural science. This forms 
the background to the specific rationales for legislative intervention, which will be 
identified and discussed in the third part of this chapter. Lastly, five criteria for 
measuring the success of a particular form of legislative intervention over another 
will be discussed.  
2.2. Who is the ‘consumer’ in consumer protection? ‘Defining’ 
vulnerability 
The legislative approach to consumer protection depends on the characteristics of the 
theoretical ‘consumer’ whom the legislature wants to protect.39 Is this hypothetical 
consumer aware of the risks associated with buying goods in the modern market? 
For instance, is this consumer aware that if he or she purchases products at a very 
39 Chapter 3 includes a comparative discussion of the definition of ‘consumer’ in the CPA, which 
draws from this discussion. In addition to giving insight into what the scope for consumer protection 
laws ought to be, this picture of who the ‘consumer’ is serves as the guiding principle when deciding 
on appropriate remedies. For instance, the consequence of the ‘definition of vulnerability’ discussed 
in this section is that remedies aimed at improved information alone will not address the plight of the 
vulnerable consumer (Norbert Reich, Hans-W. Micklitz & Peter Rott (et al) European Consumer Law 
2 ed (2014) 47). Legislative intervention should rather be focussed on improving the consumer’s 
access to redress to help the consumer lead ‘a self-determined’ life. This thesis is aimed at providing 
this backdrop, but an exhaustive discussion of the remedies chosen by the South African legislature is 
beyond its scope. 
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low price, chances are that the products are of a lower quality? Or must the 
lawmaker accept that, for various reasons, some of which will be discussed below, 
consumers are not alert, and that the theoretical consumer is rather gullible?40 
Essentially, the lawmaker must ‘conceptualise vulnerability’.41 
These conceptual consumers are used to explain why particular legislative 
intervention may be necessary. This can be done through what is referred to as 
‘consumer images’ or ‘consumer benchmarks’.42 These are ‘abstract constructions of 
the qualities of consumers, based on certain perceptions of reality’ that ‘normatively 
function as starting points (Leitbilder) for the regulation of the consumer area’.43 In 
Europe, an ‘active and critical information-seeker’ is an image that has influenced 
consumer policy and has led to an emphasis on transparency (information). This 
consumer is ‘reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’.44 
The European approach ‘is based on an assumption of rational-acting consumers and 
suppliers and is deeply rooted in the information paradigm’. This paradigm is built 
on the notion that ‘there are consumers who are able, willing and competent to deal 
with information provided, to read different languages, to take informed rational 
decisions and to enforce their information-based rights’.45 The average consumer 
benchmark still influences EU law, but two alternative benchmarks – the vulnerable 
consumer benchmark and the target group benchmark – have also emerged.46 This 
will be discussed later in this section in the context of the Unfair Business Practices 
Directive.  
The approach taken by the European Court of Justice has been described as trade-
oriented and liberal, and has been criticised as setting too high an expectation for 
40 Geraint Howells & Stephen Weatherill Consumer Protection Law 2 ed (2005) 6. 
41 James Devenney & Mel Kenny European Consumer Protection: Theory and Practice (2012). This 
phrase is borrowed from the heading of part II of Devenney and Kenny’s publication. 
42 Bram B Duivenvoorde The Consumer Benchmarks in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
(2015).  
43 Geraint Howells, Iain Ramsay & Thomas Wilhelmsson (et al) (eds) Handbook of Research on 
International Consumer Law (2010) 12. 
44 Ibid. Also see Reich, Micklitz & Rott op cit note 39 at 45; Ewoud Hondius ‘The notion of 
consumer: European Union versus member states’ (2006) 28(1) Sydney Law Review 89 at 94; 
Duivenvoorde op cit note 42 at 19.  
45 Hans-W Micklitz, Lucia A Reisch & Kornelia Hagen ‘An introduction to the special issue on 
“Behavioural Economics, Consumer Policy, and Consumer Law”’ (2011) 34 Journal of Consumer 
Policy 271 at 271.  
46 Duivenvoorde op cit note 42 at 27. 
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consumers, as it is an ‘idealised image’.47 However, this image is not applied in all 
European countries. For instance, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) consumer is 
an evolved consumer compared to the ‘passive glancer’ of the Nordic countries, who 
does not take all available information into account.48 In Spain, it has been held that 
the average consumer of common consumer products (in this case, olive oil) does not 
pay significant attention to external appearance.49 In Belgium and Germany, the 
courts in the past also ‘referred to an uncritical or casually observant consumer’.50 A 
stricter benchmark of the ‘average consumer’ was adopted in Germany, but is 
tempered by taking the context into account. So, for instance, consumers are 
expected to be more critical in cases involving products of a higher value.51  
This is an aspect of the challenge with which European consumer policy is faced 
‘to reconcile the emphasis found in much of EU protection on the alert and 
circumspect consumer, well able to look after him- or herself in the market and 
“empowered” by the pro-competitive integration of markets in the EU, with the 
plain reality that a great many consumers behave in ways that are remote from 
this supremely rational and confident paradigm’.52 
The passage refers to two (often competing) theories that inform consumer 
protection policy, which will be discussed below: the rational choice theory53 and 
behavioural economics.54 The latter theory acknowledges ‘the inattentive consumer, 
the vulnerable consumer, the consumer who is bewildered by the complexity of 
modern markets and the consumer whose head spins when confronted by a mass of 
information that is meant to help him or her through the choices available’.55 
47 H Unberath & A Johnston ‘The double-headed approach of the ECJ concerning consumer 
protection’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1237 at 1282; Duivenvoorde op cit note 42 at 22, 
and chapter 2 generally; G Howells ‘The scope of EU consumer law’ (2005) 1(3) European Review of 
Contract Law 360 at 366.  
48 Howells, Ramsay & Wilhelmsson (eds) op cit note 43 at 12. This ‘consumer image’ is by no means 
limited to Nordic countries.  
49 Hans-W Micklitz, Jules Stuyck & Evelyne Terryn (eds) Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer 
Law (2010) 39. 
50 Duivenvoorde op cit note 42 at 19.  
51 Ibid at 101.  
52 Stephen Weatherill EU Consumer Law and Policy (2014) 310. 
53 See para 2.3.1. 
54 See para 2.3.2. 
55 Weatherill op cit note 52 at 310.  
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In a country such as South Africa, where approximately 45.5% of the population 
live below the poverty line56 and only approximately 30% of the population 
complete grade 1257 and 15.4% of the population are functionally illiterate,58 the 
‘identity’ of the consumer is surely different to that of the average resident of a ‘First 
World’ or ‘Developed’ country.59 The implication is that higher levels of protection 
are required where a particular population is more vulnerable than another. After all, 
it seems obvious that  
‘[m]ore complex markets and the growing amount of information needed to 
make responsible choices bear particularly hard on those who have low levels 
of education and skills and the socially excluded. These are also the consumers 
who can least afford to make bad choices’.60  
It is then also not surprising that protecting the poor and the vulnerable ‘has been 
a continuing undercurrent in consumer protection’.61 Viewed in this way,  
‘[c]onsumer policy might therefore be part of a general policy of “positive 
welfare” designed to establish minimum standards in the marketplace, provide 
access to consumption opportunities and enforce rights’.62  
In South Africa, the legislature created the concept of the ‘vulnerable 
consumer’.63 In terms of s 3(1)(b) of the CPA, these vulnerable consumers are 
consumers: 
56 Statistics South Africa Poverty Trends in South Africa: An examination of absolute poverty between 
2006 and 2011 (2014) 12, available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-
06/Report-03-10-06March2014.pdf, last accessed on 6 August 2016. 
57 Statistics South Africa Statistical Release: Census 2011 (2011) 33, available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03014/P030142011.pdf, last accessed on 1 March 2016; also 
see Statistics South Africa General Household Survey, 2015 (2015) 20, available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0318&SCH=6475, last accessed on 27 July 2016. 
58 ‘Functional illiteracy’ is defined as a person who either has no schooling, or left school before 
completing grade 7. See Statistics South Africa General Household Survey op cit note 57 at 20, 
available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0318&SCH=6475, last accessed on 
27 July 2016. 
59 L Hawthorne ‘The “new learning” and transformation of contract law: reconciling the rule of law 
with the constitutional imperative to social transformation’ (2008) SA Public Law 77 at 84.  
60 UK Government Modern Markets, Confident Consumers — Government’s Consumer White Paper 
(1999) para 1.5 available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dti.gov.uk/ 
consumer/whitepaper/wpmenu.htm, accessed on 13 February 2014. 
61 Iain Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy: Texts and Materials on Regulating Consumer Markets 
3 ed (2012) 70. 
62 Ibid. 
63 The ideology of protecting vulnerable consumers was discussed in Standard Bank of South Africa 
Ltd v Dlamini 2013 (1) SA 219 (KZD). According to the judgment, the CPA is ‘aimed specifically at 
consumers to reverse historical socio-economic inequalities and adjust the imbalances’. See para 32.  
Also see Minette Nortje ‘Informational duties of credit providers and mistake’ 2014 TSAR 212 at 214; 
Robert Sharrock & Lienne Steyn ‘The problem of the illiterate signatory: Standard Bank of South 
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‘(i) who are low-income persons or persons comprising low-income 
communities;  
(ii) who live in remote, isolated or low-density population areas or
communities;
(iii) who are minors, seniors or other similarly vulnerable consumers; or
(iv) whose ability to read and comprehend any advertisement, agreement,
mark, instruction, label, warning, notice or other visual representation
is limited by reason of low literacy, vision impairment or limited
fluency in the language in which the representation is produced,
published or presented’.
‘Vulnerable consumers’ in terms of the CPA are not given additional rights, but 
the entire Act is aimed at ‘reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages experienced 
in accessing any supply of goods or services’, because s 4(3) provides that 
‘[i]f any provision of this Act, read in its context, can reasonably be construed 
to have more than one meaning, the Tribunal or court must prefer the meaning 
that best promotes the spirit and purpose of this Act, and will best improve the 
realisation and enjoyment of consumer rights generally, and in particular by 
persons contemplated in section 3(1)(b)’.  
The courts and the Tribunal have to develop the common law to ‘improve the 
realisation and enjoyment of consumer rights’ by these vulnerable consumers. In 
addition, vulnerability is expressly taken into account in the context of the 
consumer’s right to fair and honest dealing, as s 40(2) provides that  
‘it is unconscionable for a supplier knowingly to take advantage of the fact that 
a consumer was substantially unable to protect the consumer’s own interests 
because of physical or mental disability, illiteracy, ignorance, inability to 
understand the language of an agreement, or any other similar factor’.  
Literacy and economic exclusion are also taken into account when establishing 
whether information has been provided in plain language.64 Lastly, s 52(2)(b) 
provides that ‘the nature of the parties … their relationship to each other and their 
relative capacity, education, experience, sophistication and bargaining position’ must 
be taken into account by a court when considering whether a supplier acted 
unconscionably, misled the consumer through its marketing, or made use of an 
unfair, unjust or unreasonable contract term. In all of these instances, vulnerability is 
Africa v Dlamini’ (2014) 26(1) SA Merc LJ 150; Jacolien Barnard ‘Consumer rights of the elderly as 
vulnerable consumers in South Africa: Some comparative aspects of the Consumer Protection Act 68 
of 2008’ (2015) 39(2) International Journal of Consumer Studies 223 at 226. 
64 Section 22(2) read with s 50(2)(b)(ii). 
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a factor considered in establishing liability, but is not a requirement for liability. 
Assessing whether there are any other instances in which vulnerability of the 
consumer should play a role, or whether the penalties imposed on suppliers who 
exploit vulnerability should be more severe, is beyond the scope of this thesis. The 
question here is whether vulnerability should play a role at all, and if so, how it 
should be defined. 
This can be compared with the approach taken to the incorporation of 
vulnerability in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. Article 5(3) of the 
Directive provides: 
‘Commercial practices which are likely to materially distort the economic 
behaviour only of a clearly identifiable group of consumers who are particularly 
vulnerable to the practice or the underlying product because of their mental or 
physical infirmity, age or credulity in a way which the trader could reasonably 
be expected to foresee, shall be assessed from the perspective of the average 
member of that group. This is without prejudice to the common and legitimate 
advertising practice of making exaggerated statements or statements which are 
not meant to be taken literally.’ 
The following aspects of this article are noteworthy: First, before vulnerability is 
taken into account, the practice must be directed at a clearly identifiable group, at 
which point the average consumer in that group will be used as the benchmark. This 
is also referred to as the ‘target group benchmark’.65 Secondly, the vulnerability of 
individual consumers is not taken into account – the test is objective. Thirdly, the 
effect of the practice on the vulnerable group must have been reasonably foreseen 
before the supplier will be liable. Lastly, ‘credulity’ is also used as a factor indicating 
vulnerability. ‘Credulity’ is described as ‘a tendency to be too ready to believe that 
something is real or true’.66 The inclusion of this factor is significant because it is not 
really an indicator, but rather a symptom of vulnerability. The list of ‘vulnerabilities’ 
is not a closed list, but is significantly more limited than the one contained in 
s 3(1)(b) of the CPA.67 
65 Duivenvoorde op cit note 42 at 24. 
66 Oxford Dictionaries Online ‘Credulity’ available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
english/credulity, accessed on 3 May 2016. 
67 See recital 19, which indicates that the vulnerabilities listed are examples instead of a closed list. 
The EC Guidance on the implementation/application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
also indicates that ‘the reasons mentioned by Article 5 as the basis to establish the vulnerability of a 
specific category of consumers are listed indicatively and cover a wide range of situations’. See 
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The CPA’s definition of ‘vulnerability’ extends beyond poverty to instances of 
‘social exclusion’, namely where a set of often interrelated personal circumstances 
make it difficult or impossible for consumers to access goods or services68 or to 
access justice.69 These are consumers ‘who run the risk of being isolated from social 
and economic life, be it by over-indebtedness, illness or lack of possibilities to 
communicate [and] … who cannot, or can no longer, cope with the requirements of 
the modern consumer society’.70 Consumer policy not only concerns itself with 
access to so-called essentials, but rather those goods or services that are required to 
take part in the ‘life of the community’. An inability to access these goods and 
services can lead to further ‘social exclusion’. This may include televisions, 
computers, the internet and cellphones. One survey in the United Kingdom defined 
poverty as a ‘lack of access to a list of goods and services that 50 per cent or more of 
a representative sample of the population believe no one should be without’.71 
Having access to these goods is not necessarily where it ends, though. Consumers 
who purchase these goods from the ‘alternative retail sector’ (in South African 
terms, the ‘informal retail sector’) can also be viewed as excluded because the mode 
of access differs from the mainstream (and, therefore, regulated) consumption 
practices.72 Another component of social exclusion is the ‘digital divide’. This refers 
to ‘the extent to which information and communication technology (ICT) increases 
or reduces social divisions and contributes to social exclusion’.73 Increasingly, ICT is 
used to provide access to product information, transaction information (such as 
returns policies) and access to consumer redress (retailers and regulators increasingly 
handle complaints via email or call centres). Not having access to these channels of 
communication therefore contributes significantly to social exclusion. Golding sums 
up the disenfranchising effect of poverty as follows: 
Commission Staff Working Document Guidance on the implementation/application of Directive 
2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices COM (2016) 320 final at 45. 
68 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 73; Iain Ramsay ‘Consumer redress and access 
to justice’ in Charles E F Rickett & Thomas G W Telfer (eds) International Perspectives on 
Consumers’ Access to Justice (2003) 23. 
69 A J Barnard ‘A different way of saying: On stories, text, a critical legal argument for contractual 
justice and the ethical element of contract in South Africa’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 278 at 283.  
70 Reich, Micklitz & Rott (et al) op cit note 39 at 46. 
71 David Gordon, Ruth Levitas & Christina Pantazis (et al) Poverty and Social Exclusion in Britain 
(2000) 10. 
72 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 74. 
73 Ibid. 
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‘[P]overty is not just about money but about powerlessness. … [A]ctive 
citizenship requires the capacity to confront the institutions, public and private, 
which frame people’s lives. Tackling the town hall, getting to see and challenge 
your child’s teacher, battling with the shop which sold you faulty goods, 
seeking advice in an unexpected run-in with the law, all demand that easy 
access to time, telephones, transport, and the soft terrorism of middle-class 
articulacy which are denied so many.’74 
A further consequence of ‘social exclusion’ is that lower-income households are 
under-represented in figures relating to complaints because the poor tend to 
complain less frequently. This may also be the result of a lack of confidence.75 In 
short, ‘individualised redress procedures’ (where the consumer must claim in order 
to access consumer protection) may in fact operate against vulnerable consumers.76  
Sometimes, a consumer will be made ‘more vulnerable by virtue of their lesser 
decision-making skills to participate in the consumer market’.77 This is also referred 
to as ‘commensurability’, which 
‘requires that actors are able to identify the perceived consequences of all the 
options available in a given situation in advance, to measure the expected 
utilities, and to transform the result into numbers, in order to make a 
comparison and to pick the option that promises the most utility’.78 
The description of vulnerability in terms of s 3(1)(b) of the CPA and ‘social 
exclusion’ are essentially both factors or circumstances that would contribute to 
impaired decision-making skills. 
Section 3(1)(b) is comparable to five ‘dimensions’ of vulnerability identified in a 
study commissioned by the European Commission aimed at conceptualising and 
assessing consumer vulnerability in the EU.79 The study referred to the five 
‘dimensions’ as being: 
a) A ‘[h]eightened risk of negative outcomes or impacts on well-being’;
74 P Golding Excluding the Poor (1986) x.  
75 Ramsay ‘Consumer Redress’ op cit note 68 at 28. 
76 Ibid at 38. 
77 Deeksha Bhana & C J Visser ‘The capacity of a minor to enter into a consumer contract: A 
reconciliation of section 39 of the Consumer Protection Act and the common law’ (2014) 77(1) 
THRHR 177 at 188.  
78 Gerhard Wagner ‘Mandatory contract law: Functions and principles in light of the proposal for a 
directive on consumer rights’ (2010) 3(1) Erasmus LR 47 at 56.  
79 Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency Consumer Vulnerability across Key 
Markets in the European Union: Final Report (2016) 41 available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ 
consumer_evidence/market_studies/docs/vulnerable_consumers_approved_27_01_2016_en.pdf, 
accessed on 6 June 2016. 
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b) ‘[h]aving characteristics that limit ability to maximise well-being’;
c) ‘[h]aving difficulty in obtaining or assimilating information’;
d) ‘[i]nability or failure to buy, choose or access suitable products’; and
e) ‘[h]igher susceptibility to marketing practices, creating imbalance in market
interactions’.80
It would therefore seem that the definition of ‘vulnerability’ in the CPA is 
appropriate. However, in the context of determining the scope of consumer 
legislation, the question is also whether the recognition of ‘vulnerability’ in the CPA 
is appropriate at all. According to Ramsay, the findings of behavioural economics 
suggest that the distinction between vulnerable and more rational consumers should 
be reconsidered, given that the biases exhibited by consumers are universal.81 For 
instance, the biases revealed by behavioural economics apply throughout the 
population;82 they are not confined to ‘orphans and widows’.83 It is not surprising 
that the study commissioned by the European Commission revealed that the majority 
of consumers showed signs of vulnerability in at least one of the five dimensions.84 
This is relevant in the context of one of the most controversial questions, namely 
whether juristic persons can be included in the definition of ‘consumer’ despite the 
perception that they do not exhibit the same vulnerabilities as described above. This 
perception may not be entirely correct, as juristic persons are always represented by 
individuals who bring their own vulnerabilities to work.85  
80 Ibid at 47. 
81 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 63. Also see Ramsay ‘Consumer Redress’ op 
cit note 68 at 24. In the EU, the argument against specific protection for ‘vulnerable’ consumers is 
that it is ‘disproportionate in relation to the free movement of goods’ (Duivenvoorde op cit note 42 at 
22). Also see the minority judgment of Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para 
149, where he pointed out that standard-term contracts ‘hit the computer-literate owner of a relatively 
new BMW who buys online with the same impact as they do the owner of the jalopy close to the 
scrapyard who signs with a thumbprint’. 
82 The biases identified by this theory are discussed in para 2.3.2.  
83 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 302; Bastian Schüller ‘The definition of 
consumers in EU consumer law’ in James Devenney & Mel Kenny European Consumer Protection: 
Theory and Practice (2012) 130. Also see Norbert Reich ‘Diverse approaches to consumer protection 
policy’ (1992) 14 Journal of Consumer Policy 257 at 258.  
84 Guidance on the implementation/application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive op cit 
note 67 at 45.  
85 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 130. This will be discussed in para 3.3, but the traditional 
counterargument is that when they are at work, they have access to resources such as attorneys and 
other risk management resources, including procurement processes.  
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In addition, the vulnerability of consumers is also considered in terms of their 
relative weakness compared to suppliers in relation to bargaining power and their 
level of knowledge about the transaction or product.86 This is referred to as 
inequality of economic or bargaining power.87 In this sense, all consumers, 
potentially even juristic persons, are vulnerable to exploitation.  
Another argument mitigating against the overstatement of ‘vulnerability’ as a 
‘requirement’ is that behavioural scientists do not necessarily define consumers 
according to who they are (in other words, whether they are vulnerable or not), but 
rather in terms of what they do (in other words, buying consumer goods as opposed 
to goods bought for commercial purposes). Using the aim of the transaction 
(purchasing consumer goods) as the distinguishing factor is not unheard of. It is 
referred to as the functional-occupational test, which is also discussed below.88 
The approach in the CPA does not rule out that all consumers may be vulnerable 
(even juristic persons) — it simply allows for the possibility that in some cases, 
certain types of consumers may be in need of further protection. Put differently, the 
importance of ‘vulnerability’ is not overstated. However, this does give rise to the 
broader question of why consumers should be protected at all.  
2.3. Why is legislative control necessary? A tale of two theories 
In this section, two theories that provide a backdrop to the theoretical rationales for 
legislative intervention will be discussed. The first is the rational choice theory (the 
neoclassical theory) and the second, behavioural economics. Why these two 
theories? Ramsay calls them ‘two influential contemporary paradigms for 
regulation’.89 
Just looking at the consumer interest columns of daily newspapers, Carte 
Blanche90 or Hellopeter.com makes it seem trite to say that consumers are in need of 
protection. However, a coherent consumer protection policy can only be formulated 
if the policymaker knows exactly why this is so. As Howells and Weatherill put it 
86 VB Penzügji Lizing v Schneider European Court of Justice (9 November 2010) (C-137/08) para 46. 
87 This is discussed in paragraph 2.4.1. 
88 Paragraph 3.2. 
89 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 41. 
90 A South African investigative journalism television programme. 
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‘[i]t is critically important to appreciate that simply because some things go 
wrong for some consumers, nonetheless it is vital to examine precisely how and 
why the law might intervene in the market’.91  
For purposes of this thesis, one needs to add that it is equally vital to examine 
who should be protected. When analysing the rational choice and behavioural 
economics theories, it is important to ask who is affected by the vulnerabilities that 
they reveal. For instance: Are consumers only vulnerable when purchasing goods for 
their personal use, or do the market failures and heuristics discussed below also exist 
when they are entering into commercial transactions? Are only individuals affected, 
or does the vulnerability also exist in respect of juristic persons? 
2.3.1. The rational choice theory (neoclassical theory) 
The neoclassical or rational choice economic theory is a non-interventionist theory 
centred on the notion that the market has a built-in self-correcting mechanism. 
Consumer behaviour is explained by means of this rational choice theory.92 The 
point of departure is the assumption that where consumers are presented with several 
choices, they will always select the one that will best satisfy their preferences; that 
‘people make decisions based upon stable and consistent preferences’ and ‘optimally 
assess and acquire information, including information about the risks and possible 
outcomes of the decisions involved’.93 As Luth puts it: ‘Homo economicus “knows it 
all”: he knows all his preferences and is able to assess both the full set of options and 
corresponding risks and probabilities.’94  
Howells and Weatherill summarise neoclassical theory as follows: 
‘Producers have to sell their goods to consumers in order to survive. They will 
only be able to sell to consumers what consumers want to buy. Consumer 
preferences will dictate what is made available. Producers compete. Consumers 
choose [rationally]. The “invisible hand” of producers behaving in response to 
consumer preference organises the market. The survival instinct among 
producers which is instilled by the mechanism of competition will ensure an 
efficient allocation of resources. Given the stimulus of competition, resources 
will not be wasted. Production will stand in equilibrium with consumption. 
91 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 6. 
92 There are several versions of the theory, the discussion of which falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. See Hanneke Luth Behavioural Economics in Consumer Policy: The Economic Analysis of 
Standard Terms on Consumer Contracts Revisited (2010) 16. 
93 Ibid at 15; Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 47.  
94 Luth op cit note 92 at 41. 
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Viewed from this perspective, the market economy is a self-organised 
system.’95  
Because the market looks after itself, legislative intervention is frowned upon, 
except where there is a ‘market failure’.96 
Many types of market failures do not affect the decision to regulate consumer 
sales in particular and will therefore not be discussed.97 However, the following two 
market failures are relevant for the determination of the scope of legislative 
intervention: 
a) The ability of the market to correct itself may be restricted if transaction costs
become too high. Transaction costs refer to the ‘funds, effort and time spent
on a transaction that do not (directly) benefit the counterparty’.98 When they
become too high, an individual may be prevented from concluding a
transaction, thereby disrupting the market. In other words, the institutional
framework that regulates ‘market exchanges’ must be efficient.99 Typical
examples of transaction costs include ‘search and information costs,
negotiation costs, contracting costs and monitoring and enforcement
costs’.100 The disruptive effect of high transactional costs is particularly acute
in the context of consumer sales where the price of products tends to be low,
whereas the impact of the harm could be large in aggregate.101 Many, if not
most, of the specific rationales for legislative intervention discussed below
are examples of transactional costs that have become too high.
b) Information asymmetry also leads to a market failure. This refers to a
situation ‘where one party possesses information about a certain product
characteristic and the other party does not’102 — in other words, the
distribution of information is asymmetrical. This, in turn, influences those
parties’ respective bargaining power. Typically, consumers will not have as
95 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 1.  
96 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 42. 
97 For example imperfect competition, the low incentive to pay for public goods (encouraging people 
to ‘free ride’), ‘moral hazard’ and negative consequences for third parties (externalities). See Luth op 
cit note 92 from 19; Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 from 43.  
98 Luth op cit note 92 at 21. 
99 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 43. 
100 Luth op cit note 92 at 19; Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 43. 
101 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 43. 
102 Luth op cit note 92 at 22; Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 43. 
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much information about the quality of goods as the supplier, leading to 
information asymmetry and a process called ‘adverse selection’, whereby 
good products are driven out of the market by lower-quality (but cheaper) 
products because the consumer is unable to assess the quality of the goods. 
This leads to a loss in welfare as the market for high-quality goods 
evaporates.  
In the consumer context, the neoclassical economic theory has been described as 
‘as alluring as it is unrealistic’.103 The following are some criticisms of this theory: 
a) First, ‘[o]ne of the main ideas behind consumer protection is that the
individual is entitled to protection notwithstanding that, on the basis of a
cost-benefit analysis, the economy might benefit if the individual consumer
receives defective goods or hazardous products’.104 The limits on rational
behaviour discussed in the next section (dealing with behavioural economics)
are present, whether there are market failures or not. As such, it may be
justified to always protect consumers against their own bad decisions. So,
consumer protection is seen as a ‘third-generation’ human right.
b) The rational choice theory is predicated on the notion that consumers
determine their own wants and needs. This was perhaps true in the past, but
suppliers are now increasingly able to create demand for their product
through complicated and expertly devised and targeted marketing
strategies.105 This creates a ‘false consciousness’ because consumers are not
entirely in control of what they want; their preferences are moulded.106
c) Consumers are less and less capable of making informed choices about what
the ‘best product’ will be as a result of the absence of appropriate
information, the inaccessibility or complexity of information when it is
available, and the bewildering array of products available on the market.107
103 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 1. 
104 Sinai Deutch ‘Are consumer rights human rights?’ (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 537 at 
552. Such paternalism is traditionally criticised by economists. See Ramsay Consumer Law and
Policy op cit note 61 at 81; Luth op cit note 92 at 82. This is discussed in para 2.3.3.
105 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 47.
106 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 2.
107 Ibid. This criticism is one of the key ‘insights’ developed by the behavioural science theory
discussed in detail in para 2.3.2.2 below.
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While this is acknowledged as one of the market failures that qualify the 
theory, it can be argued that it is so prevalent in consumer transactions that it 
actually renders the rational choice theory stripped of all practical relevance.  
d) Even when consumers have all the information they need, they often make
miscalculations. This is because consumer behaviour is much more erratic
than the rational choice theory would have us believe. So, for instance,
consumers are prone to overestimate some risks, while underestimating
others.108 The study of these behaviours is called behavioural economics,
which will be discussed in the next section.
It can be argued that the criticisms above are simply market failures, and that the 
rational choice theory, therefore, makes allowances for these failures by permitting 
regulation — in other words, that the theory has not failed. However, it could also be 
said that in respect of consumer goods, the market is in a permanent state of failure, 
which makes the theory more illusionary than real. These criticisms show that, in the 
context of regulating the quality of consumer goods, consumers have ‘lost their role 
as the balancing factor in the economic system’.109 
2.3.2. Behavioural economics 
2.3.2.1. Introduction 
Behavioural economics challenges many of the predictions made based on the 
rational choice theory and echoes the criticisms of rational choice theory alluded to 
above.110 Therefore, in a sense, behavioural economics ‘automatically’ disproves the 
rational choice theory.111 It posits that consumer decision-making varies because of 
the emotional state of an individual before, during and after the decision to buy a 
product is made. As Ariely puts it, consumers are ‘predictably irrational’.112 
However, the more recent explanations offered for consumer decision-making can be 
seen as an attempt to consolidate the rational choice theory and the behavioural 
108 Ibid. 
109 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 126. 
110 Luth op cit note 92 at 45. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Dan Ariely Predictably Irrational — The Hidden Forces that Shape our Decisions (2009). 
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sciences.113 The emergence of a completely new economic framework has not been 
ruled out. The current existence of both is in keeping with the fact that, in reality, 
both methods of decision-making are used. Sometimes a person’s decision-making 
will be rational, and at other times more intuitive. In other words, the traditional 
economic analysis should not be abandoned completely. The existence of a 
limitation on a consumer’s ability to make a rational decision does not in itself 
necessarily justify intervention.114  
In short, behavioural economics is the study of biases (‘a decision outcome that is 
systematically different from rational choice predictions’)115 and heuristics (‘simple 
rules of thumb which people use in day-to-day decision making’) in an attempt ‘to 
increase the predictive value of theories by making the underlying assumptions more 
realistic’.116 These predictions paint a more realistic picture of the impact of 
particular legal interventions on consumers. In addition, behavioural insights might 
reveal rationales for legislative intervention. 
In the remainder of this section, some of the most prominent behavioural insights 
will be discussed briefly. These insights have particular bearing on consumer 
decision-making and policy. 
2.3.2.2. Information overload117 
It has been said that ‘the economics of consumer protection is the economics of 
information’.118 However, there is not necessarily a direct correlation between 
increased information and increased consumer protection. In other words, even 
‘well-informed’ consumers can behave irrationally.  
113 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 129. 
114 See Luth op cit note 92 at 127.  
115 Ibid at 46. 
116 Ibid at 44; Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 130. 
117 Ramsay believes that information overload is not an aspect of behavioural economics (see Ramsay 
Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 59). Nonetheless, it is useful to include it here. Likewise, 
Luth does not include it by name, but rather as a significant contributor to the occurrence of ‘bounded 
rationality’ (see Luth op cit note 92 at 48). 
118 Luth op cit note 92 at 26. 
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With the advent of the era of mass production came a proliferation of new 
technology, products, suppliers and marketing campaigns.119 This, in turn, led to an 
increase in the amount and complexity of information that a consumer must process 
in order to make an informed, rational decision between products and/or suppliers.120 
When too much information is made available to consumers, they will suffer from 
information overload, and the quality of their decision-making will be affected due 
to ‘the limited capacity of the human mind to evaluate every possible alternative and 
calculate the corresponding results’.121 In other words, their rationality becomes 
bounded or restricted.122 As a result, consumers will base their choice on some of the 
product characteristics instead of considering all of them (this is called ‘satisficing’). 
For instance, consumers are more likely to base their choice on price alone.123 This 
can be exploited by suppliers, who may overemphasise certain characteristics in 
marketing, thereby guiding consumers’ choice of which characteristic to base their 
decision on (known as ‘priming’).124 The problem is that these characteristics may be 
unreliable, leading to the ‘wrong’ choice. In other cases, information overload may 
lead to ‘decision paralysis’ or inertia. Where the choice set is too large, consumers 
will rather walk away without entering into a transaction than to engage in the 
decision.125 Studies about this occurrence abound. One of the most famous studies 
was done by Iyengar and Lepper.126 It showed that 30% of consumers would buy 
jam when presented with six choices, while that number fell to 3% when they were 
presented with 24. In addition, consumers were more satisfied with their decisions in 
cases where the set of choices was smaller. 
119 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 2; Tanya Woker ‘Why the need for consumer 
protection legislation? A look at some of the reasons behind the promulgation of the National Credit 
Act and the Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 31(2) Obiter 217 at 230.  
120 Board of Trade Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection (Molony Committee) 
Cmnd 1781, July 1962 at para 41. 
121 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 59; Luth op cit note 92 at 48.  
122 Luth op cit note 92 at 48; Bastian Schüller ‘The definition of consumers in EU consumer law’ in 
Devenney & Kenny op cit note 41 at 131. 
123 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 60; Lynden Griggs ‘The [ir]rational consumer 
and why we need national legislation governing unfair contract terms’ (2005) 13 Competition & 
Consumer Law Journal 1 at 20. 
124 Luth op cit note 92 at 49.  
125 Luth op cit note 92 at 49; Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 60.  
126 S S Iyengar & M R Lepper ‘When choice is demotivating: Can one desire too much of a good 
thing?’ (2000) 51(6) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 995. Also see Ramsay Consumer 
Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 60. 
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However, consumers also often suffer because they have insufficient information 
about the reliability, durability and running costs of products, and about their legal 
rights.127 The knee-jerk reaction is to force suppliers to provide more information 
through mandatory disclosures. However, increasing information may have the 
unintended result of overloading consumers with information, which undermines the 
objective of the notification duty. In other words, while transparency is alluring, it 
may have a detrimental effect on consumer decision-making. This deserves further 
discussion, as the apparent contradiction illustrates the dichotomy between the 
rational choice theory and behavioural science, while also revealing much about the 
nature of the vulnerability of consumers.  
The following rationale for mandatory disclosure duties is based on the principles 
of the rational choice theory: 
‘By requiring particular types of information to be made available to 
consumers, the law serves to bridge the information gap, permitting the 
consumer to choose between different types of product in an informed manner. 
The technique avoids the objection to the setting of minimum standards that the 
State is thereby taking away from the market the decision of what will and will 
not be available. Information disclosure addresses the market failings of 
informational imbalance, but then leaves the market to set its own quality 
levels. The technique is also usually cheaper to enforce.’128 
In a similar vein, Beales, Craswell and Salop point out that ‘information remedies 
allow consumers to protect themselves according to personal preferences rather than 
place on regulators the difficult task of compromising diverse preferences with a 
common standard’.129 The standard they are rejecting is a quality standard. They 
assume that consumers can accurately reflect their personal preferences in the 
choices they make, which assumes rationality.  
Behavioural scientists point out that there are pitfalls associated with mandatory 
disclosure. The lives of consumers have become so saturated with information that 
‘consumer protection instruments that actually generate information that is costly for 
127 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 505. 
128 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 62. Luth (op cit note 92 at 36) refers to ‘process-based 
interventions’ and points out that they ‘interfere to a lesser extent with party autonomy, as consumers 
are still allowed a choice from all provided options’. Also see H Beales, R Craswell & S Salop ‘The 
efficient regulation of consumer information’ (1981) 24 Journal of Law and Economics 419 at 419.  
129 Beales, Craswell & Salop op cit note 126 at 513.  
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consumers to interpret or access may be counterproductive’.130 Howells and 
Weatherill also point out that ‘[a] wealth of valuable research in recent years has 
exposed limitations in the cognitive capacity of consumers to process information 
and to act on it in a manner that is rational’.131 The risk is that the decision-making 
process becomes too complex and the information too costly to assess — this cost is 
referred to as the ‘opportunity cost of attention’.132 At some point, the cost of 
assimilating all the information becomes more than the value of the information 
itself. Put differently, the transactional costs (particularly time) outweigh the benefit 
of having more information and thereby obtaining a marginally better product.133 In 
simple terms, if the effort required to understand and weigh the information is too 
high, the consumer will not take the information into account. In such cases, 
regulating the product standard may be more appropriate.134   
However, the field of behavioural economics suggests that even if consumers had 
‘perfect information’, their decisions are not always rational, but are instead skewed 
by their biases and heuristics. These will be discussed in the remainder of this 
section.  
2.3.2.3. Risk perception biases 
Contrary to what the rational choice theory would have us believe, consumers do not 
interpret or weigh risk rationally. As Ramsay puts it, ‘individuals are poor 
statisticians’.135 This phenomenon is explained by several risk perception biases. All 
130 Michael J Trebilcock ‘Rethinking consumer protection policy’ in Charles E F Rickett & Thomas G 
W Telfer (eds) International Perspectives on Consumers’ Access to Justice (2003) 75; Howells & 
Weatherill op cit note 40 at 64; Luth op cit note 92 at 36; Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit 
note 61 at 101.  
131 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 64; Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 
101. 
132 Luth op cit note 92 at 36. It is also referred to as ‘information processing cost’. Also see Stoop op 
cit note 1 at 1096. He points out that there are many reasons other than a lack of information that may 
prevent consumers from overcoming a lack of transparency. These include consumers’ reluctance to 
read contracts (due to the perception that they have no power to change the terms), their expectation at 
the time of concluding the contract that the relationship with the supplier will be successful, a lack of 
understanding of the terms and their implications, even if they are transparent, and information 
overload. 
133 ‘Transaction cost’ was discussed in para 2.3.1 in the context of the rational choice theory. 
However, in a broad sense, all of the rationales for legislative intervention, whether based on rational 
choice theory or behavioural economics, are aimed at addressing a ‘transaction cost’.  
134 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 53. 
135 Ibid at 59. 
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of these biases cause consumers to over or underestimate risks that play a part in 
their decision-making: 
a) Consumers are often over-optimistic about future risks, which leads them to
underestimate the risk factor.136
b) Similarly, consumers tend to assess risk in their own favour, saying ‘it won’t
happen to me’ (the ‘self-serving bias’).137 This could have an impact on the
efficacy of generic warnings. Consumers will not heed such warnings, as
they are over-optimistic about the chances of the risk affecting them.138
c) They also tend to be overconfident about their own capabilities, for instance
overestimating their driving ability.139 This is referred to as ‘low probability
neglect’.140
d) However, if a particular risk is well publicised (such as aeroplane disasters)
or happened recently, the risk will be overestimated. This is known as the
‘focussing effect’,141 which is closely related to the strong bias towards
certainty (the ‘certainty bias’). Luth explains it as follows: ‘The certainty
effect describes how people have a strong preference for things that are
certain. There is a large gap between 100% probability and 99%, whereas the
difference between 99% and 98% probability is not interpreted to be that
large.’ 142
e) If the risk involves something unpleasant or gruesome, such as death or pain
and suffering, consumers tend to shy away from considering the risk. This is
referred to as the ‘dread factor’.143
f) The ‘hindsight bias’, in turn,
‘describes how events seem much more likely in retrospect than they 
were assessed to be before or at the time of the occurrence of the event. 
136 Ibid at 58. 
137 Luth op cit note 92 at 51.  
138 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 58. 
139 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 136; Luth op cit note 92 at 51.  
140 Luth op cit note 92 at 50. 
141 Ibid; Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 59. 
142 Luth op cit note 92 at 50.  
143 Ibid. 
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Looking back, a certain event taking place, such as a machine 
malfunctioning during a certain dangerous procedure causing injuries to 
employees, seems almost inevitable. However, at the time, the risk may 
have been well looked into and well understood by experts who designed 
the production line, and it may have been a freak accident’.144 
g) ‘Ambiguity aversion’ or ‘confirmation bias’145 refers to the phenomenon that
when consumers interpret information, they ‘tend to take information that is
in line with their previously held thoughts into account, and neglect
information that is contrary to their beliefs’.146
2.3.2.4. Hyperbolic discounting 
‘Hyperbolic discounting’ is a particular aspect of behavioural psychology. In short, it 
entails people’s tendency to attach more weight to short-term gratification than long-
term gratification. Put differently, people are myopic in the short term, but become 
more rational in the long term.147 It is also referred to as ‘present bias’.148 For 
instance, a consumer will prefer $100 today over $110 tomorrow, but if gratification 
is delayed, the same consumer would prefer $110 in 31 days over $100 in 30 days. 
Clearly, ‘people discount for risks in a non-linear way’.149 According to Ramsay, 
‘[t]his conflict suggests that we cannot assume that consumer choice always reflects 
consumer preferences’.150 Hyperbolic discounting also reflects the certainty bias and 
the focussing effect, as people perceive the present to be more certain than the future. 
2.3.2.5. Status quo biases 
Consumers have a strong bias towards leaving things as they are (maintaining the 
status quo).151 People tend to value things that they already own more than those 
144 Ibid at 51. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 57; Luth op cit note 92 at 52. 
148 Luth op cit note 92 at 52. 
149 Ibid at 51.  
149 Ibid. 
150 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 57. 
151 Ibid at 58; Luth op cit note 92 at 52. 
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they still have to acquire (in other words, they will accept a higher price when selling 
than they would offer when buying).152 This is referred to as the ‘endowment effect’.  
The ‘regret aversion’ or ‘cognitive dissonance’, in turn, causes people to 
rationalise bad decisions in retrospect in order to avoid regret.153 Therefore, they 
attempt to justify the status quo rather than to feel (or even act on) dissatisfaction.  
The ‘omission–commission bias’ relates to the fact that a person will ‘generally 
feel less bad over inactions that proved to be wrong than active choices that turned 
out to be the chooser’s detriment [sic]’.154 So, when in doubt, people will act 
conservatively by choosing doing nothing over doing something. 
2.3.2.6. Context and framing 
When people make decisions, they take more into account than just the price and 
benefits of the respective options; the context and available alternatives are also 
considered.155  
Advertising often exploits what is referred to as the ‘affect heuristic’. This is 
when people attach positive perceptions to a product that have nothing to do with the 
product itself. An example is when advertisers place a beautiful woman in a car they 
are marketing, to make the car more appealing to male consumers.156  
Decisions are also guided by ‘loss aversion’, namely people’s tendency to prefer 
avoiding loss over acquiring gain.157 In fact, research has revealed that losses are 
given twice as much weight as gains.158 Suppliers can take advantage of this through 
the way in which options are framed.159 This is another iteration of the status quo 
biases discussed above.160 
152 This was illustrated in a famous experiment by Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler (D Kahneman, JL 
Knetsch & RH Thaler ‘Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem’ (1990) 
98(6) Journal of Political Economy 1325).  
153 Luth op cit note 92 at 52. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 136; Luth op cit note 92 at 53. 
156 Luth op cit note 92 at 53. 
157 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 138; Luth op cit note 92 at 53.  
158 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 138. 
159 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 58. 
160 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 138. 
32 
2.3.2.7. Anchoring and adjustment 
If someone forms an early impression (for instance, that a car drives well in rough 
conditions), that person will have trouble adjusting this impression later on, despite 
receiving information that justifies an adjustment (for instance, a warning that how 
the car handles would depend on the skill of the driver). This is referred to as 
‘anchoring’.161 This bias is exploited by marketers by initially attaching a high price 
to goods to eventually enable them to sell the goods at a lower price. The consumer 
uses the initial high price as an anchor, and then experiences the sale price as more 
reasonable than it actually is. This practice is referred to as ‘hi-lo pricing’.162 Put 
differently, consumers often use the price of a product to estimate its value, which 
leaves them open to being misled. Disturbingly, this happens even where consumers 
are given other information about the value of the product.163 This is probably the 
result of information overload, which was discussed above.  
2.3.2.8. Fairness 
The rational choice theory is predicated on the assumption that consumers will 
always act in their own interest, even if it is to the detriment of society as a whole. 
However, studies in behavioural economy show that individuals are willing to 
‘punish’ suppliers who act unfairly or exploit other consumers by boycotting their 
products.164 
2.3.2.9. The bounded consumer 
It is widely acknowledged that ‘the most important deviation from standard 
economic theory is the notion of bounded rationality (which is acknowledged 
nowadays by nearly all economists), bounded willpower and bounded self-
interest’.165 This can be caused by any number of the biases discussed above.  
‘Bounded rationality’ refers to consumers’ inability to clearly evaluate all options 
open to them.166 ‘Bounded willpower’ refers to the phenomenon that people will act 
161 Luth op cit note 92 at 53. 
162 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 59. 
163 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 135. 
164 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 60. 
165 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 131. 
166 Ibid; Luth op cit note 92 at 48. 
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against their long-term interests if there is a short-term cost.167 Examples of this are 
dieting or to quit smoking. Schüller illustrates it with reference to Ulysses’ journey 
to the sirens: 
‘[H]e demanded to be bound to the mast in order to enjoy the songs of the 
sirens while his comrades had to put wax in their ears to prevent them from 
steering the boat into the cliffs. Like Ulysses, most consumers cannot avoid 
acting against their own long-term interest on their own and may regret their 
choices afterwards, and therefore need some kind of institution to prevent them 
from doing so.’168 
‘Bounded self-interest’ refers to the influence of consumers’ sense of fairness 
discussed in the immediately preceding section above. Consumers will act against 
their own best interests if they feel that they are being treated fairly. Conversely, if 
consumers feel hard done by, they will punish the supplier to their own detriment.169 
2.3.3. Concluding remarks 
In general terms then, the use of behavioural economics in policy-making seems to 
be called for because 
‘the thrust of empirical work since the 1960s in a variety of approaches is that 
the rational consumer is a fiction, and that choice is often fallible. The choices 
people make do not always accord with what, from a different temporal 
viewpoint, they would judge as being good for themselves’.170 
Behavioural economics does not necessarily aim to discard conventional law and 
economics, but rather to improve on it by offering behavioural insights into decision-
making.171 The criticism against behavioural science is that it ‘is just a 
conglomeration of rationality biases and fallacies, but without any theory of how to 
predict or weight the different phenomena’.172 However,  
‘this is perhaps the basic misunderstanding in the whole discussion; behavioural 
economics is not a new paradigm which can replace the old rationality 
paradigm, but it is like a toolbox which can help to explain deviations from 
167 Luth op cit note 92 at 55; Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 131. 
168 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 131. 
169 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 60; Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 131. 
170 See A Offer The Challenge of Affluence: Self-control and Well-being in the United States and 
Britain since 1950 (2006) 70 in Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 61. Also see 
R Weber & R Dawes ‘Behavioral economics’ in N J Smelser & R Swedberg (eds) The Handbook of 
Economic Sociology 2 ed (2005) 91.  
171 Luth op cit note 92 at 57.  
172 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 140. 
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predicted rational behaviours; and at the same time it is a warning not to follow 
the predictions of neoclassical theory blindly’.173 
Consumer policy must therefore be ‘debiasing interventions’.174 
Behavioural economics challenges the notion that ‘it is not the role of the 
government to protect individuals against making “foolish” choices’.175 In that sense, 
it has been said that ‘[b]iased decision making might provide a justification for 
paternalistically protecting consumers from their own errors’.176 Behavioural 
economics has shown the economists’ rejection of ‘paternalism’ to be a hopelessly 
oversimplified view, as it has proved ‘consumer choice’ to be a much more 
complicated concept than the rational choice theory presupposes. In answer to this 
criticism, the concept of ‘soft paternalism’ (also known as ‘light paternalism’) 
developed.177 Given that not all consumers will have the biases identified by 
behavioural economists, soft paternalism guides or nudges consumers towards the 
optimal decision, without completely taking away their ability to choose. There are 
many iterations of this regulatory approach, but they are all characterised by a non-
intrusive nature that respects sovereignty and free choice.178 The strategies employed 
in this brand of paternalism are choice architecture (the manipulation of contexts, the 
alternatives provided and the presentation of the choices), switching defaults, 
debiasing and rebiasing.179 However, Ramsay points out that ‘it is often very 
difficult to distinguish between situations where governments are responding to 
problems that prevent individuals from reaching a rational judgment and those where 
government is overruling individual preferences and substituting its own 
judgment’.180 
The question is whether this theoretical framework sheds any light on what the 
scope of the application of consumer legislation should be. For instance, it may feel 
counterintuitive to say that paternalism over businesses is justified. The question for 
purposes of this thesis, is whether businesses would be vulnerable to the biases and 
173 Ibid. Also see Luth op cit note 92 at 127. 
174 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 61. 
175 Ibid at 62.  
176 Luth op cit note 92 at 82.  
177 Ibid at 73.  
178 Ibid.  
179 Ibid at 76. 
180 Ramsay ‘Consumer Redress’ op cit note 68 at 21. 
35 
heuristics described here. It could be argued that there is always an individual who 
makes a final decision on whether to enter into a transaction and what to buy. 
However, this argument may be undercut by the fact that when juristic persons enter 
into transactions (particularly large ones), a group of people make the decisions. A 
group is less susceptible to the biases and vulnerabilities discussed in this chapter. 
This goes back to the old adage that two heads are better than one. It could also be 
argued that there should be a distinction between consumers (particularly juristic 
persons) who buy goods for commercial (such as resale) purposes, and consumers 
who buy goods for personal use. The underlying assumption here is that consumers 
will be less susceptible to biases when acting for commercial purposes and will have 
the means to protect themselves. Both of these questions are discussed in detail in 
chapter 3. 
2.4. Specific rationales for legislative intervention 
The two theories discussed above create the backdrop against which legislative 
interventions in consumer transactions can be justified. There are also specific 
rationales for legislative intervention. Some of them respond to certain specific 
vulnerabilities of consumers, such as inequality of economic power, information 
asymmetry, the failure of regulating through contracts, and the inability of the 
consumer to guard against or absorb risk. The nature of these vulnerabilities provides 
insight into what the scope of application of consumer legislation should be in order 
to neutralise them.  
Other rationales such as an increase in quality, an increase in consumer 
confidence and increases in efficacy of consumer redress indicate the positive effects 
on the market that can be achieved through consumer legislation.  
2.4.1. Inequality of economic power 
The overarching reason why there is general ‘scepticism about the modern 
unregulated market as an adequate defender of the consumer interest’ is because the 
market is characterised by ‘inequality of economic power between consumer and 
supplier’.181 This is also referred to as inequality of bargaining power or a ‘lack of 
181 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 6; J Ziegel ‘The future of Canadian Consumerism’ 1973 
(52) Canadian Bar Review 191; Stoop op cit note 1 at 1105.
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equilibrium’.182 Mass production and the technological advances of the last century 
have disturbed the equilibrium between consumer and supplier.183 
In the context of standard-term contracts, inequality in bargaining power is 
created by the phenomenon of ‘contracts of adhesion’. Consumers are not in a 
position to negotiate because goods are offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis — the 
supplier ‘lays down the law’, as it were. This problem is alleviated by legislation 
prohibiting unfair contract terms.184 
The following quote by Ziegel refers to various forms of inequality that illustrate 
the need for consumer protection: 
‘I believe it will be found that every consumer problem exhibits one or more of 
the following characteristics. First, a disparity of bargaining power between the 
supplier of goods or services and the consumer to whom they are being offered; 
secondly, a growing and frequently total disparity of knowledge concerning the 
characteristics and technical components of the goods or services; and thirdly, a 
no less striking disparity of resources between the two sides, whether that 
disparity reflects itself in a consumer’s difficulty to obtain redress unaided for a 
legitimate grievance or in a supplier’s ability to absorb the cost of a defective 
product as part of his general overhead as compared to the consumer to whom 
its malfunctioning may represent the loss of a considerable capital 
investment.’185  
However, the role of consumer ‘weakness’ should not be overstated. As Wagner 
points out, 
‘[t]he bargaining power that consumers have does not come in the currency of 
negotiating power, but manifests itself in the form of an option to walk away. In 
competitive markets, consumers are strong since they are free to turn down 
offers they do not like, and to turn to a competitor who offers better quality or 
lower prices’.186 
What are the implications of inequality of bargaining power for this thesis? It 
seems clear that individuals (particularly vulnerable individuals) are affected, but the 
position is murkier when it comes to juristic persons. Schüller points out that 
‘consumers are the weaker party, not because they are natural persons, but because 
182 Micklitz, Stuyck & Terryn (eds) op cit note 49 at 2; Woker op cit note 119 at 230. 
183 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 2; Trebilcock op cit note 130 at 68. Also see 
the historical overview in Geraint Howells, Iain Ramsay & Thomas Wilhelmsson ‘Consumer law in 
its international dimension’ in Geraint Howells, Iain Ramsay & Thomas Wilhelmsson (et al) (eds) 
Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law (2010) 4.  
184 Deutch op cit note 104 at 553. 
185 Ziegel op cit note 181 at 193.  
186 Wagner op cit note 78 at 67.  
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consumers do not have the resources to analyse and overcome their biases’.187 The 
disparity of economic power, knowledge concerning the product, and ability to 
obtain redress (cost of litigation) is generally considered to be less acute when the 
buyer is a juristic person. However, there are underlying assumptions (wealth, 
knowledge, control over the terms of the transaction, and insulation against loss) that 
exclude smaller juristic persons from the general rule, particularly if they are small 
retailers who also have no (or very little) economic power in relation to their 
suppliers.188  
2.4.2. Information asymmetry 
The phenomenon of information asymmetry was discussed in the context of the 
rational choice theory as one of the market failures that justifies legislative 
intervention.189 The related issue of information overload was discussed as one of the 
behavioural insights derived from behavioural economics.190 In summary, although it 
would seem logical to suggest that this information asymmetry should always be 
rectified by providing more information, the reality is that compulsory disclosure 
duties can often lead to an information overload, which can be just as detrimental to 
consumers. Juristic persons (as buyers) often also do not have the same level of 
knowledge about the product as the supplier of the goods. However, some juristic 
persons may have more experience in transacting, better access to redress, and better 
insulation against loss.  
2.4.3. Increase in quality of goods 
There is a link between information asymmetry and the standards maintained in a 
particular market. Twigg-Flesner argues the following based on a seminal article by 
Akerlof:191 
187 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 141.  
188 Juristic persons (as buyers) who have a large market share in the resale of the goods in question 
often have a lot of bargaining power, but this does not hold true for smaller juristic persons. This is 
discussed in more detail in para 3.3. 
189 See para 2.3.1. 
190 See para 2.3.2.2. 
191 Christian Twigg-Flesner Consumer Product Guarantees (2003) at 7; G Akerlof ‘The market for 
“lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism’ (1970) 84 Journal of Law and Economics 
488 at 490. 
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‘[T]he inability of consumers to identify whether a particular product is a low-
quality or a high-quality item, together with the inability of sellers and 
manufacturers to communicate the level of quality of their products, may result 
in a drop of the overall standard of quality in a particular product sector. If 
consumers cannot ascertain the level of quality before purchase, there is no 
incentive for a seller to offer high-quality products. There is also no 
encouragement for manufacturers to avoid design and manufacturing defects. 
As a result, low-quality products (“lemons”) will push high-quality products off 
the market.’ 
Akerlof’s theory is also referred to as the theory of ‘adverse selection’.192 If a 
consumer is confronted with two products — one cheap and one expensive — and 
has no information about the respective quality of the products, the consumer will 
always choose the cheaper one.193 Consequently, the bad products will drive the 
good products off the market. The market does not correct itself, because although 
consumers may be aware that the quality has decreased, they cannot recognise higher 
quality, and consequently, cannot demand it. Therefore, the process repeats itself in 
what is known as ‘a race to the bottom’.194  
This is a further rationale for regulating quality through mandatory standards, as it 
may lead to an actual increase in the quality of goods. Sivesand refers to it as the 
theory of ‘risk reduction’, namely where ‘the legal obligation imposed upon the 
seller by the warranty induces him to care about the quality of the goods’.195 In short, 
a supplier faced with far-reaching remedies will be incentivised to invest more in the 
prevention of quality problems.196 
How does this relate to a discussion of the scope of the application of consumer 
legislation? As with information deficits in general, it is possible to argue that the 
192 Akerlof op cit note 191 at 488; Luth op cit note 92 at 22. 
193 J A Jolowicz ‘The protection of the consumer and purchaser of goods under English law’ (1969) 
32 Modern Law Review 1 at 8; Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 51. 
194 Luth op cit note 92 at 23. 
195 Hanna Sivesand The Buyer’s Remedies for Non-conforming Goods (2005) 222. 
196 This relates to what is called the ‘signalling theory’, which plays a role in rationalising the 
regulation of guarantees. If manufacturers are forced to make certain guarantees (signals of quality), 
they will strive to meet the signalled quality. Robert Bradgate & Christian Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding 
the boundaries of liability for quality defects’ (2002) 25 Journal of Consumer Policy 345 at 357. The 
theory has been criticised because it does not account for the role of the consumer’s behaviour in the 
product failure. It has been argued that if consumers are given comprehensive rights in respect of the 
quality of goods, they are more likely to be careless in handling a product. Put differently, consumers 
are de-incentivised to take proper care of goods because of the expectation that the supplier will be 
held liable if something goes wrong. This can be remedied (and the criticism, therefore, neutralised) 
by limiting the warranty in time, or through limiting access to the rights in cases where the goods 
were misused or neglected. See Sivesand op cit note 195 at 222. 
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assumption that juristic persons (as buyers) have more knowledge than consumers 
will be a fallacy in many cases.197 
2.4.4. Failings of regulating quality through contracts 
All things being equal, the aim of contract law is to provide ‘security for the 
recipient of a promise who has given something in return for that promise’.198 It is 
‘enshrined in a notion of the efficiency of exchange’, which means that it ‘promotes 
bargains’ as a result of which both parties are better off.199 The following examples 
illustrate this principle: 
‘If A has an item worth 100 to him, which is worth 200 to B, they will 
exchange it at 150 (assuming there are no other bidders) and both are better off 
as a result. Overall, society generally is better off as a result of a transaction 
beneficial to both A and B which prejudices no third party.’200  
If this is the case, legislative intervention is not justified.201 However, all things 
are not equal. Jolowicz refers to the ‘fetish of freedom of contract which, as 
everybody knows, has much more of myth than of substance so far as consumer 
contracts are concerned’.202 And according to Lord Denning, ‘[t]he freedom was all 
197 See para 3.3. 
198 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 9. 
199 Ibid at 10. 
200 Ibid. 
201 This is referred to as the ‘Coase Theorem’. See R Coase ‘The problem of social cost’ (1960) 3 
Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
202 Jolowicz op cit note 193 at 8. This topic has received extensive attention in South Africa. See 
generally Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA); Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 
(SCA); Breedenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2009 (6) SA 277 (GSJ); Johannesburg 
Country Club v Stott 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA); Tjakie Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) op 
cit note 4; Tjakie Naudé & Gerhard Lubbe ‘Exemption clauses — a rethink occasioned by Afrox 
Healthcare v Strydom’ (2005) 122 SALJ 441; Tjakie Naudé ‘Enforcement procedures in respect of the 
consumer’s right to fair, reasonable and just contract terms under the Consumer Protection Act in 
comparative perspective’ (2010) 127 SALJ 515; Tjakie Naudé ‘The consumer’s “right to fair, 
reasonable and just terms’ under the new Consumer Protection Act in comparative perspective’ 
(2009) 126 SALJ 505; Tjakie Naudé ‘Unfair contract terms legislation: the implications of why we 
need it for its formulation and application’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch LR 361; Tjakie Naudé ‘The use of 
black and grey lists in unfair contract terms legislation: a comparative perspective’ (2007) 124 SALJ 
128; Stoop op cit note 1 at 1091; P N Stoop ‘Background to the regulation of fairness in consumer 
contracts’ (2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 191; Tjakie Naudé & Charlotte Koep ‘Factors relevant to the 
assessment of the unfairness or unreasonableness of contract terms: Some guidance from the German 
law on standard contract terms (2015) 26 Stellenbosch LR 85; P N Stoop ‘The current status of the 
enforceability of contractual exemption clauses for the exclusion of liability in the South African law 
of contract’ (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 496; R D Sharrock ‘Judicial control of unfair contract terms: the 
implications of Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 295; P J Sutherland ‘Ensuring 
contractual fairness and consumer contracts after Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC)’ (2008) 
19 Stellenbosch LR 390; P J Sutherland ‘Ensuring contractual fairness and consumer contracts after 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) — part 2’ (2009) 20 Stellenbosch LR 50; Y Mupangavanhu 
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on the side of the big concern. … The big concern said, “Take it or leave it”. The 
little man had no option but to take it’.203  
It will rarely, if ever, be the case that both parties are equally informed (the so-
called information asymmetry); consumers suffer from information overload (often 
as a result of the contract itself)204 and standard-form contracts are rarely the result of 
arm’s-length negotiation. Even if these contracts were negotiated, consumers do not 
have the resources to match those of the average supplier, resulting in disparities 
between their bargaining powers. Howells and Weatherill give an example that is 
apposite in the context of legislative control over the quality of goods: 
‘[I]n a market where goods of different quality are available at prices varying 
from 100 to 500, but where the consumer is completely unable to distinguish 
between goods on the basis of quality, the result will be consumer [sic] 
unwillingness to pay at the higher end of the price scale. As a result, sellers will 
simply withdraw better quality goods from that market.’205 
So, Akerlof’s theory of ‘adverse selection’, in which the bad products drive out 
the good products, resurfaces as justification for legislative intervention ‘as a means 
of correcting problems caused by intransparancy [sic]’.206 Because consumers do not 
read standard-form contracts (nor would it make any difference if they did), 
contracts are inappropriate vehicles for information about quality. Although 
consumers will pay attention to ‘salient’ terms such as the price and warranties, 
which may signal quality, ‘[c]onsumers are also over-optimistic and may 
underestimate certain risks’.207 In the words of Howells and Weatherill, ‘[i]t points 
towards the adoption of a legal approach which is more receptive to controlling the 
‘Exemption clauses and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: An assessment of Naidoo  v 
Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ)’ (2014) 17 PELJ 1166; Deeksha Bhana & Marius Pieterse 
‘Towards a reconciliation of contract law and constitutional values: Brisley and Afrox revisited’ 
(2005) 122 SALJ 865; Deeksha Bhana ‘Contract law and the Constitution: Bredenkamp v Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd (SCA): Case note’ (2014) 29 Southern African Public Law 508; Dikgang 
Moseneke ‘Transformative constitutionalism: its implications for the law of contract’ (2009) 20 
Stellenbosch LR 3; C-J Pretorius ‘Exemption clauses and mistake: Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 3 
SA 572 (SCA)’ (2010) 73 THRHR 492; Gerhard Lubbe ‘Taking fundamental rights seriously: the bill 
of rights and its implications for the development of contract law’ (2004) 121 SALJ 395. 
203 George Mitchell v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 1 AER 109 at 113. 
204 Luth op cit note 92 at 63. She also points out that consumers will be prone to accepting the terms 
as they are, due to the status quo bias, or will not read the terms as a result of decision paralysis 
(inertia). Both of these biases were discussed under para 2.3.2. Information asymmetry was discussed 
in para 2.3.1. 
205 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 11. 
206 Ibid at 12; Wagner op cit note 78 at 61. 
207 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 302. This is one of the biases that impede a 
consumer’s ability to make rational choices. This was discussed in para 2.3.2 as part of the discussion 
of the principles of behavioural economics.  
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substance of deals rather than simply enforcing them once they display the requisite 
legal form’.208  
One such approach is an implied warranty that the goods will be of a certain 
quality. Terms that are implied in the contract function independently from any facts 
relating to the negotiations between the parties, the information to their disposal, or 
any other imbalances in the bargaining power between them – they ‘reflect State-
imposed minimum standards for the transaction, divorced from individual will’, and 
‘[c]onsumers cannot bargain away such protection, wittingly or unwittingly’.209  
What are the implications for the scope of application required for effective 
consumer protection? It could be argued that contracts of adhesion can be to the 
detriment of juristic persons. Wagner points out that  
‘it seems plausible that the same toxic combination of rational apathy and 
failure of competitive forces also affects transactions between businesses. In the 
business world too, it is rational, and therefore common, not to over-invest in 
contract negotiations. The fine print often goes unnoticed and unanalysed, even 
in transactions involving more than small stakes’.210  
He does acknowledge that business will be in a better position to impose their 
own terms or to negotiate with the contracting partner, particularly in the case of 
large, high-stakes transactions (for instance, where the buyer is a large and, 
therefore, valued customer). The question of whether unfair contract terms 
legislation should specifically apply to business-to-business transactions and, if this 
is the case, whether the rules should be different, is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
2.4.5. The collective insurance theory 
Sivesand points out that ‘remedies might fulfil an insurance function with the seller 
acting as insurer’ because the statutory remedies ‘protect the buyer against a product 
208 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 21; Jolowicz op cit note 193 at 8. 
209 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 30. Article 7 of the Consumer Sales Directive provides that 
guarantees are not binding if they ‘directly or indirectly waive or restrict the rights resulting from this 
Directive, as provided for by national law’. In the United Kingdom, s 6(2)(b) of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act provides that liability for the breach of terms about quality and fitness implied by statute 
(in this case, the UK SoGA) ‘cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any contract term’ 
against a person who is ‘dealing as a consumer’. In South Africa, the CPA prohibits terms that 
directly or indirectly result in the waiver of a right or obligation provided for in the Act (see 
s 51(1)(b)).  
210 Wagner op cit note 78 at 62.  
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failure as a negative and uncertain event’.211 The implicit decision that the legislature 
must make in each instance is whether the loss of one individual should be passed on 
to all consumers of a particular product, in the form of slight price increases 
occasioned by the increased risk faced by the supplier as a result of the new 
legislation.212 
Detractors of the regulation of the quality of consumer goods use the potential 
increase in price as an argument why such regulation is not desirable, thereby taking 
the implicit stance that lower prices are always ‘better’ for the consumer. This is 
referred to as the ‘futility argument’. The argument is predicated on the assumption 
‘that so long as individuals remain free to contract, businesses will pass along the 
increased costs of any redistributive measure to consumers, and that if businesses are 
prevented from doing so, then they may be unwilling to deal with consumers. In 
short, the measure intended to protect consumers will backfire’.213 
There are limited concrete studies of the actual economic impact of quality 
regulation on the price of goods.214 Ramsay criticises the fact that in academic 
writing, the futility argument is used in ‘a priori terms without much serious 
investigation of the nature of particular markets’. He points out that ‘[w]hen the 
distributional effects are studied carefully the potential detrimental effects may be 
much more modest and need to be balanced against the benefits of the legislation and 
other social values which might be furthered by the regulation’.215 One study done 
by the Department of Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom during the 
implementation of the Consumer Sales Directive showed that the new remedial 
scheme would lead to a marginal cost increase (0,25%) as a result of the anticipated 
‘ease’ with which consumers would understand the alternative remedies and the 
reversed burden of proof.216 Business, on the other hand, estimated the increase in 
211 Sivesand op cit note 195 at 222. 
212 Jolowicz op cit note 193 at 10; Luth op cit note 92 at 36. 
213 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 48; Wagner op cit note 78 at 63; Ton Hartlief 
‘Freedom and protection on contemporary contract law’ (2004) 27 Journal of Consumer Policy 253 at 
258.  
214 Sivesand op cit note 195 at 223; Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 48; Ewoud 
Hondius ‘The protection of the weak party in a harmonised European contract law: A synthesis’ 
(2004) 27 Journal of Consumer Policy 245 at 247.  
215 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 48. 
216 Department of Trade and Industry Consultation Paper of 26.2.2002 at 63. 
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cost at 3-5% of their turnover.217 A study carried out by the European Commission 
on the economic impact of the Consumer Sales Directive concluded that it was 
difficult to predict the influence of the reform on sellers’ costs.218 The significance of 
these studies does not lie in the answers, but rather in the underlying question. The 
question asked — namely, what the expense will be to the supplier — recognises the 
fact that the regulation of product quality is, at its core, the regulation of the cost of 
doing business; it is not about punishing the supplier for some perceived 
wrongdoing, or primarily about preventing quality-related problems. The latter is an 
impossibility; things will and do go wrong. Liability, therefore, becomes a legislative 
‘expense’ taken into account by the supplier as part of the bottom line.219 In addition, 
Sivesand points out that the retailer will often absorb the costs or find ways to pass 
the risk (and, therefore, the costs) back to producers rather than on to the 
consumer.220 This is not hard to believe, given the substantial bargaining power of 
large retail chains. 
The collective insurance theory counters the perceived negative effect of price 
increases by characterising these increases as a ‘premium’ that all consumers pay to 
belong to a collective insurance scheme, which will compensate consumers for the 
‘loss’ of the product due to non-conformity.221 The term ‘compensation’ is used in a 
wide sense here. It not only refers to monetary compensation in the form of a full or 
partial refund, but also to compensation in the form of a new or repaired product.  
This argument is particularly persuasive in the case of vulnerable consumers who, 
due to their precarious social position (whether through poverty, illiteracy or other 
socio-economic impediments), will not be able to absorb the loss of the product by 
buying another, or do not possess the faculties or resources needed to obtain redress 
in the absence of a consumer protection regime. It is less persuasive when 
considering whether juristic persons deserve protection, as they are more likely to 
self-insure by either purchasing insurance or factoring the risk (and cost) of buying 
sub-par goods into the price. This relies on the underlying assumption that juristic 
217 Ibid at 65.  
218 Sivesand op cit note 195 at 223. In Sweden, it was concluded that any price increase would be 
insignificant. The finding in Sweden is not surprising, given that the reforms only led to minor 
changes to the existing legislation. 
219 Jolowicz op cit note 193 at 10. 
220 Sivesand op cit note 195 at 222. 
221 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 70. 
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persons are more ‘well off’ than individuals. Obviously, this assumption will not be 
true in all cases — particularly not for ‘small’ juristic persons (measured in 
turnover).  
2.4.6. The risk should lie with the party who can avoid it 
Consumer law is also about the redistribution of risk. It is suggested that ‘[i]n 
consumer sales, it is generally considered the best solution that the seller bears the 
risk of the goods being non-conforming, as he has financial power and the possibility 
to insure against such risks, as well as the possibility to spread them over a larger 
number of sales transactions’.222 This is another example of the inequality of 
economic power between the supplier and consumer. According to Ziegel, the 
inequality in economic power manifests in the ‘supplier’s ability to absorb the cost 
of a defective product as part of his general overhead as compared to the consumer 
to whom its malfunctioning may represent the loss of a considerable capital 
investment’.223 In addition to being able to insure against the risk of non-conformity, 
the seller is in a better position to prevent non-conformity by investing in quality 
control measures. Suppliers are the ‘cheapest cost avoider’.224 
In this respect, it is necessary to distinguish between different types of sellers, 
namely retailers or distributors versus the manufacturer. As a general proposition, it 
is the manufacturer who is in control of the quality of the product. Retailers and 
distributors are often not only uninvolved in the production processes, but are also 
not in a position to do much in the way of quality control. That being said, however, 
the notion of the retailer as a powerless conduit for consumer goods should not be 
overstated. In the modern marketplace, many retailers closely control quality through 
‘spot testing’, have the bargaining power to force manufacturers to produce quality 
goods through stringent contractual controls, invest in their manufacturers’ 
businesses, and even provide detailed instructions regarding manufacturing methods. 
It is only smaller retailers who remain unable to control the quality of their wares in 
222 Sivesand op cit note 195 at 223. In South Africa, this has also been accepted by consumer law 
authorities (see Consumer Goods & Services Ombud ‘Advisory note 2: Incorrect pricing 2’ available 
at http://www.cgso.org.za/dl/cgso%20advisory%20note%20%20incorrect%20pricing.pdf, accessed 
on 5 June 2015.  
223 Ziegel op cit note 181 at 193. 
224 This phrase was coined in the seminal work of Guido Calabresi (Guido Calabresi The Cost of 
Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970) 135). The goal of the lawmaker should be to find 
the cheapest cost avoider and place legal responsibility on him.  
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an effective manner. It is necessary to consider whether these retailers, who will 
often be small to medium-sized enterprises (or ‘SMEs’), (a) should be held to the 
same standards as other sellers through a full or partial exemption from the 
application of consumer laws, and (b) should not in fact be protected as consumers to 
insulate them against losses caused by defective products.225 
2.4.7. Consumer confidence 
Legislative intervention can be justified because it has a positive effect on consumer 
confidence. This rationale is used in the context of the right to reject goods that are 
defective. On the one hand, it is argued that giving the consumer an ‘absolute’ right 
to reject is a very potent remedy, while on the other hand, suppliers are concerned 
about the resultant ‘bad faith rejections’ — the rejection of goods displaying only 
minor defects. However, it is likely that consumers who reject goods for seemingly 
minor defects do so because their confidence in the supplier has been undermined for 
reasons either related or unrelated to that specific defect. It might be that it is a small 
defect, but the supplier can either not ‘diagnose’ it properly, or after a couple of 
attempts, the defect still recurs. Products such as these are often referred to as 
‘lemons’, and the fear of having purchased a lemon can motivate a consumer to 
reject the product, despite the relatively minor nature of the defect. The consumer’s 
confidence can also be shaken as a result of media reports about the same or other 
defects having occurred in other cases, or if the supplier in question does not seem 
willing (to the consumer) to repair the goods. If one considers that the amount 
consumers spend on goods will often be relatively large when measured against their 
expendable income (as opposed to the relative value of that same goods in the hands 
of a large business), the consumers’ confidence or right to feel secure in their choice 
of product deserves protection.226  
The absence of consumer confidence can also have a detrimental effect on the 
economy. During the consultations by the Law Commission of England and Wales 
and the Scottish Law Commission on the retention of a general right to reject, Willet, 
Morgan-Taylor and Naidoo said the following: 
225 These issues are discussed in para 3.6.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
226 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 189. 
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‘Losing the short-term right to reject could have an adverse impact on the 
competitiveness of SMEs and new entrants into the market. This is because the 
absence of the right to reject means that consumers are locked into longer 
relationships with traders following the sale of faulty goods. It means that there 
is an incentive for consumers to favour who they perceive as being capable … 
of repairing the product effectively. This may well impose a competitive 
disadvantage on SMEs, new entrants and new traders from outside the UK.’227 
The importance of consumer confidence in the EU is obvious, as it promotes the 
free movement of goods in the internal market. It is equally obvious that consumer 
confidence is an important driver of economic growth in a developing country such 
as South Africa. This is because228 
‘[c]onsumers benefit from competitive markets, but they generate them too. 
Policy is therefore sensibly directed at improving consumer information and 
education, so that people are able to perform the role as demanding consumers 
which is a pre-condition to efficiently functioning markets’. 
This means that ‘consumer protection can be seen as operating in harmony with, 
rather than contrary to, the encouragement of commerce, the law providing 
consumers with a safety net, which in turn gives them the confidence to enter the 
market’.229 
As discussed above, the rationale of creating confident consumers will have a 
beneficial effect on both SMEs (as suppliers) and new entrants to the market. 
However, creating consumer confidence amongst businesses (as consumers) may 
also be beneficial for the market. The nature of this rationale does not exclude 
protecting the business consumer. 
2.4.8. Improved consumer redress 
Consumers are faced with very high enforcement costs when using the private-law 
system to enforce their rights. This is caused by procedural hurdles and information 
asymmetry, in that the consumer does not have the necessary technical knowledge to 
assert a claim. Other hurdles in this context are evidentiary burdens (it is often 
227 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods (Law Com 
No 317 and Scot Law Com No 216) (2009) para 3.6. 
228 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 48. This is based on UK Government op cit note 60; 
Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 116. 
229 Robert Bradgate Consumer Rights in Digital Products: A Research Report Prepared for the UK 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2010) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31837/10-1125-
consumer-rights-in-digital-products.pdf, accessed on 27 April 2016 at 11. 
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difficult for consumers to substantiate claims), the cost of legal representation, 
geography, and time. Importantly, high enforcement costs can also be the result of 
vague standards and rights that are hard to interpret, and that lead to disputes.230 In 
short, ‘[t]he law cannot empower consumers if there are grey areas’.231 
The aim of improving consumer redress refers to the interaction of the consumer 
with the law — whether the law is useable in practice. The notion of access to justice 
in a consumer context is of no use if it is simply equated to access to courts or other 
‘legal’ institutions. Justice is hard to achieve in courts in the context of consumer 
rights because consumers’ claims are often ‘small in monetary value, but large in 
aggregate’.232 In this regard, Laura Nader wrote: 
‘Little injustices are the greater part of everyday living in a consumption 
society, and, of course, people’s attitudes towards the law are formed by their 
encounters with the law or by the absence of encounters when the need arises. 
If there is no access for those things that matter, then the law becomes 
irrelevant to its citizens and, something else, alternatives to the law become all 
they have.’233 
Most consumer disputes are therefore resolved informally.234 In fact, studies 
published by the UK Office of Fair Trading in 2000235 and the UK Department of 
Trade and Industry in 2001236 found that 87% of consumers complained directly to 
the supplier of the faulty goods. Of those, only 50% were successful, and 40% of 
these consumers did not press matters further. Ramsay points out that ‘[t]he great 
majority of consumer disputes are settled by bargaining between the parties or in the 
shadow of the law’.237 This means that the law itself must give consumers clear 
rights, which they can then use in bargaining and settlement instead of focussing on 
enforcement mechanisms. This, for instance, is a prominent argument in favour of 
retaining a clear right to terminate.238  
230 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 507.  
231 National Education and Information Advisory Taskforce op cit note 35 at 69. 
232 Iain Ramsay ‘Consumers’ access to justice: an introduction’ in Rickett & Telfer (eds) op cit note 
68 at 19. 
233 L Nader (ed) No Access to Law: Alternatives to the American Judicial System (1980) 4. 
234 Robert Bradgate & Christian Twigg-Flesner Blackstone’s Guide to Consumer Sales and 
Associated Guarantees (2003) 12; Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 542.  
235 Office of Fair Trading Consumer Detriment (2000). 
236 Department of Trade and Industry Consumer Knowledge Survey (2001) and Department of Trade 
and Industry Consumer Knowledge Performance Monitor (2001). 
237 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 542. 
238 Ibid. 
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Legislative intervention could fulfil three roles in the context of improving 
consumer redress. First, the legislature can decide to combat ignorance of the law. 
Secondly, regulations can lower search costs. Thirdly, consumer redress will be 
improved if enforcement costs are lowered. These three aspects are discussed below. 
2.4.8.1. Combatting ignorance of the law 
Consumers are faced with practical difficulties that prevent them from exercising the 
consumer rights they are afforded on paper. The most fundamental of these 
difficulties is that consumers are often ignorant of the law:239 
‘[P]aradoxically, the more sophisticated and nuanced consumer protection law 
is on paper, the greater the risk that consumers will be confused by it and 
alienated from it in practice. Legal rights should be easy to grasp and to use. 
Lack of understanding of the law among consumers plainly defeats much of the 
purpose of the law. Moreover, it should not be left out of account that ignorance 
of and/or disinterest in the nuances of consumer law among practising lawyers, 
perhaps even combined with antipathy to consumer disputes as trivial 
complaints, constitute a yet further impediment to its practical effect.’ 
In South Africa, the CPA has expressed the particular aim of protecting 
vulnerable consumers.240 Vulnerable consumers are faced with particular challenges 
such as illiteracy and social isolation (in rural communities), which increase their 
likelihood of being ignorant of the law. This creates ‘information apartheid’241 and 
has led to the allegation that consumer law is the law of the middle class:242 
‘The middle class complains about purchases, whereas poorer sections of 
society worry about being able to make purchases in the first place. It hardly 
matters whether a product is of satisfactory quality if you cannot afford it. The 
middle class understands the law and can either use it or threaten to use it; 
poorer sections of society are doubtful about its relevance to their needs. The 
allegation that consumer law is middle class law is not without foundation, 
though it would be churlish to hurl aside the accumulated body of legal 
protection on that under-articulated basis alone. However, if it is true that 
adjustment of the private law is of disproportionate assistance to already 
affluent members of society, then a stronger commitment to public law 
regulation may be appropriate.’ 
239 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 46. 
240 This was discussed in para 2.2 above.  
241 This phrase is borrowed from a TED talk by Sandra Fisher-Martins on the use of plain language 
(Sandra Fisher Martins The Right to Understand (11 March 2011) available at https://www.ted.com/ 
talks/ sandra_fisher_martins_the_right_to_understand, accessed on 21 March 2016).  
242 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 47. 
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Reich points out that the problem in developing countries is often that the basic 
needs of consumers are not met. In his words, ‘[a]ccess to consumption, not 
consumer protection is the central problem’.243 
Ignorance of the law does not necessarily result in a lowering of the level of 
protection. According to research done by the Law Commission of England and 
Wales and the Scottish Law Commission in 2008 as part of their investigation into 
remedies for faulty goods, 
‘the impression from these focus groups was that only rarely did lack of 
understanding of their legal rights really work against these particular 
consumers. While most were sympathetic to the principle of simplifying the 
law, confusion surrounding current laws and consumer rights coupled with the 
policies of retailers to please and appease customers means the current situation 
can sometimes work to the benefit of consumers’.244 
However, while it may be true that many retailers will often give consumers more 
rights than the law when they complain, it has to be borne in mind that vulnerable 
consumers generally do not complain (simply because they are not able to).245 
Educating consumers is a complex task that is about much more than just 
providing consumers with information, as this could contribute to information 
overload and higher search costs.246 In addition, ‘[t]he confidence and skills that 
consumer education aims to develop depend on sound levels of numeracy and 
literacy’, and education initiatives tend to ‘target those consumers who are easiest to 
reach, rather than those with the greatest need’.247 An exhaustive study of consumer 
education is however beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The aim of ‘lower search costs’ is closely related to combatting ignorance of the 
law, as high search costs will lead to more ignorance. This is discussed in the next 
section. 
243 Reich op cit note 83 at 258. 
244 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Joint consultation paper op cit note 31 at 138. 
245 Iain Ramsay ‘Consumer redress mechanisms for defective and poor-quality products’ (1981) 31 
University of Toronto Law Journal 17 at 25. 
246 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods op cit note 
227 from para 7.1. 
247 Office of Fair Trading A Strategy and Framework for Consumer Education — A Consultation 
Paper (July 2004) (OFT 735) 6; Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Consumer Remedies 
for Faulty Goods op cit note 227 from para 7.23. 
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2.4.8.2. Lower search costs 
The CPA is not a codification of the common law. Instead, ‘[n]o provision of this 
Act must be interpreted so as to preclude a consumer from exercising any rights 
afforded in terms of the common law’.248 This is a conscious choice made by the 
legislature, born (at least in South Africa) from the fear that the new consumer 
protection legislature might limit consumers’ rights if they are deprived from 
recourse to the common law.249 This is referred to as ‘double-banking’ in the United 
Kingdom and has been severely criticised, as it leads to complexity.250 Already in 
1969, Jolowicz expressed the sentiment that 
‘[t]o try to regulate the civil remedies of the consumer by the manipulation of 
the commercial law, which is, I think, all that we have really been doing up to 
date, is bound to lead to ever-increasing complexity and artificiality if not 
worse. A fresh look at the whole basis of the law governing the civil remedies 
of the consumer is, I think, long overdue’.251 
In other words, ‘double-banking’ is not desirable, as it creates a system of 
consumer redress that is overly complex.252  
The increased effort required by such an overly complex system leads to what is 
called ‘search costs’.253 Search costs affect not only consumers, but suppliers also. 
Where consumer remedies are overly complex, suppliers have to spend additional 
time and money training staff on those rights. It is also likely that the lack of 
common understanding will increase litigation.254  
248 Section 2(10).  
249 A full investigation into the development of a consolidated set of rules is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The discussion will be limited to whether the current definitions determining the scope of 
application of the CPA are rational. 
250 UK Government Davidson Review: Implementation of EU legislation (November 2006) 3 
available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/davidson_review281106.pdf, accessed on 16 December 2013.  
251 Jolowicz op cit note 193 at 9. 
252 In the Australian context, the Law Reform Commission of Victoria (Discussion Paper No 27: An 
Australian Code (September 1992) at 4) listed two basic characteristics of successful ‘codes’. The 
first is that ‘it must be the only authoritative statement of the law – it must function as a “clean slate”’, 
and secondly, ‘its propositions must be both sufficiently specific to serve as points of certainty and 
sufficiently general to be enduring’.  
253 It is important to keep in mind that consumers rarely obtain legal advice in consumer disputes, 
which means that the legislation must be understood by the actual consumers and not their legal 
advisors. See Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods 
op cit note 227 at para 1.21. 
254 UK Government Davidson Review op cit note 250 at 40. 
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The following passage explains ‘search costs’ in the context of the 
implementation of the EU Consumer Sales Directive:   
‘[T]hose who are affected by the rules must invest extra resources in working 
out the implications of the new (and unfamiliar) concepts emanating from the 
Directive and the relationship (and possible overlap) between these concepts 
and the existing concepts.’255 
The risk(s) of transposing the Directive into national law without integrating it 
with the existing system are clearly analogous with enacting the CPA alongside the 
existing common law. The net effect is that it is more difficult for suppliers, but 
particularly consumers, to understand and exercise their rights. When rules are 
integrated with the existing system, this confusion is avoided, coordination of the old 
and new rules is facilitated, the number of rules is reduced, greater legal certainty is 
created, better compliance by suppliers may be facilitated, and the amount of time 
spent on disputes will be reduced.256 It is essential to compare the common law with 
the CPA in order to investigate whether a consolidated set of rules can be developed 
without detracting from the main aim of ensuring greater consumer protection. This 
exercise falls outside the ambit of this thesis, save where the definitions that 
determine the scope of the CPA have a negative impact on consumer redress. This is 
discussed in chapter 3.  
2.4.8.3. Lower enforcement costs 
The other reality with which consumers are faced is the high cost of litigation. This 
cost refers to the cost of legal and other experts, the time cost for formal legal 
proceedings to reach the courts and judgments to be written, the uncertainty of the 
outcome, as well as the emotional costs to which the consumer will be exposed.257  
These costs are particularly high when one considers that the loss the consumer 
will be facing will be relatively small.258 Of course, these small claims add up to 
larger problems, but this will be concealed by the fact that the traditional private law 
system insists on each consumer pursuing their own claim, and the market will not 
255 Oughton & Willett op cit note 23 at 306. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 43. 
258 Woker op cit note 119 at 230.  
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correct itself.259 It also means that ‘traders, typically with more resources at their 
disposal than consumers, will be able to use consumer reluctance to litigate as a 
method for fobbing off the vindication of consumer rights’.260 
A discussion of procedural regulations aimed at improving consumers’ access to 
justice is beyond the scope of this thesis, save where the application provisions are a 
barrier to effective enforcement.261 Some methods include representative actions 
brought by consumer organisations, legal aid, class actions, contingency fees, small 
claims courts, consumer agencies and industry-specific alternative dispute 
resolution.262 Enforcement costs will be reduced by ensuring that legislation is clear 
and unambiguous, by providing for alternative dispute resolution (such as industry 
ombuds), by allowing for representative and class actions, and by strengthening 
small claims courts.263  
2.4.9. Concluding remarks 
The acknowledgment that all consumers of products are vulnerable in some ways, 
along with the rationales for legislative intervention in consumer protection 
discussed in this section, illustrates that the following assumptions and decisions 
made by the South African legislature when drafting the CPA require further 
interrogation:  
a) Should consumer protection be extended to juristic persons? There is no
apparent reason why the bulk of the rationales discussed in this section could
not also be valid for juristic persons. The question then becomes whether the
rationales would be more (or less) valid in respect of SMEs.
b) Should consumer protection be extended to consumers who purchase goods
in the course of a business? Likewise, there is no apparent reason why the
259 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 48; Trebilcock op cit note 130 at 73. 
260 Howells & Weatherill op cit note 40 at 48. 
261 Socio-legal research on the behaviour of consumers when it comes to exercising their rights has 
been considered superficially only. See for instance Ramsay ‘Consumer Redress’ op cit note 68 at 26. 
262 Anthony J Duggan ‘Consumer access to justice in common law countries: a survey of the issues 
from a law and economics perspective’ in in Charles E F Rickett & Thomas G W Telfer (eds) 
International Perspectives on Consumers’ Access to Justice (2003) 46. 
263 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 103; Trebilcock op cit note 130 at 80; Steven 
Rares ‘Striking the modern balance between freedom of contract and consumer rights’ (2013) Federal 
Judicial Scholarship, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/ 
journals/FedJSchol/2013/21.html#_ftn57, accessed on 7 June 2016 para 48. 
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rationales would be less valid when goods are bought for commercial 
purposes (as opposed to goods bought for domestic purposes).  
c) Are there other aspects of the definitions of ‘consumer’ and ‘supplier’ that
undermine effective consumer redress? In addition to the substantive
questions raised, it appears that the way in which the definitions are
formulated can have an impact on the efficacy of consumer redress.
All of these issues will be discussed in chapter 3 in comparative perspective. 
However, before commencing with that discussion, it is important to create a set of 
criteria for evaluating the law and proposing alternatives.  
2.5. Criteria for evaluating the law and proposing alternatives 
The methodology employed in this thesis is a comparative study of the legislative 
intervention made as part of the CPA, as seen against international precedent. In this 
section, a set of criteria is developed against which consumer protection regulations 
can be measured and analysed. These criteria, which are based on a set of criteria 
discussed in an article by Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner,264 are that the legislation 
must be fair, rational, clear and efficient, must give effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the consumer, and must provide for effective dispute resolution. 
These criteria will be discussed briefly below. 
Many of the criteria mirror the ‘rationales’ for legislative intervention discussed 
above. This stands to reason, given that the rationales can also be seen as problems 
that need to be solved through regulation. When assessing the legislation, the 
question will be whether these problems have been addressed. The formulation of 
‘criteria’ is simply a means of focussing that enquiry.  
This is not the only set of published criteria for evaluating the ‘quality’ of 
consumer legislation. A similar set of criteria is referred to in the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference,265 which includes the principles of freedom, security, justice 
and efficiency. In addition, several EU directives (including the Consumer Sales 
264 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 345.  
265 Christian von Bar, Eric Clive & Hans Schulte-Nölke (eds) Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR): Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law (Full Edition) (2009) 
from 48. 
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Directive, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, and the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive) are currently undergoing a ‘fitness check’ in order to ascertain whether 
they are ‘proportionate to their objectives and delivering as expected in all EU policy 
areas’. The criteria used in that evaluation are effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, 
relevance and ‘EU added value’. 266 Lastly, Justice Steven Rares said the following 
in the context of Australian consumer protection laws: 
‘Consumer protection legislation should be well thought through, clear, 
succinct and have an intelligible purpose. It should not result in significant 
“collateral damage” to unintended or unnecessary targets. A shotgun approach 
is not likely to be beneficial. Nor should a law impose disproportionate burdens 
on the whole community through increased costs, greater need, if not necessity, 
for every level of commerce to use professional advisers such as lawyers, and 
increased use of litigation over Delphic, legislative cascades of alternative 
causes of action.’267 
These criteria are substantially similar to those argued for here. 
2.5.1. Is the legislation fair? 
The legislation should be fair to both the consumer and supplier. It has been 
suggested that fairness in this context means that ‘liability should fall where 
responsibility lies’.268 As Ramsay puts it:269 
‘Consumer law and policy may be viewed as a general attempt to redistribute 
power and resources (eg rights) from producers to consumers… . This might 
not merely involve low prices but also policies of loss-spreading which shift 
risks from consumer to producer.’ 
This criterion ties in with the theory that risk should be allocated to the party who 
can avoid it, as well as the collective insurance theory, both of which were discussed 
above.270 
The question is not only whether the legislation is fair to the consumer, but also 
whether it is fair to the supplier. Put differently, the legislation must not put undue 
strain on the supplier. If the legislation can utilise less invasive means to achieve a 
particular goal, it is overly burdensome and, therefore, unfair.271 The legislation will 
266 European Commission op cit note 20. 
267 Rares op cit note 263 para 72.  
268 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 350. 
269 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy op cit note 61 at 70. 
270 See paras 2.4.5 and 2.4.6. 
271 Evert van Eeden Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 40. 
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also be seen as inefficient, which is another criterion that is discussed below. To a 
certain extent, many of the criteria below are aimed at ascertaining whether the 
legislation is fair. In other words, fairness is not only an independent criterion, but 
also a by-product of rationality, clarity and efficiency.  
2.5.2. Is the legislation rational? 
The legislation should be rational, which means that the law should be internally 
consistent as well as consistent with the rest of the legal system.272 Put differently, 
this criterion measures whether the legislation is both internally and systemically 
coherent.273  
Internal coherence refers to whether the constituent parts of the legislation work 
together, and whether all overlapping provisions (if any) are necessary and explained 
in a satisfactory manner. In the context of consumer protection legislation in 
particular, this also becomes a matter of clarity and accessibility, as the need for 
rights that are easy to access and understand is stronger in this context than in a 
commercial context. 
Systemic coherence involves much the same consideration, except that the 
comparison here is not between the various sections within a piece of legislation, but 
rather between the consumer protection legislation and other, potentially overlapping 
laws.274 The ultimate goal is that ‘the legislation needs to be clear and 
understandable, and, in so far as this is possible, should treat like transactions 
alike’.275  
2.5.3. Is the legislation clear? 
In a similar vein, legislation should make the rights of consumers and the obligations 
of suppliers clear. Unclear or overly technical regulation can ultimately undermine 
272 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 350; Better Regulation 
Task Force Principles of Good Regulations (Revised) (2006) 1. 
273 Bradgate & Twigg-Flessner Blackstone’s Guide op cit note 234 at 11. This is why it is also 
necessary to evaluate how any consumer protection legislation interacts with existing law — in the 
case of warranty liability in South Africa, how it interacts with the common law. 
274 For instance, it has already been argued that the choice to retain the common law alongside the 
CPA does not meet the criteria of rationality or clarity, which results in higher search costs. See para 
2.4.8.2.  
275 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner Blackstone’s Guide op cit note 234 at 11. 
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efficient consumer protection, as it gives suppliers too many technical grounds based 
on which justice for the consumer can be delayed. Put differently, regulations must 
be transparent and user-friendly.276 This lowers search costs, as it will be easier for 
consumers to establish what their rights are, while also making it easier for suppliers 
to comply, since they will have certainty regarding their obligations.277 Justice 
Steven Rares succinctly summarised the effect of convoluted and impenetrable 
statutory definitions in Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia 
Ltd (in Liq) as follows: ‘The cost to the community, business, the parties and their 
lawyers, and the time for courts to work out which law applies have no rational or 
legal justification.’278  
2.5.4. Is the solution offered by the legislation efficient? 
The solution offered by the legislature must be efficient. Aspects of the efficiency 
enquiry are that the regulation must be proportional and targeted.279  
Proportionality in this context means that the intervention must be necessary, the 
remedy proposed must be appropriate for the risk it addresses, and costs must be 
identified and minimised. This means that the regulation must be the most direct way 
to achieve the desired outcome (solution) — nothing more must be possible with the 
same amount of resources. Put differently, the regulation must have a better cost-to-
benefit ratio than other alternatives.280  
Efficiency also requires the intervention to be targeted.281 This, in turn, entails 
that the intervention must be focussed on the problem, must not be overly broad, and 
the possible ‘side effects’ of the legislation must be considered and minimised. 
Efficiency is described as the central criterion used in the field of law and 
economics when assessing legal rules.282 However, it should be treated with 
circumspection, as it presupposes the utilitarian approach taken by proponents of the 
rational choice theory, whereas in consumer law, ‘the individual is entitled to 
276 Better Regulation Task Force op cit note 272 at 1. 
277 UK Government Davidson Review op cit note 250 at 40. The lowering of search costs as a 
rationale for legislative intervention was discussed in para 2.4.8.2. 
278 [2012] FCA 1028. 
279 Better Regulation Task Force op cit note 272 at 1. 
280 Luth op cit note 92 at 17. 
281 Better Regulation Task Force op cit note 272 at 1. 
282 Luth op cit note 92 at 17. Several concepts of efficiency are discussed there.   
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protection notwithstanding that, on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, the economy 
might benefit if the individual consumer receives defective goods or hazardous 
products’.283 
An example of inefficiency is ‘circuity of actions’. This should be avoided 
because it is wasteful and inefficient.284  
‘The avoidance of circuity is a well-established objective of the law: circuity is 
wasteful and inefficient, so that in the absence of special circumstances it is 
better if the party suffering the loss is given a remedy directly against the party 
responsible and ultimately liable for it, rather than liability being pursued by a 
circuitous route.’ 
2.5.5. Does the legislation give effect to the reasonable expectations of 
honest men? 
In the words of Lord Steyn, ‘a thread runs through our contract law that effect must 
be given to the reasonable expectations of honest men’.285 When applied to the law 
of sale, this means that the purchaser is entitled to goods that are of a good quality 
because ‘the purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a 
dunghill’.286 The expectations referred to here are the expectations of the consumers, 
retailers and producers.287 
As Jolowicz points out, ‘the public may actually be wiser than the law’.288 He 
continues to say that ‘[t]he problem should not be seen any longer in terms of 
contract and tort … [but] as a question of the allocation between all the parties 
concerned in a consumer transaction of the losses to which those transactions are 
bound from time to time to give rise’.289 This, then, is the basis on which he 
distinguishes the function of the law in commercial transactions as opposed to 
consumer transactions, namely that in a commercial setting, the function of the law 
283 Deutch op cit note 104 at 537. See para 2.3.1 for a discussion and critique of the rational choice 
theory.  
284 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 350. Bradgate and 
Twigg-Flesner elevate avoiding circuity of actions to an independent criterion. However, it is 
submitted here that it is simply an example of an inefficiency or irrationality that should be avoided. 
285 Johan Steyn ‘Contract law: fulfilling the reasonable expectations of honest men’ (1997) 113 Law 
Quarterly Review 433 at 433.  
286 Gardiner v Gray [1815] 4 Camp 144 in Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op 
cit note 196 at 351; Bradgate op cit note 229 at 18. 
287 Gardiner v Gray in Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 346. 
288 Jolowicz op cit note 193 at 2.  
289 Ibid at 6. 
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is not to allocate the actual losses, ‘but the risk that those losses may occur’.290 The 
idea is that businessmen will insure against those risks, but also that the more risk 
the buyer is prepared to accept, the cheaper the goods or services will be.291 The 
same is not true of consumers, because ‘[i]f they think about legal liability at all, 
they think only in the terms “Who pays if something happens to go wrong?”’.292 The 
challenge is to give effect 
‘to the legitimate expectations of consumers by developing a fair and rational 
system of liability that would ensure that the party who is actually responsible 
would ultimately be held liable, whilst ensuring that consumers can obtain a 
remedy as quickly and efficiently as possible’.293 
A very practical example can be found in the Law Commission of England and 
Wales and the Scottish Law Commission’s report on consumer remedies for faulty 
goods, in the context of the retention of a right to reject faulty goods: 
‘Our discussions with retailers and manufacturers indicate that the large 
majority do not seek the abolition of the right to reject faulty goods. Generally, 
they recognised that consumers expect to be able to obtain refunds for faulty 
goods, and a mismatch between consumer expectations and the law might lead 
to disputes.’294 
2.5.6. Does the legislation provide improved consumer redress? 
According to Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, the main aim of consumer protection law 
should be to ensure that consumers are provided with effective ways to resolve 
disputes.295 Devising effective means for improving consumer redress was discussed 
in para 2.4.8 as a rationale for legislative intervention. This thesis is limited to the 
review of the scope of the application of the CPA, and does not include the 
procedural side of consumer protection. However, this does not mean that this 
criterion is not relevant. The way in which substantive provisions are drafted has 
important implications for consumer redress, and in a broad sense, all of the 




292 Ibid at 7. The notion that liability should lie with the party who can best avoid it was discussed in 
para 2.4.6 as a rationale for intervention in consumer sales.  
293 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 375.  
294 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods op cit note 
227 at para 3.15. 
295 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 351.  
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Due to the prohibitive cost of litigation, particularly when measured against the 
relatively small amounts involved in the average consumer transaction, improved 
legislation or access to justice will probably not increase the number of consumers 
willing to take suppliers to court. This does not mean that legislation has no place in 
the protection of consumer interest. It simply means that consumer legislation should 
be comprehensible to consumers, without them having to rely on the courts. In other 
words, consumers must be aware of their rights, be able to understand the rights, and 
be able to use them in negotiations with suppliers.296 However, in order to achieve 
clarity, flexibility is often sacrificed.297 Given the variety of problems that arise in 
consumer sales transactions, rigid rules can prejudice the consumer and supplier 
alike. This means that a balance must be struck between clarity and flexibility. 
However, clarity in consumer legislation is so important that it will sometimes 
even outweigh the disadvantage of a more limited right. For instance, in the context 
of a fixed 30-day right to reject (as opposed to the right to reject within a reasonable 
period, which may or may not be longer than 30 days), the Office of Fair Trading 
said: ‘Although we appreciate that even specification is likely to reduce the period of 
time in which the right may currently be exercised in some circumstances, the 
advantages of simplicity outweigh the potential disadvantages in our opinion.’298 In 
the same context, the British Retail Consortium had this to say: ‘The fewer caveats, 
uncertainties and opt outs there are, the less will be the room for 
misunderstandings.’299 
2.6. Concluding remarks 
This chapter has provided a framework within which suggestions for legislative 
reform must be developed. First, while the fact that South Africa is a developing 
country with particularly ‘vulnerable’ consumers was given prominence in the 
drafting of the CPA, it is acknowledged that all consumers are in a sense vulnerable. 
296 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner Blackstone’s Guide op cit note 234 at 12. 
297 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission (Law Com No 160 and Scot Law Com No 104) 
Sale and Supply of Goods (1987) para 4.4; Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner Blackstone’s Guide op cit note 
234 at 13. 
298 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods op cit note 
227 at para 3.57. Ramsay has discussed the ‘norm’ of ‘satisfaction guaranteed or money refunded’ as 
an example of a clear and straightforward remedy for consumers. See Iain Ramsay ‘Consumers’ 
access to justice: an introduction’ in Rickett & Telfer (eds) op cit note 68 at 29. 
299 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods op cit note 
227 at para 3.67.  
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Care must be taken to adjust international precedent, where necessary, to 
accommodate this fact.300 
Secondly, legislative reform should take the form of ‘debiasing interventions’ 
based on the insights on consumer decision-making provided by the rational choice 
theory, as augmented (and, in some instances, replaced) by the findings of 
behavioural science.301 Specific rationales have been identified that should be taken 
into account in any recommendations for legislative reform.302  
Lastly, suggestions for legislative reform will be developed based on a 
comparative study of international precedent, informed by the criteria developed in 
para 2.5 above.  
300 This was discussed in para 2.2. 
301 This was discussed in para 2.3. 
302 See para 2.4. 
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3. Chapter 3: Application of consumer protection legislation in comparative
perspective
3.1. Introduction 
Definitions can reveal much about legislative intent. The South African approach in 
the CPA can generally be described as ‘inclusive’ or ‘broad’. Put differently, the 
CPA has a wide reach.  
This thesis is limited to a discussion of the typical provisions that determine the 
scope of legislation: the ‘definitions’ and ‘application’ sections. The approach taken 
by the South African legislature will be analysed in light of the findings and criteria 
described in the previous chapter, and compared to the approaches taken by the 
European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia and some international instruments. 
The aim of the comparative study is to make recommendations on how the relevant 
provisions of the CPA can be improved and to suggest alternative formulations, 
which is done in chapter 4. 
In this thesis, the scope of application of consumer legislation is discussed 
(primarily) against the backdrop of problems relating to the quality of goods, as the 
approach to the consumer contract of sale can be used as a model for the general 
rules governing consumer law. While there is some discussion of the scope of 
application of regulations relating to consumer contracts, the question of whether it 
ought to be regulated separately, and whether the application of such a separate 
instrument should be different, is not discussed in detail. The thesis also does not 
address the application of the CPA to services or the combination of goods and 
services. 
The point of departure is that the CPA will apply to all ‘transactions’ taking place 
within South Africa.303 ‘Transaction’ is defined in s 1 of the Act and can take the 
following forms:  
(a) A ‘transaction’ can refer to ‘an agreement’ between a person acting in the
ordinary course of business ‘for the supply or potential supply of any goods
or services in exchange for consideration’, and ‘one or more other persons’.
303 Section 5(1)(a). 
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(b) It can also refer to ‘the supply by that person of any goods to or at the
direction of a consumer for consideration’.
(c) ‘[T]he performance by, or at the direction of, that person of any services for
or at the direction of a consumer for consideration’ can also be a
transaction.304
(d) The ‘supply of any goods or services in the ordinary course of business to
any of its members by a club, trade union, association, society or other
collectivity’ in terms of s 5(6)(a) is another form of transaction.
(e) The solicitation of offers to enter into a franchise agreement, the actual offer
and agreement, and the supply of goods or services in terms of a franchise
agreement will also be considered transactions in terms of the Act.305
Certain general requirements can be discerned from the definition of 
‘transaction’.306 These requirements must always be met for an activity to fall within 
the definition and, consequently, within the scope of the Act: 
(a) The transaction must be between one or more ‘persons’. This will be
discussed in the paragraphs devoted to the definition of ‘consumer’,
exploring the questions of whether juristic persons should be protected,
whether the purpose of the goods should play a role in determining whether
the CPA applies, whether there should be any other limitations on the scope
of the legislation, and who should bear the onus of proving whether a person
is a consumer.307
(b) The transaction must take place in the ordinary course of the supplier’s
business.
(c) The transaction must be for ‘consideration’. Requirements (b) and (c) will be
discussed in the paragraph on the definition of ‘supplier’,308 paying particular
attention to the suitability of the ‘ordinary course of business’ and
304 Paragrah (a)(i) to (iii) of the definition of ‘transaction’ in s 1.  
305 Section 5(6)(b) to (e). 
306 Elizabeth de Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé & Eiselen op cit note 4 para 7. 
307 Paragraphs 3.3 to 3.5. 
308 Paragraph 3.6. 
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‘consideration’ requirements, and the extension of a direct claim against all 
the members of the supply chain. 
(d) The transaction must be for the supply of goods. This will be discussed in the
paragraph on the definition of ‘goods’.309
Before these issues can be discussed, the definition of ‘consumer’ in terms of the 
CPA will be explored.  
3.2. Definition of ‘consumer’ in terms of the CPA 
Section 1 of the CPA defines ‘consumer’ as 
‘(a) a person to whom those particular goods or services are marketed in the 
ordinary course of the supplier’s business; 
(b) a person who has entered into a transaction with a supplier in the
ordinary course of the supplier’s business, unless the transaction is
exempt from the application of this Act by section 5(2) or in terms of
section 5(3);
(c) if the context so requires or permits, a user of those particular goods or
a recipient or beneficiary of those particular service, irrespective of
whether that user, recipient or beneficiary was a party to a transaction
concerning the supply of those particular goods or services;
(d) a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement, to the extent applicable
in terms of section 5(6)(b) to (e)’.
Paragraph (b) of the definition simply repeats that a consumer is a person who 
enters into a transaction, as long as that transaction is not exempt from the 
application of the Act. Paragraph (a) extends the definition to a person to whom 
goods or services are promoted or supplied (in other words, ‘marketed’), with the 
implication that the provisions of the CPA relating to marketing apply irrespective of 
whether a transaction is ultimately concluded. Paragraph (c) of the definition of 
‘consumer’ includes persons who are the users or beneficiaries of goods or services, 
but who did not transact with the supplier directly. Paragraph (d) confirms that 
franchisees will also be considered consumers for purposes of the CPA.  
For purposes of this discussion, the definition of ‘person’ is significant, as it 
includes a ‘juristic person’. This means that the CPA will also apply to transactions 
309 Paragraph 3.7. 
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with ‘juristic persons’, which in turn include a body corporate, a partnership or 
association, or a trust as defined in the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988.310 
Another way of arriving at the conclusion that the Act protects juristic persons also is 
by considering the definition of ‘consumer’, which again refers to ‘persons’. 
Interestingly, the threshold determination is irrelevant when a juristic person 
wants to rely on either s 60 or s 61 of the CPA.311 In other words, a customer who is 
a juristic person may be able to rely on ss 60 or 61 (which respectively regulate 
safety monitoring and recall, and product liability claims) even if its asset value or 
annual turnover equals or exceeds the threshold. This is relevant for the discussion of 
the direct claim against the supply chain, and the rights of redress between the 
members of that supply chain.312 
However, it was always the legislature’s intention that this protection would 
extend to small businesses only.313 This is achieved by making the protection of 
juristic persons subject to s 5(2)(b). Transactions that involve juristic persons as 
consumers and have an asset value or annual turnover equal to or exceeding a 
threshold value to be determined by the Minister of Trade and Industry in terms of 
s 6 are excluded from the application of the Act. The current threshold is 
R2 million.314 
Note the use of the conjunction ‘or’ in the phrase ‘asset value or annual turnover’ 
in s 5(2)(b). It means that the juristic person will not be regarded a consumer if either 
its asset value or its annual turnover equals or exceeds the threshold. It is not 
necessary for both of these values to exceed the threshold — if one exceeds the 
threshold, the value of the other is irrelevant.  
310 See the definition of ‘juristic persons’ in s 1.  
311 Section 5(5).  
312 The position in terms of the CPA is discussed in paragraph 3.6 and is compared to the approach in 
other jurisdictions in paragraph 3.6.2. 
313 See for instance paragraph 3.2 of the Memorandum on the Objects of the Consumer Protection Bill 
(Consumer Protection Bill [B19—2008] at 80), which states that ‘[t]he use of a threshold will mean 
that the protection of the Bill will extend to small shop-keepers and other business’. See Van Eeden A 
Guide to the Consumer Protection Act (2009) 42; Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law op cit note 
271 at 44. 
314 GN 294 in GG 34181 of 1 April 2011. See the discussion of s 5(2)(b) read with s 6. This notice 
also contains a schedule in which the ‘method of calculation’ is set out. Submissions were made that 
the threshold should be in line with that in the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, which is R1 million. 
See Parliamentary Research Unit Synopsis of Submissions issued by the Parliamentary Research Unit 
to the Select Committee to Economic and Foreign Affairs (23 June 2008) at 5. 
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The Minister has published a method to calculate the asset value or annual turnover 
of a juristic person.315 The calculation method creates two problems: 
(a) The juristic person’s audited financial statements must be used in the
calculation. If the juristic person does not have audited financials, the
statements must be prepared in accordance with South African generally
accepted accounting standards.316 It seems unrealistic, unduly burdensome
and even impractical for both parties to suggest that this investigation must
be conducted even in cases where the transaction may be small or
transaction volumes may be high. The operational costs created by this
burden may not be justified in those cases. It also does not cater for cases
where the consumer does not provide the information, provides inaccurate
information, or where the information is not available.317 In short, this
method of defining the juristic person consumer is not fair, clear or
efficient.318 The National Credit Act319 is also limited to juristic persons
whose asset value or annual turnover at the time of entering into the credit
agreement is below a threshold determined by the Minister.320 However,
that act mitigates the adverse effect of this provision by providing that ‘the
asset value or annual turnover of a juristic person at the time a credit
agreement is made, is the value stated as such by the juristic person at the
time it applies for or enters into that agreement’.321 It is unfortunate that a
similar approach was not adopted in the CPA.322
(b) Given that asset value and annual turnover will have different values at
different times, it was necessary to pin down the moment at which the
calculation is to be made. Section 5(2)(b) provides that the valuation must
be made at the time of the transaction. However, this has created even more
uncertainty, as ‘transaction’ is defined as the conclusion of an agreement or
the actual supply of the goods or services. The asset value or annual
315 It was published in a schedule to GN 294 in GG 34181 of 1 April 2011. The Minister published 
another version of the method of calculation for public comment in GN 898 in GG 33621 of 11 
October 2010. 
316 Item 4(a). 
317 Elizabeth de Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé & Eiselen op cit note 4 para 85. 
318 These criteria were discussed in paragraph 2.5. 
319 Act 34 of 2005. That limit is currently R1 million.  
320 Section 4(1)(a)(i). 
321 Section 4(2)(a).  
322 Elizabeth de Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé & Eiselen op cit note 4 para 86. 
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turnover of the business may vary at these different moments during the 
transaction. It is also not clear what will happen in cases where the 
transaction is for the ongoing supply of goods and services. Must the 
determination be made each time goods or services are supplied? If that is 
the case, it creates the difficulty that the buyer can qualify as a consumer at 
certain times, and not qualify at others. This is referred to as the ‘pendulum 
effect’.323 This effect can also be caused by frequent changes to the 
threshold. The CPA provides that the threshold must be reviewed every five 
years. The first deadline has passed without any change to the threshold. 
The determination of the threshold should have an internal logic, failing which it 
may lose its value as a true indicator of vulnerability.324 It can be argued that a one-
size-fits-all approach would not be a true indicator of vulnerability, as the definition 
of what may constitute a small enterprise in one industry may not necessarily hold 
true in another. There is South African precedent for a combined approach using the 
number of employees, turnover and asset value: the National Small Business Act.325 
The aim of this act is ‘[t]o provide for the establishment of the Advisory Body and 
the Small Enterprise Development Agency; to provide guidelines for organs of state 
in order to promote small business in the Republic; and to provide for matters 
incidental thereto’.326 One of the specific objectives of the Small Enterprise 
Development Agency is to ‘generally, strengthen the capacity of⎯ (i) service 
providers to support small enterprises; and (ii) small enterprises to compete 
successfully domestically and internationally’.327 The protection of small enterprises 
as consumers in terms of the CPA would certainly be in keeping with this objective.  
Whether an enterprise is considered small is determined by thresholds for the 
number of ‘total full-time equivalent of paid employees’, the total turnover and the 
323 Parliamentary Research Unit op cit note 314 at 6. 
324 Of course, this concern is present in the determination of any threshold value, whether it relates to 
the size of the juristic person or the transaction value.  
325 Act 102 of 1996.   
326 See the preamble to the National Small Business Act. This intention to protect small to medium-
sized businesses was also communicated in paragraph 3.2 of the Memorandum on the Objects of the 
Consumer Protection Bill (Consumer Protection Bill [B19—2008] at 80). 
327 Section 9A(c)(i) and (ii). 
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gross asset value (excluding fixed property). The thresholds are set per industry,328 as 




















Medium 100 R 5 m R 5 m 
Small 50 R 3 m R 3 m 
Very small 10 R 0.50 m R 0.50 m 
Micro 5 R 0.20 m R 0.10 m 
Manufacturing 
Medium 200 R 51 m R 19 m 
Small 50 R 13 m R 5 m 
Very small 20 R 5 m R 2 m 
Micro 5 R 0.20 m R 0.10 m 
Retail and Motor 
Trade and 
Repair Services 
Medium 200 R 39 m R 6 m 
Small 50 R 19 m R 3 m 
Very small 20 R 4 m R 0.60 m 






Medium 200 R 64 m R 10 m 
Small 50 R 32 m R 5 m 
Very small 20 R 6 m R 0.60 m 
Micro 5 R 0.20 m R 0.10 m 
Transport, Medium 200 R 26 m R 6 m 




Small 50 R 13 m R 3 m 
Very small 20 R 3 m R 0.60 m 




Medium 200 R 26 m R 5 m 
Small 50 R 13 m R 3 m 
Very small 20 R 3 m R 0.50 m 
Micro 5 R 0.20 m R 0.10 m 
All four class sizes are considered ‘small enterprises’.329 When the entire table is 
considered, it becomes clear that the R2 million annual turnover or asset value 
provided for in the CPA is at the low end of the spectrum. What is also of interest is 
the substantial difference between the industries. While following this more nuanced 
approach would probably result in a more accurate barometer for vulnerability, the 
approach is impractical and will lead to a high level of uncertainty for suppliers as 
well as consumers, and increased transaction costs.  
On the other hand, there is also a precedent for the limitation of the application of 
consumer legislation to natural persons who do not use the goods for business 
purposes. The definition of ‘consumer’ in s 1 of the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act is limited to natural persons who are the end-users of the goods 
supplied.330 
This also raises the question whether the nature of the goods should play a role in 
determining whether a particular transaction is governed by the CPA? This is 
referred to as the ‘functional-occupation limitation’. In terms of the CPA, it is 
irrelevant whether or not the consumer acts for purposes related to his trade, business 
329 See the definition of ‘small enterprise’ in s 1 of the National Small Business Act. However, it is 
not clear what the position will be if a business falls in different categories depending on the criteria 
used. The definition of ‘small enterprise’ simply states that a business is classified as a small 
enterprise ‘by satisfying the criteria mentioned in columns 3, 4 and 5 of the Schedule’. The use of 
‘and’ suggests that the requirements must all be satisfied, but as there are three criteria and four 
possible categories per industry, it is entirely possible for a business to fall in more than one category. 
330 Act 25 of 2002. 
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or profession.331 Put differently, the goods or services do not have to be acquired for 
personal or household purposes for the Act to apply; the Act also applies to 
‘business-to-business dealings’.332 This is in keeping with the fact that the Act 
extends protection to small businesses also.  
In the following section, the question of whether juristic persons should be 
included in the definition of a ‘consumer’ will be discussed. This will be followed by 
a comparative analysis of the following methods of limiting consumer protection 
legislation: the functional-occupation limitation, limiting the definition of 
‘consumer’ to the end-user of the product (the ‘commercialisation limitation’), 
limiting the size of consumer transactions, and limiting the size of consumers who 
are also juristic persons.  
3.3. Should the definition of consumer be extended to juristic persons? 
In Europe, the definition of consumers is typically limited to natural persons.333 By 
contrast, the CPA also protects ‘small’ juristic persons identified by the size of their 
annual turnover or asset value, without any further limitation. This section will 
explore the question whether juristic persons should be protected at all. The 
following section will then be devoted to a discussion on whether any further 
limitations should be imposed on the scope of the application of the CPA.   
Extending consumer protection to juristic persons is not unheard of, but it is not 
usually done without limitation. Examples of these limitations will be discussed 
below. Juristic persons are protected to some degree in the United Kingdom (in 
respect of unfair contract terms), Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
331 This restriction is found in other consumer protection instruments, such as the Consumer Rights 
Directive and the Consumer Sales Directive. It will be discussed in paragraph 3.2. 
332 Robert Sharrock Business Transactions Law 8 ed (2011) 578; Van Eeden Consumer Protection 
Law op cit note 271 at 44. 
333 There is no uniform definition for ‘consumer’ across the European Union, but in general, the 
definitions are limited to individuals buying goods for private use. See Bridge, M (ed) Benjamin’s 
Sale of Goods 9 ed (2014) 882; Reich, Micklitz & Rott op cit note 39 at 50; Angus Johnston ‘Seeking 
the EU “consumer” in services of general economic interest’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz & Stephen 
Weatherill (eds) The Images of the Consumer EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition 
Law (2016) 93; Evelyne Terryn, Gert Straetmans & Veerle Colaert (eds) Landmark Cases of EU 
Consumer Law (2013) 59. This approach is also followed in Sweden, Germany, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Finland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia. 
See Schulte-Nölke, Hans (ed) EC Consumer Law Compendium (2008) 460. 
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France, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia and Australia.334 Interestingly, the protection of 
juristic persons is common in South America. ‘Persona natural o juridica’ (or 
variations of this) are protected in El Salvador, Chile, Panama, Peru, Guatemala, 
Argentina, Costa Rica and Mexico.335 The Model Law for Consumer Protection in 
Africa also extends protection to juristic persons.336 
While the Consumer Rights Directive still limits the definition of consumer to 
natural persons, recital 13 allows for the possibility that member states could ‘decide 
to extend the application of the rules of this Directive to legal persons or to natural 
persons who are not consumers within the meaning of this Directive, such as non-
governmental organisations, start-ups or small and medium-sized enterprises’. That 
there may be policy reasons for extending protection to these entities was also 
acknowledged in the Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis:337 
‘Several Member States have granted natural persons acting for purposes which 
fall primarily outside their trade, business or profession the same protection as 
consumers. In addition, some businesses, such as individual entrepreneurs or 
small businesses may sometimes be in a similar situation as consumers when 
they buy certain goods or services which raises the questions whether they 
should benefit to a certain extent from the same protection provided for to 
consumers. During the review the widening of the definition to cover 
transaction for mixed purposes should be considered.’ 
This is referred to as a ‘transactional consumer notion’ — the weaker contract 
party is protected, regardless of whether it is a natural or juristic person.338  
The DCFR also limits the notion of consumer to natural persons.339 However, it is 
pointed out that  
‘[w]hether the notion of the consumer is necessarily the best way of identifying 
those in need of special protection is a question which has been raised and will 
334 Schulte-Nölke (ed) op cit note 333 at 461.  
335 See Consumers International op cit note 9 at 4. 
336 Definition of ‘person’ in para 2 of part 2 — ‘Application of law and interpretation’ in Consumers 
International Model Law for Consumer Protection in Africa (1996) available at 
http://www.consumersinternational.org/news-and-media/resource-zone/the-model-law-for-africa-
protecting-the-african-consumer/, accessed on 10 April 2016. 
337 Op cit note 17 at 15. 
338 Terryn, Straetmans & Colaert op cit note 333 at 60. Some even argue that it has become a 
companion to the paradigm of freedom of contract (Hondius ‘The protection of the weak party’ op cit 
note 214 at 246). Also see Vincenzo Roppo ‘From consumer contracts to asymmetric contracts: A 
trend in European Contract Law?’ (2009) 5(3) European Review of Contract Law 304 at 311–13. He 
refers to a policy shift ‘from consumer protection to customer protection’ (at 317).  
339 Article I.1:105(1). See Von Bar, Clive & Schulte-Nölke DCFR Full Edition op cit note 265 at 69. 
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no doubt be raised again. Some argue that small businesses or “non-repeat 
players” of any kind may be equally in need of protection’.340 
The application of the United Kingdom Consumer Rights Act is limited to 
individuals.341 The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Select Committee 
recommended that the government consider the ‘case for small business to be treated 
as consumers’, and provide ‘a substantive response to the research commissioned by 
the Federation of Small Businesses on small business as consumers’.342 The 
government responded as follows: 
‘The Government has considered the case for small businesses to be treated as 
consumers, consulting on this question in 2008 and 2012. As the committee 
acknowledges, all business groups that responded to the Government’s 2008 
Consumer Law Review preferred to retain the clarity of the current distinction 
between business and consumer and this position was supported by the majority 
of responses to the 2012 consultation.’343  
It would therefore seem that the main motivation for confining the definition of 
‘consumer’ to natural persons is clarity — it is easier for a supplier to know whether 
it is dealing with a consumer if the legislation applies to natural persons only. Clarity 
(and, by extension, legal certainty) is an important criterion in evaluating the merit of 
a particular drafting choice.344 As was demonstrated in paragraph 3.2, the current 
inclusion in the CPA of juristic persons with an asset value or annual turnover under 
a certain threshold leads to considerable uncertainty as to who is protected by the 
CPA and who is not. In addition to being unclear, this fails to improve consumer 
redress.345 Specifically, it increases the supplier’s ‘search costs’ to comply with the 
legislation because it increases the complexity of the legislation. Suppliers are rarely 
aware of the size of their customers (particularly in industries with a high transaction 
340 Ibid at 70. 
341 Section 2(3).  
342 UK Government Consumer Rights Bill: Statement on policy reform and responses to pre-
legislative scrutiny available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/274912/ bis-14-566-
consumer-rights-bill-statement-on-policy-reform-and-responses-to-pre-legislative-scrutiny.pdf, 
accessed on 1 May 2014.  
343 Ibid. This report has now been published and the findings and recommendations will be discussed 
below. See Amelia Fletcher, Antony Karatzas and Antje Kreutzmann-Gallasch Small Businesses as 
Consumers: Are They Sufficiently Well Protected? A Report for the Federation of Small Businesses 
(January 2014) available at http://www.fsb.org.uk/policy/assets/fsb%20project_small_businesses_as-
consumers.pdf, accessed on 1 May 2014. Ostensibly, another reason for the choice not to extend 
protection to small businesses was that business groups were opposed to the idea (Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills Enhancing Consumer Confidence by Clarifying Consumer Law: 
Consultation on the Supply of Goods, Services and Digital Content (2012) 27). 
344 Clarity as a criterion for evaluating legislation is discussed in chapter 2, paragraph 2.5.3. 
345 See chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.8. 
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volume), and it would be expensive for them to investigate.346 Over and above that, 
this complexity will also have an adverse effect on consumer confidence, as it will 
be difficult for this class of consumer to assess whether they ‘qualify’ as a consumer 
at any given time.347 These criticisms do not relate to the fact that small juristic 
persons should be protected, but rather to how they are defined. This will be 
discussed in paragraph 3.4. Lastly, it has been argued that the approach ‘would 
increase the risks of dealing with a small business and would therefore operate 
against their interests’.348 
The report prepared by the Federation of Small Businesses in the UK criticises the 
exclusion of small businesses from the definition of ‘consumer’. Their criticism 
hinges on the  
‘increasing recognition … that smaller business customers, and in particular 
sole traders and micro businesses, are likely to face many of the same problems 
as individual consumers when making purchasing decisions, especially when 
buying products or services that are not directly related to their particular line of 
business’.349 
According to Schüller, ‘consumers are the weaker party, not because they are 
natural persons, but because consumers do not have the resources to analyse and 
overcome their biases’.350 Put differently, behavioural science defines consumers 
according to what they can or cannot do, versus who they are. In addition, ‘[t]he act 
of buying is always in fact done by a natural person (physical entity) even in the case 
of a legal person’.351  
Certainly, small business tends to have individualistic characteristics (compared 
to large business).352 First, despite their separate legal personality, these businesses 
are often hard to distinguish from their owner(s). Secondly, there is no reason to 
346 Fletcher, Karatzas & Kreutzmann-Gallasch op cit note 343 at 15.  
347 See chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.7. 
348 The Confederation of Business Industry in Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission (Law 
Com No 292 and Scot Law Com No 199) Unfair Terms in Contracts (2005) para 5.23.  
349 Fletcher, Karatzas & Kreutzmann-Gallasch op cit note 343 at 3. The Law Commission and 
Scottish Law Commission, writing in the context of the reform of unfair contract terms legislation, 
made the case for the extension of protection to ‘small business contracts’ because they are also 
affected by unfair terms in standard contracts, ‘even when the contracts under which they obtain 
goods or services are in what might be called their area of expertise’ (Law Commission & Scottish 
Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 348 para 5.6). 
350 Schüller ‘op cit note 83 at 141.  
351 Ibid at 130. 
352 Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis op cit note 17 at 15.  
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believe that small businesses have any more knowledge about products than 
individuals.353 In this sense, virtually all customers are at a disadvantage. Thirdly, the 
‘opportunity cost of decision-making’ is just as high, if not higher, as the small 
business has to focus on its core activity in order to stay afloat and does not have the 
resources to dedicate to finding information and making careful decisions. Fourthly, 
small businesses will be reluctant to spend time evaluating decisions, as the (real or 
perceived) benefits derived from the time spent will be low, given that smaller 
businesses have a smaller need for non-core products (in other words, products not 
used to fulfil the businesses’ core function) relative to bigger businesses. Lastly, 
small businesses are also hamstrung by their relatively weak bargaining power.354 
The ‘small business manufacturing a single product which has a major multinational 
as its sole or dominant purchaser’ is an (albeit extreme) example of a scenario where 
the small business will have no power to dictate the terms of the contract.355 The 
Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission used the 
example of 
‘terms that prevent a small retailer which has incurred liability when it resells 
defective goods from passing that liability “back up the chain” to its supplier. 
The retailer is in effect “squeezed” between consumers, on the one hand, and 
the supplier or manufacturer, on the other. This can happen where a relatively 
small number of large suppliers dominate the supply of goods to the retail 
sector. It can also occur in an entirely competitive retail environment: a retailer 
that faces a “brand-specific” demand from its consumers cannot afford not to do 
business with a particular supplier. So, for the benefit of the consumer, a retailer 
may have to replace the manufacturer’s faulty goods with the new goods yet be 
unable to obtain compensation or replacement stock from the manufacturer 
because of clauses allowing the manufacturer to observe lower standards in its 
dealing with the retailer’.356  
In Australia, the Trade Practices Act Review Committee also pointed out that 
juristic persons can be affected by ‘inequalities in the technical expertise required to 
recognise, and the bargaining power to negotiate, a fair bargain’.357 This particular 
353 Roppo op cit note 338 at 315. This is less severe where the transaction takes place within the 
juristic person’s ‘area of expertise’ as opposed to once-off contracts. See Law Commission & Scottish 
Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 348 para 5.19.  
354 Fletcher, Karatzas & Kreutzmann-Gallasch op cit note 343 at 7; Richard Stone & James Devenney 
The Modern Law of Contract 11 ed (2015) at 18.  
355 Fletcher, Karatzas & Kreutzmann-Gallasch op cit note 343 at 7. 
356 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 348 para 5.7. 
357 See Trade Practices Act Review Committee Report to the Minister for Business and Consumer 
Affairs (1976) para 9.40. 
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vulnerability can also be alleviated by providing that the parties to the supply chain 
have an unalienable right of redress in respect of consumer claims.358  
If it is not consumers’ status as individuals that triggers protection, but rather their 
vulnerability, the protection of businesses with the same vulnerabilities seems 
rational. Once this is accepted, the argument for the protection of small businesses 
becomes an argument for ‘normative coherence’, or ‘treating like cases alike’.359 As 
Fletcher and colleagues point out:  
‘If small businesses behave more like consumers than they behave like big 
businesses, then it would be coherent to treat them the same under the law.’360 
Protecting small businesses as consumers also acknowledges their role in 
establishing a healthy, competitive market. This is beneficial to consumers from both 
a price and quality perspective,361 and is referred to as the ‘virtuous cycle’ of 
competition. 
When looking at the ‘quality’ of goods in particular, 
‘[t]here is no obvious policy reason for insisting that a microwave sold to a 
consumer be of acceptable quality, while a microwave sold to a business need 
not be. A business may not necessarily be in any better position to assess 
whether a microwave was of acceptable quality, pre-sale, than is a 
consumer’.362 
However, just as with individual consumers, not all juristic persons are in fact 
vulnerable. The question then becomes how the application of consumer protection 
measures to juristic persons should be limited.363 As Hondius puts it: 
‘The difficulty is where to draw the line. Time and again, legislators have tried 
– and failed – to draw a precise line between small and big.’364
The challenge has been described as seemingly ‘insurmountable’ in the comments 
to art IV.A. – 1:204 of the DCFR, which provides that ‘a consumer contract for sale 
358 This will be discussed in paragraph 3.6.3.3. 
359 This touches on the criterion of rationality discussed in chapter 2, paragraph 2.5.2.  
360 Fletcher, Karatzas & Kreutzmann-Gallasch op cit note 343 at 14.  
361 Ibid; Von Bar, Clive & Schulte-Nölke DCFR Full Edition op cit note 265 at 76. 
362 Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council op cit note 35 at 46. 
363 Limiting the scope of application of consumer protection to individuals is slightly less contentious, 
as their vulnerability is more universal. However, the option of limiting the application of consumer 
protection based on the purpose for which goods were bought will be discussed above in paragraph 
3.4.1. 
364 Hondius ‘The notion of consumer’ op cit note 44 at 96.  
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is a contract for sale in which the seller is a business and the buyer is a consumer’. It 
is pointed out that ‘[e]ach possible solution will seem more or less arbitrary, where it 
is very difficult to provide convincing reasons for the substantive rules chosen’. 
This, then, was why special protection for small businesses was not included.365 This 
is one extreme. On the other end of this spectrum are proposals in which the 
vulnerability of customers is taken as universal, and unqualified protection is 
suggested, or at least protection with the possibility that the parties to a contract can 
agree to exclude the protections.366  
It will never be efficient or fair to require suppliers to investigate the actual 
vulnerability of each and every buyer who is a juristic person. The cost of such a 
legislative intervention will far outweigh its utility. A definition of a vulnerable 
juristic person will have to utilise factual indicators of vulnerability that are easily 
discernible. Some of the methods of limiting the application of consumer protection 
legislation will be discussed below.  
However, even applying and verifying these indicators may place an unfair 
burden on suppliers, particularly in businesses where a high volume of smaller 
transactions are concluded. Another method of alleviating this burden is to allow 
suppliers to accept any statements made by consumers on face value, without further 
verification (much like a warranty), or by regulating the onus of proof. This will be 
discussed in paragraph 3.5. 
It is recommended that small juristic persons ought to be protected. However, the 
burden on suppliers must be alleviated by carefully considering the way in which 
‘juristic person’ is defined, and the allocation of the burden of proof. These aspects 
will be discussed below. 
365 See Von Bar, Clive & Schulte-Nölke DCFR Full Edition op cit note 265 at 1244. 
366 Roppo op cit note 338 at 315; Justin Malbon & Luke Nottage Consumer Law and Policy in 
Australia and New Zealand (2013) 46.  
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3.4. Methods of limiting the application of consumer protection 
legislation 
3.4.1. Approaches to the functional-occupation limitation 
The CPA places no constraints on the purpose for which the goods or services must 
have been supplied, with one exception. The application of the ‘list of contract terms 
which are presumed not to be fair and reasonable’ in reg 44 applies only to a natural 
person who enters into an agreement ‘for purposes wholly or mainly unrelated to his 
or her business or profession’.367 Therefore, consumers who acquire goods or 
services in the course of their business or for their profession are also protected by 
the Act, as long as they are not excluded on any other basis, such as their size, annual 
turnover or asset value (in the case of juristic persons).368 In contrast, the approach 
generally taken in EC law is ‘functional-occupation related’, and ‘activities which 
relate to a business, to a profession or to work are excluded even if the acting party 
as such is not experienced in legal matters’.369  
In a survey done by Consumers International, it was found that ‘[i]n the majority 
of countries, the legal definition of the consumer clearly defines consumption as only 
relating to the supply and household use of goods and services’.370 The Consumer 
Sales Directive provides that a person will only be considered a consumer if he ‘is 
acting for purposes which are not related to his trade, business or profession’.371 The 
original draft of the Consumer Sales Directive372 required a more direct connection 
between the consumer and his business before he would be disqualified from being 
protected as a consumer (the first draft, therefore, had a broader definition of 
consumer).373 It read: ‘… which are not directly related to his trade, business or 
profession …’. This means that so-called dual-purpose goods or mixed contracts 
would also have been subject to the Consumer Sales Directive had this formulation 
been adopted. Dual-purpose goods are goods procured partly for personal use and 
367 Regulation 44(1) GN 293 GG 34180 of 1 April 2011.  
368 The question of whether juristic persons must at all be included in the definition of ‘consumer’ is 
discussed in section 3.3. 
369 Bridge op cit note 333 at 882; Reich, Micklitz & Rott op cit note 39 at 50; Johnston op cit note 
333.  
370 Consumers International op cit note 9 at 4. Sixty countries were surveyed.  
371 Article 1(2)(a).  
372 Article 1(2)(a) of the Proposal for a Consumer Sales Directive. 
373 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner Blackstone’s Guide op cit note 234 at 20; Staudenmayer op cit note 23 
at 549.  
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partly for uses connected to the consumer’s business or profession. Examples of a 
mixed contract are ‘when a doctor buys a car and occasionally uses it to visit his 
patients’374 or when ‘a freelancer buys a computer for personal use as well’.375 
The European Court of Justice has not ruled on the interpretation of the definition 
of consumer under the Consumer Sales Directive, but did rule on arts 13 to 15 of the 
Brussels Convention.376 Article 15 provides that consumers are defined as a person 
contracting ‘for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or 
profession’. In a case involving the purchase of tiles by a farmer for roofing on a 
farm building used partly to house his family, the court held that arts 13 to 15 do not 
apply to 
‘a contract for goods intended for purposes which are in part within and in part 
outside his trade or profession … unless the trade or profession purpose is so 
limited as to be negligible in the overall context of the supply, the fact that the 
private element is predominant being irrelevant in that respect’.377  
This approach is considered very restrictive. This is the case because the case 
dealt with procedural law (the determination of jurisdiction).378 It has been argued 
that determining the ‘predominant use’ of the goods is the appropriate criterion.379 
This position is controversial — there are scholars who argue that it is not certain 
enough.380  
One option suggested in the Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis 
was to widen the definition of consumer to include ‘natural persons acting for 
purposes falling primarily outside … their trade, business and profession’.381 This 
374 Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis op cit note 17 at 15. 
375 Björn Sandrik ‘The battle for the consumer: On the relation between the UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the EU Directives on Consumer Sales’ (2012) 20(4) 
European Review of Private Law 1097 at 1100. 
376 Originally, the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, 1968. It is now called the Brussels I Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters) (2001) Official Journal L 16/1. 
377 Johann Gruber v Bay Wa AG (2005) European Court of Justice, case 464/01 at para 54. 
378 See Terryn, Straetmans & Colaert op cit note 333 at 68. 
379 Sandrik believes that the ‘predominant use’ criterion is also in line with the Consumer Rights 
Directive. Sandrik op cit note 375 at 1101; Reich, Micklitz & Rott op cit note 39 at 51.  
380 Terryn, Straetmans & Colaert op cit note 333 at 69.  
381 Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis op cit note 17 at 16. In Sweden, a consumer is 
defined as ‘a natural person who trades primarily for use outside of the course of business operation 
(sic)’ (§1 of the Consumer Sales Act (SFS 1990:932) translated by Randy G Sklaver & Michael G 
Lindner (2007 Norstedts Juridik)). Sivesand translates the definition as ‘any natural person who is 
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approach was not adopted in the Consumer Rights Directive, despite the fact that 
recital 17 of the Consumer Rights Directive provides that  
‘in the case of dual purpose contracts, where the contract is concluded for 
purposes partly within and partly outside the person’s trade and the trade 
purpose is so limited as not to be predominant in the overall context of the 
contract, that person should also be considered a consumer’. 
The actual definition of consumer in the Consumer Rights Directive refers to ‘any 
natural person who … is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, 
craft or profession’.382 This definition does not accurately reflect the principle 
contained in recital 17. This has resulted in considerable discussions regarding the 
status of a recital in the preamble of a directive. Article 296 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union provides that ‘[l]egal acts shall state the reasons 
on which they are based’.383 This has been interpreted as follows: 
‘It is part of the legal act. It offers an appropriate guideline for the correct 
interpretation of the Directive, since the recitals of the preamble, even if they 
are not repeated in the article of the directive itself, “reflect the will and 
intention of the legislature and therefore shed light to a significant extent both 
on the motives that led to the adoption of the directive and on the objectives 
pursued by it.”’ 384 
A better example of the ‘predominant use’ formulation is contained in art I.-
1:105(1) of the Draft Common Frame of Reference,385 which provides that consumer 
‘means any natural person who is acting primarily for purposes which are not related 
to his or her trade, business or profession’.386 In the comments on the definition, the 
application of the DCFR is explained through illustrations in which the business and 
non-business uses are expressed in percentages. Whichever is the highest determines 
whether the DCFR applies or not, even if the division is as evenly spread as 60/40. 
acting for purposes, which are not directly related to his trade, business or profession’ (Sivesand op cit 
note 195 at 19). In the Finnish Consumer Protection Act (38/1978), the adverb ‘primarily’ is used. 
382 Article 2(1). The same definition is used in art 2(f) of the CESL. Sandrik argues that because the 
Consumer Rights Directives also applies to certain aspects of the sale of goods, the definition of the 
Consumer Sales Directive should be interpreted in the same way so as to prevent the ‘highly peculiar 
results’ that would occur ‘if the notion of consumer would have a different meaning in these matters 
compared to the aspects of consumer sales that are regulated by the CSD’. See Sandrik op cit note 375 
at 1102. 
383 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Official Journal L 
326/47, 26/10/2012.  
384 Terryn, Straetmans & Colaert op cit note 333 at 70, and the cases cited there.  
385 Von Bar, Clive & Schulte-Nölke DCFR Full Edition op cit note 265 at 1241. 
386 Ibid.  
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This is a broader definition than that contained in the Consumer Rights Directive 
when the recital is not considered.387  
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive and Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
also define the consumer as a person who ‘is acting for purposes which are outside 
his trade, business or profession’.388 According to Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, this 
requires a closer connection than under the Consumer Sales Directive before a 
person can be excluded. As they put it, ‘a person may be acting for purposes which 
are outside, but still related to, his business’.389  
The definition in the Unfair Contract Terms Directives was also adopted in the 
United Kingdom Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002, which 
transposed the Consumer Sales Directive.390 However, the United Kingdom 
Consumer Rights Act now defines consumer as ‘an individual acting for purposes 
that are wholly or mainly outside that individual’s trade, business, craft or 
profession’.391 This has amended both the UK SoGA and the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act.392 According to the Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Rights Act, ‘[t]his 
means, for example, that a person who buys a kettle for their home, works from 
home one day a week and uses it on the days when working from home would still 
be a consumer. Conversely, a sole trader that operates from a private dwelling who 
387 Martijn W. Hesselink ‘Towards a sharp distinction between B2B and B2C? On consumer, 
commercial and general contract law after the Consumer Rights Directive’ (January 2010) No. 
2009/06 Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series 1 at 14. 
388 Article 2(b) of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and art 2(a) of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive.  
389 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner Blackstone’s Guide op cit note 234 at 20. The fact that the two 
Directives have not been aligned has been described as unfortunate.  
390 SI 2002/3045. 
391 Section 2(3).  
392 The UK SoGA has mainly been replaced by the Consumer Rights Act, ‘but some provisions of 
[the SoGA] will still apply, for example, rules which are applicable to all contracts of sale of goods 
(as defined by that Act – essentially these are sales of goods for money), regarding matters such as 
when property in goods passes. [The SoGA] will still apply to business to business contracts and to 
consumer to consumer contracts’. In the case of the Unfair Contract Terms Act, the Consumer Rights 
Act replaces the provisions relating to business-to-consumer contracts, and ‘[t]he UCTA will be 
amended so that it covers business to business and consumer to consumer contracts only’. See UK 
Government Consumer Rights Act 2015 (c. 15): Explanatory Notes available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2015/15/notes/contents, accessed on 24 April 2016 at 7; Stone 
& Devenney op cit note 354 at 226. The case law under the previous formulation of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act (e.g. R & B Custom Brokers Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 
321) will be discussed in the context of juristic persons in paragraph 3.4.2.
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buys a printer of which 95% of the use is for the purposes of the business, is not 
likely to be held to be a consumer’.393 
In Australia, the traditional functional-occupation limitation is used in respect of 
transactions where the price of the goods exceeds a prescribed threshold (currently 
AUD 40 000).394 If the transaction value is below AUD 40 000, the limitation does 
not apply. The limitation is formulated differently from the formulations discussed 
above. It provides that ‘a person is taken to have acquired particular goods as a 
consumer if, and only if … (b) the goods were of a kind ordinarily acquired for 
personal, domestic or household use or consumption’.395 The test here can be 
distinguished from the European approach in that it focuses on the nature of the 
goods rather than the intention of the buyer.396  
The Australian courts have given this requirement a wide interpretation to 
‘include transactions between companies involving goods or services which 
households might commonly acquire’.397 The test is objective and aimed at 
‘determining what the goods and services are ordinarily used for rather than looking 
at what they are actually used for’.398 It does not matter that the goods in question are 
often bought for commercial purposes,399 or that the goods will in fact be used by a 
business.400  
Problems arise in borderline cases where goods are ordinarily used for both 
domestic and commercial purposes. In such cases, ‘[d]etermining whether goods or 
services are ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household purposes is a 
question of fact and will depend on the type or class of the goods or services and 
393 ‘Consumer Rights Act 2015 (c. 15): Explanatory Notes’ op cit note 392 at 10. 
394 Section 3(1)(a) of schedule 2, chapter 1, of the the Australian Competition and Consumer Act 
provides that any transaction with a price of less than AUD 40 000 is subject to the act, regardless of 
the purpose for which the goods were bought. See Russell V Miller Miller’s Annotated Trade 
Practices Act: Australian Competition and Consumer Law 27 ed (2006) 82. The use of thresholds to 
‘cap’ consumer protection will be discussed in para 3.4.4.  
395 Section 3(1)(b).  
396 Malbon & Nottage op cit note 366 at 44. 
397 Holding Redlich ‘The application of the Australian Consumer Law to B2B transactions’ available 
at http://www.holdingredlich.com.au/assets/docs/The%20application%20of%20the%20australian 
%2028%20march.2.pdf, accessed on 9 June 2016 at 2.  
398 Ibid; Stephen Corones & Philip H Clarke Australian Consumer Law: Commentary and Materials 
(2015) 446. Cf Malbon & Nottage op cit note 366 at 48. The authors point out that ‘the definition’s 
apparent objectivity is deceptive: it is underpinned by subjective analysis’.  
399 Miller op cit note 394 at 82. 
400 Corones & Clarke op cit note 398 at 446. This is subject to the ‘commercialisation limitation’, 
which will be discussed in the next section.  
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how the goods or services are actually used’.401 What is evident is that the 
application of the test can be very complicated, and the results artificial and 
inconsistent. For instance, in Carpet Call Pty Ltd v Chan,402‘[c]arpet was found to be 
goods ordinarily acquired for domestic consumption and did not lose that description 
because it was of commercial quality or had some other quality which made it last 
longer than carpet normally supplied for domestic use’.403 On the other hand, air-
conditioning units purchased for a motel business was subject to the Competition 
and Consumer Act because it was held by the court that ‘they were of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for personal or domestic use’.404 In Bunnings Pty Ltd v Laminex 
Group Limited,405 the buyer was a home hardware retailer who bought insulation for 
use in the construction of its warehouses. It was held that this was goods ‘ordinarily 
acquired for personal or domestic use’. 
The Australian definition of ‘consumer’ has been described as ‘positively 
generous in comparison to the interpretation of “consumer” in relation to the relevant 
EU Directives and the interpretation of the term by the European Court of Justice’.406 
This conclusion is by and large based on the fact that the Australian definition allows 
for the protection of juristic persons.  
The ‘functional-occupation related’ approach to defining ‘consumer’ has been 
criticised, as it ‘creates a number of arbitrary delimitations and excludes persons who 
are also in need of protection’.407 Micklitz, Reich and Rott point out that it has to be 
remembered that ‘this narrow definition was first developed in matters of jurisdiction 
where, according to the European Court of Justice, not only questions of consumer 
protection, but also of legal and procedural certainty concerning the place where a 
case is to be heard must be taken into account’.408 They refer to the consumer as the 
‘non-professional market participant’ in ‘all transactions which are pre-determined 
by the marketing strategies of business (including use of pre-formulated terms) 
where the receiving party (the consumer or user) is usually in a “take it or leave it” 
401 Holding Redlich op cit note 397 at 2. 
402 (1987) ATPR (Digest) 46-025. 
403 Miller op cit note 394 at 82. 
404 Cinema Center Services Pty Ltd v Eastaway Air Conditioning Pty Ltd (1999) ASAL 55-034.  
405 (2006) 153 FCR 479. 
406 Malbon & Nottage op cit note 366 at 49. 
407 Hans-W Micklitz, Norbert Reich & Peter Rott Understanding EU Consumer Law (2009) 49. 
408 Ibid. This refers to the decision in Johann Gruber supra note 377 para 43.   
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situation’.409 The authors conclude that the focus should not be on the purpose of the 
transaction  
‘but rather with the position of the person in the marketplace. Consumer in this 
sense is the “passive market citizen” … who is entering into transactions to 
satisfy his needs without producing the product or service himself’.410  
Put differently, consumer protection should be ‘user protection’. The 
‘professional expertise of the provider’ is more pertinent than the ‘non-professional 
activity of the user’ when determining the scope of consumer protection.411 
In addition, and importantly for South Africa, it is noted in the Consumers 
International report that 
‘[t]he strict separation of business from personal life is a product of the 19th and 
20th Century industrial revolutions and is not found to the same extent in 
emerging and developing countries, especially in rural area. Where consumers 
are, for example, engaged in small-scale production and live and work in the 
same place (“above the shop”, as it were), it becomes almost impossible to 
draw a clear distinction between purchases of goods and services for business 
or for personal use’. 412  
The functional-occupation limitation is contrary to the policy position taken by 
the South African legislature, which is specifically (and explicitly) aimed at 
protecting small businesses (whether they are juristic persons or sole proprietors).413 
It has been criticised on this basis alone.414 There are also authors who believe that 
consumer protection is not only meant to protect ‘orphans and widows’. This was 
discussed in chapter 2, paragraph 2.2, in the context of conceptualising 
‘vulnerability’. In addition, the fact that juristic persons share a lot of the 
vulnerabilities of individuals was discussed in paragraph 3.3. By contrast, the 
functional-occupation limitation assumes that buyers who intend to use the goods for 
commercial purposes are either less vulnerable415 or can, and should, protect 
themselves. 
409 Micklitz, Reich & Rott op cit note 407 at 50. 
410 Reich, Micklitz & Rott op cit note 39 at 53. 
411 Ibid 39 at 54.  
412 See Consumers International op cit note 9 at 4. 
413 The application of the test to juristic persons is discussed in paragraph 3.4.2 below.  
414 Malbon & Nottage op cit note 366 at 44.  
415 For instance, it is apparently assumed that a consumer who purchases goods for purposes of his 
core business (e.g. manufacture or resale) will be more knowledgeable about the products or will have 
more resources to overcome any information asymmetry that exists.  
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It is clear from the discussion above that the inclusion of the ‘functional-
occupational’ limitation is not without interpretive problems. First, any formulation 
will be open to some conflicting interpretation when it comes to dual-purpose 
contracts. Secondly, making the extension of protection dependent on the intention 
of one of the parties at the time of the transaction leads to uncertainty, as it is 
difficult to ascertain, and may not be fair to a supplier faced with a high volume of 
transactions and/or transactions of relatively low value.416 As Nottage points out: 
‘Clearly, suppliers need to know which of their transactions should be 
considered consumer orientated, as the allocation of cost and risk is dependent 
on this knowledge. Consumers also require this knowledge in order to possess 
an awareness of their rights… . The interests of both parties demand more 
clarity.’417 
On these grounds, there are no cogent policy reasons to incorporate this 
requirement into the CPA. 
3.4.2. Atypical contracts, or the end-user of the product (the 
commercialisation limitation) 
Another way of limiting the application of consumer protection legislation is to 
require that the consumer must be the end-user or ‘final addressee’, or that, in the 
case of a business, the contract must be atypical. This is essentially a more curtailed 
version of the functional-occupational limitation in that the goods in question must 
be purchased for commercialisation. It will by and large fulfil the function of 
limiting the application of consumer legislation to juristic persons. However, it could 
also apply to individuals who run a business in their own name. For purposes of this 
section, the question is whether it should be applied to both individuals and juristic 
persons.  
Whether the product was intended for resale was included in one of the initial 
drafts of the CPA, which provided that the Act would not apply to a juristic person if 
the value of the transaction exceeded a certain threshold and  
‘the goods or services are supplied to a person in the supply chain who in the 
ordinary course of business⎯ 
416  The possible alleviation of this concern by imposing an onus on the consumer is discussed in 
paragraph 3.5.  
417 Malbon & Nottage op cit note 366 at 49.  
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(aa)  markets those goods for resale, irrespective whether to other persons in 
the supply chain or directly to consumers; or 
(bb)  applies or utilises those goods or services in the production of other 
goods or services, or in the marketing of any goods or services, 
irrespective whether to other persons in the supply chain or directly to 
consumers’.418 
The underlying premise is that if goods are intended for resale or other forms of 
commercialisation, the consumer is less vulnerable. 
This approach has been adopted in varied forms in France, Poland, Latvia and 
Luxembourg, and was previously employed in the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act.419 
In France, protection is extended to a legal person ‘concluding contracts which are 
not directly related … with [its] profession’.420 This formulation is identical to the 
functional-occupation limitation. When the French courts applied this section to an 
estate agent who had bought a defective alarm system, the estate agency was 
protected ‘because the subject matter of the contract did not bear any direct relation 
to the substance of the business activity and because the technical expertise of an 
estate agency did not encompass the technology of alarm systems, by reason of 
which the buyer must be treated just as any other consumer’.421 However, in later 
decisions, the courts pointed out that the enquiry should not be into the technical 
competencies of the individual, but rather whether the ‘contract is directly related to 
the business activity’.422 Be that as it may, the decisions seem to be based on the 
underlying premise that a business can also experience inequality of economic power 
and information asymmetry.  
Other examples where juristic persons are also considered to be consumers when 
concluding ‘atypical contracts’ can be found in Poland, Latvia423 and, before it was 
amended by the Consumer Rights Act in 2015, under s 12(1) of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act in the United Kingdom. Previously under the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 
UK consumers were always protected, and juristic persons were protected if the 
418 Section 5(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Consumer Protection Bill B 19B⎯2008. 
419 Schulte-Nölke (ed) op cit note 333 at 459.  
420 Schulte-Nölke (ed) op cit note 333 at 458; Micklitz, Stuyck & Terryn op cit note 49 at 33. Also see 
Fletcher, Karatzas & Kreutzmann-Gallasch op cit note 343 at 18; Hesselink op cit note 387 at 14.  
421 Cass. Civ. of 28 April 1987 (JCP 1987. II. 20893 Juris-classeur periodique) as discussed in 
Schulte-Nölke (ed) op cit note 333 at 458. 
422 Cass. Civ. of 24 January 1995 (Recueil Dalloz Sirey 1995) as discussed in Schulte-Nölke (ed) op 
cit note 333 at 459. 
423 Schulte-Nölke (ed) op cit note 333 at 459. 
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goods were ‘of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption’.424 In 
R & B Custom Brokers Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd,425 the buyer was a 
shipping brokerage who bought a motor vehicle for the business and private use of 
its directors. This was not the only time that the business had purchased motor 
vehicles. In this case, it was found that the purchase was only incidental to the 
business (the degree of regularity was not such that it could be said that it was an 
integral part of the business), and that the buyer was therefore ‘dealing as a 
consumer’ — in other words, it was protected by the Unfair Contract Terms Act. 
Although the judgment was a useful guide to the interpretation of the ‘non-
commercial use’ requirement, the application of this judgment was not extended to 
UK consumer protection law generally.426 The decision has also been reversed by the 
Consumer Rights Act. 
It is submitted that this limitation is too narrow, even in the context of juristic 
persons. This conclusion is based on the considerations set out in paragraph 3.4.1 
above. 
Another way of framing the commercialisation limitation is to limit the 
application of consumer protection laws to the ‘final addressee’ or ‘end-user’ of 
goods or services. This definition is used in Spain, with the addition that the 
consumer must not have ‘the aim of integrating [the goods] in production, 
transformation, commercialisation processes’.427 Article 1(4)(a) of the Greek 
Consumer Protection Act defines consumer as a ‘natural or legal person, at whom 
products or services on a market are aimed and who makes use of such products and 
services, so long as the person is the end recipient’.428 This is a more inclusive 
limitation (and will make it easier for a business to be a consumer) than the 
424 Section 12. Now, juristic persons will only be protected where the attempt to exclude or limit 
liability is unreasonable (s 11). See Stone & Devenney op cit note 392 at 273. 
425 [1988] 1 WLR 321. 
426 So, for instance, the same interpretation is not given to ‘in the course of a business’ as used in 
s 14(2) of the UK SoGA, which is aimed at establishing whether that act should apply to a particular 
supplier (Stevenson v Rogers 1999 QB 1028 from 1040; Schulte-Nölke (ed) op cit note 333 at 459; H 
G Beale (General Ed) Chitty on Contracts 31 ed (2012) 1487; Stone & Devenney op cit note 392 at 
253).  
427 Article 1(2) and (3) of the Law 26/1984 of July 19 on Consumer Protection. See Schulte-Nölke 
(ed) op cit note 333 at 458. 
428 Law 2251/1994. Other countries who employ the notion of the final addressee or end-user are 
Hungary and Luxembourg. See Schulte-Nölke (ed) op cit note 333 at 458. 
86 
functional-occupation or atypical-contract limitations, as a business can be the end-
user of goods or services, while still using them for commercial purposes.  
Australia has adopted a limitation that is slightly narrower than the end-user 
limitation, but not as wide as the functional-occupation or atypical-contract 
formulation. The Australian Competition and Consumer Act defines a ‘consumer’ as 
a person (including juristic persons) who paid less than AUD 40 000 for the goods or 
bought goods ‘of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use 
or consumption’, regardless of whether the goods were bought by a natural or juristic 
person, as long as the consumer  
‘did not acquire the goods, or hold himself or herself out as acquiring the goods, 
for the purpose of re-supply or for the purpose of using them up or transforming 
them, in trade or commerce, in the course of a process of production or 
manufacture or of repairing or treating other goods or fixtures on land’.429 
Corones and Clarke use the following table to explain the operation of the 
limitation (in conjunction with the other requirements in the definition):430 
Examples of consumers Examples of non-consumers 
1. The purchaser of a $10,000
second-hand car
1. The purchaser of a $10,000
second-hand car acquired as
part of a hobby of restoring
and selling of old cars
2. A printing company that
leased a commercial printer
for $35,000
2. The purchaser of a new
$2,000 television set who
acquired it to lease to a friend
429 Section 3(1) and (2) of schedule 2, chapter 1, of the Competition and Consumer Act, read with the 
definition of ‘person’ in s 22(a) of the Acts Interpretation Act, 1901, which provides that ‘person’ 
includes ‘body politic or commercial as well as an individual’; Luke Nottage ‘The government’s 
proposed review of Australia’s contract law: An interim positive response’ in Mary Keyes & Therese 
Wilson (eds) Codifying Contract Law: International and Consumer Law Perspectives (2014) 138; 
Luke Nottage ‘Consumer law reform in Australia: Contemporary and comparative constructive 
criticism’ (2009) 9(2) Queensland University of Technology Law & Justice Journal 111 at 122; 
Australian Competitor & Consumer Commission ‘Business rights’ available at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/business/business-rights-protections/business-rights, accessed on 7 June 
2016. However, note that the sections on unfair contract terms are limited to consumer contracts, 
which are restricted to contracts with individuals for goods ‘wholly or predominantly for personal, 
domestic or household use’ (s 23(3)). See Jeannie Paterson Unfair Contract Terms in Australia (2012) 
58; Standing Committee of Officials of Consumer Affairs An Australian Consumer Law: Fair 
Markets — Confident Consumers (2009) available at http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/ 
1484/PDF/An_Australian_Consumer_Law.pdf, accessed on 7 June 2016 at 32; Commonwealth 
Treasury The Australian Consumer Law: Consultation on Draft Provisions on Unfair Contract Terms 
(2009), available at http://archive.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?ContentID=1537, accessed on 
7 June 2016 at 8.  
430 Corones & Clarke op cit note 398 at 450. 
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3. A company that purchased a
$300,000 car for an executive
3. A small farmer who
purchased a second hand
tractor for $50,000
4. A furniture removal company
that purchased a new vehicle
for its business
4. A commercial furniture
maker who purchased timber
for $20,000 to be used in its
business
5. A farmer who purchased a
stud ram for $40,000
5. A farmer who purchased a
stud ram for $41,000
6. The ACCC when it purchases
toilet rolls
6. A school child who
purchased lemons for $30 to
make drinks to sell at a
school fete
In short, 
‘[t]he person remains a consumer even though goods are required for the 
purpose of using them up unless the goods are used up, relevantly, “in the 
course of repairing or treating other goods” or “in the course of the process of 
repairing or treating other goods”’.431 
Despite the conclusion in paragraph 3.4.1 that there are no cogent policy reasons 
to incorporate the ‘occupational-functional’ limitation, it is nonetheless 
recommended that the ‘commercialisation limitation’ be included, for the following 
reasons: 
a) It has been argued that the similarities between juristic persons and
consumers are less pronounced when the product in question is ‘directly
related to their [the small business’] particular line of business’.432 When
goods are resold or used in the production process, they directly relate to the
core business of the supplier. The rationale would be that one can expect that
a juristic person would act diligently when it comes to such transactions.
b) In terms of the quality of the goods, manufacturers, distributors and retailers
(in other words, the entire supply chain) are liable to the consumer in terms
of the CPA.433 In order to avoid the risk of liability, a buyer could be
431 Lewis v GWS Machinery Pty Ltd (2007) NSWSC 316 para 142.  
432 See Fletcher, Karatzas & Kreutzmann-Gallasch op cit note 343 at 4. 
433 Sections 56 and 61 are discussed in paragraph 3.6.3 below.  
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expected to make inquiries into the quality of the products that are bought for 
resale or as components of the buyer’s own product, and/or to insure against 
liability when something does go wrong.434  
c) It will be easier to establish that goods are intended for resale or production
purposes without too much investigation on the part of the supplier. Several
characteristics of the transaction could indicate that the small business
purchases the goods for resale or production purposes. These are the nature
and purpose of the goods, the nature of the buyer’s business (what they sell),
the quantity of goods purchased, and whether the transaction repeats
(whether there is a supply agreement). This means that the criticism that the
‘occupational-functional’ limitation is difficult for suppliers to apply does not
hold equally true here. Put differently, this limitation is less likely to operate
unfairly towards suppliers. Any residual unfairness that remains can be
resolved by adjusting the burden of proof. This is discussed in paragraph 3.5.
This raises the question whether the ‘commercialisation’ limitation recommended 
in respect of small juristic persons should be extended to sole proprietors too. 
Although there has been extensive argument about the fact that small juristic persons 
have the same vulnerabilities as individuals, individuals are undeniably more 
exposed when things do go wrong.435 This is for the simple reason that a juristic 
person has an economic and legal identity that is deliberately distinguishable from 
the individuals who run and own the business. For a sole proprietor, the exposure to 
potential loss is very personal. So, the first rationale for unlimited protection for sole 
proprietors (versus incorporated small entities) is that they are more exposed. The 
second rationale is one of practicality and certainty. Distinguishing a sole proprietor 
from other individuals is not as easy as identifying an incorporated entity (where it is 
reflected in the name). It would require the introduction of an investigation akin to 
that required for implementing the occupational-functional limitation (expecting the 
supplier to ask: ‘Will you be using this in your business or profession?’). It would be 
434 It will be argued in paragraph 3.6.3.3 below that retailers should have a right of redress against 
their suppliers where the retailer is held responsible by a consumer for a post-purchase quality 
problem. This redress does not have to (nor should it) be achieved by including the retailer in the 
definition of ‘consumer’. 
435 Fletcher and colleagues refer specifically to the vulnerability of ‘sole traders and micro 
businesses’. See Fletcher, Karatzas & Kreutzmann-Gallasch op cit note 343 at 3. 
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preferable to accept that not being incorporated is a sufficient indicator of 
vulnerability, and leave it at that.  
3.4.3. The size of the juristic person 
The size of the juristic person can also be a delineating factor. The rationale is that 
smaller juristic persons will not have the resources in order to overcome their 
vulnerabilities (e.g. their weak bargaining power and information asymmetry). This 
is the approach ultimately taken in the CPA.436  
If one were to assume that the size of the juristic person ought to be a factor, it 
raises the question as to how size should be quantified and what the thresholds 
should be. In South Africa, the application of the CPA depends on the asset value or 
annual turnover of the juristic person at the time of the transaction. If, at the time of 
the transaction, either of these values exceeds the threshold determined by the 
Minister, the buyer will not be considered a consumer. As pointed out in paragraph 
3.2, there are several difficulties with this test that undermine its fairness and 
practicality.  
In the EU, micro, small and medium enterprises are defined according to their 
number of employees and their annual turnover and/or balance sheet.437 In the case 
of a micro enterprise, the thresholds are ten employees and an annual turnover 
and/or annual balance sheet of less than €2 million.438 In the UK, a threshold of nine 
employees has been suggested.439 The UK Financial Conduct Authority also uses an 
annual turnover threshold of £1 million to classify ‘small businesses’.440 The 
application of the CESL to business-to-business contracts would have been limited 
436 The current threshold is R2 million. See the discussion and criticism in paragraph 3.2. 
437 Article 2(3) of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 
concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises Official Journal L 124, 
20/05/2003 (Commission Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises). Small enterprises employ fewer than 50 persons and have an annual turnover 
and/or annual balance sheets of less than €10 million. Medium enterprises employ fewer than 250 
persons and have an annual turnover of less than €50 million and an annual balance sheet of less than 
€43 million. This approach is also used in the telecommunications industry in the United Kingdom. 
See Fletcher, Karatzas & Kreutzmann-Gallasch op cit note 343 at 15. 
438 Commission Recommendation on the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises op 
cit note 438 art 2(3).  
439 The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission have referred to this as the ‘primary aspect’ 
of the definition of small business (Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms op 
cit note 348 para 5.34; Commission Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises op cit note 438 recital 4).  
440 Fletcher, Karatzas & Kreutzmann-Gallasch op cit note 343 at 15.  
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to contracts where at least one of the traders is a small or medium-sized enterprise 
(SME).441 An SME was defined as ‘a trader which (a) employs fewer than 250 
persons; and (b) has an annual turnover not exceeding €50 million or an annual 
balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million’.442  
Using the number of employees as a threshold is not without its challenges. First, 
the supplier will depend on the consumer to ascertain the number. Secondly, it is not 
a static criterion, but will fluctuate over time, which increases search costs, as it has 
to be done for every transaction. Thirdly, it can be an artificial indicator of size. By 
their very nature, some industries are more labour-intensive than others. It is 
therefore not a standardised measuring tool.443 Lastly, the definition of employee 
will be crucial. Many large businesses (such as Über) make significant use of 
independent contractors who do not fall within the definition of employee under 
labour law.444 
Turnover as a threshold value has been criticised on the grounds that it will be 
difficult and impractical for the trader to assess the financial statements of the other 
party.445 Secondly, it is not an accurate indicator of the size or vulnerability of the 
business, as some industries ‘have a small profit to turnover ratio because there is 
considerable outlay involved in reaching the finished saleable product’. 446 These 
businesses may be less sophisticated than businesses in the service industry, where 
the profit-to-turnover ratio is larger. In addition, businesses in the retail and 
distribution sectors may have larger turnovers than their manufacturers.447 Thirdly,  
441 Article 7. 
442 This is much higher than the threshold suggested by the Law Commission and Scottish Law 
Commission. They recommend that protection should be extended to the most vulnerable businesses 
only, i.e. micro businesses (Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 
348 para 5.35).  
443 This is evident from the schedule to the National Small Enterprise Act 102 of 1996, in which this 
indicator is used with varying thresholds depending on the sector.  
444 The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission recommended that the definition of 
‘employee’ should not only include employment contracts, but also contracts for services (Law 
Commission & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 348 para 5.41).   
445 Horst Eidenmüller, Nils Jansen, Eva-Maria Kieninger, Gerhard Wagner & Reinhard Zimmermann 
‘The proposal for a regulation on a Common European Sales Law: Deficits of the most recent textual 
layer of European contract law’ (2012) 16(3) The Edinburgh Law Review 301 at 304. This was 
discussed in paragraph 3.2 in the context of the threshold used in the CPA. In some instances, it will 
even be difficult for the consumer to ascertain the value of the business at any given time.  
446 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 348 para 5.36.  
447 Recital 4 of the Commission Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises op cit note 438. 
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‘key elements in the rules must be certainty, accessibility and predictability for 
persons acting in the market. Turnover is rarely accurately ascertainable on the 
“face” of the business. It will be easier for the other party to determine whether 
it is dealing with a small business if the criterion is simply one of employee 
numbers. A turnover criterion may be suitable for administrative regimes 
setting tax exemptions or subsidy levels where it would be used as a threshold 
criterion which, once satisfied, would entitle a business to membership of a 
certain class for a period of time. It is more difficult to see how it would work 
in regard to transactions. The fact that the size of the business must be 
reassessed with each transaction means that the inherent variability of a 
turnover criterion would be likely to cause problems for a business of marginal 
size’.448 
Lastly, in some instances, disclosing turnover will reveal sensitive information, 
such as the pricing used by the consumer. This will be the case where the small 
business relies on a small number of key contracts. This will ‘place the [supplier] in 
a strong position to exact stricter terms from the small business’. 
Annual turnover, asset value and number of employees are all fluctuating values. 
This raises a further concern: Must these values be determined at the time of each 
transaction (assuming multiple transactions with the same consumer)? Determining 
these values afresh at the time of each transaction does not seem practical. 
Article 4(1) of the European Commission Recommendation concerning the 
definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises provides that the data and 
financial amounts that must be used ‘are those relating to the latest approved 
accounting period and calculated on an annual basis’. If an enterprise exceeds the 
threshold for two consecutive accounting periods, it will lose its status as micro, 
small or medium-sized enterprise.449 In the case of new businesses, the determination 
will be made using ‘a bona fide estimate made in the course of the financial year’.450 
The Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission 
recommended that the ‘size of a business should be calculated by averaging the 
number of persons employed by that business or by it and any associated business 
over the preceding year’.451  
Some small businesses may be less vulnerable because they operate within a 
larger group. This is taken into account in the Commission Recommendation 
concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, which 
448 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 348 para 5.37. 
449 Op cit note 438 art 4(2).  
450 Ibid art 4(3).  
451 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 348 para 5.46. 
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introduces the concept of partner and linked enterprises.452 A similar exemption was 
recommended by the Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law 
Commission.453 
It has been argued that a measure of consumer protection, subject to the 
commercialisation limitation, should be extended to ‘small’ juristic persons. This 
raises the very difficult question of how ‘small’ is small enough. The extent of the 
challenge posed by this question is evident from the widely divergent approaches 
outlined above. It seems that the overriding aim must be to find a method of 
measurement that is easy to ascertain and certain to prevent an escalation in 
transaction costs. This immediately excludes the annual turnover, asset value or 
balance sheet of the buyer, as those figures are not always readily available and are 
fixed in time (in other words, at the company year-end), making measurement ‘at the 
time of the transaction’ impossible. This means that there are persuasive policy 
reasons to amend the current formulation of the exclusion in s 5(2)(b) of the CPA. 
3.4.4. The size of the transaction 
During the drafting process, transaction size was contemplated as a limitation on the 
application of the CPA. In an earlier draft, it provided that if the consumer is a 
juristic person, the Bill would not apply if ‘the value of the transaction exceeds the 
threshold value determined by the Minister’.454  
As discussed above, the Australian Competition and Consumer Act makes use (in 
part) of a monetary threshold in its definition of ‘consumer’ in s 3(1)(a). This 
definition is used despite opposition from the Consumer Affairs Advisory Council, 
452 Commission Recommendation on the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises op 
cit note 438 art 3. The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission suggest ‘a provision 
exempting from the regime those small businesses that are “associated with” larger businesses, for 
example, where they belong to the same group of companies’ (Law Commission & Scottish Law 
Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 348 para 5.34). Also see Hesselink op cit note 387 at 14.  
453 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 348 para 5.54. 
454 Section 5(2)(b)(ii) of the second discussion draft of the Consumer Protection Bill, 2007, dated 21 
September 2006. This was eventually changed after submissions were received expressing a 
preference for limiting the application of the Act to juristic persons in relation to their size (see 
Consumer Protection Bill B 19C⎯2008, as amended by the Portfolio Committee on Trade and 
Industry; ‘Presentation to the Select Committee on Economic & Foreign Affairs of 16 October 2008’ 
available at http://slideplayer.com/slide/9866348/, accessed on 30 March 2016; Parliamentary 
Research Unit op cit note 314 at 5; Tjakie Naudé ‘Proposals for amendment of Consumer Protection 
Bill’ available at www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/ 080826proftjakiesub.doc, accessed on 27 October 
2008). 
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who supported the removal of the monetary threshold.455 Specifically, they were of 
the view that  
‘there is no meaningful distinction to be made between a person who pays 
$40 000 for goods or services and a person who pays $40 001. The focus of the 
definition should be on the class of person who makes the purchase, or on the 
kind of goods or services which are purchased’.456 
A similar approach was taken in its predecessor, the Trade Practices Act of 
1974.457 At that time already, the approach was criticised as ‘convoluted and 
seemingly quite arbitrary’.458 It has also been said to ‘reveal a distinctive Australian 
bias favouring the protection of “small business”, which may extend to very large 
inter-firm deals and which is actually of debatable merit for individual 
consumers’.459 Justice Steven Rares also pointed out that ‘[o]ne wonders why such 
[large] corporations have any need for the thicket of protection given to a consumer 
in the Australian Consumer Law’.460 
This criticism was made in the context of s 68A of the Trade Practices Act, which 
provided that warranty liability could be excluded if it is ‘fair and reasonable’ and 
the goods are not ordinarily for personal use. The provisions on unfair contract terms 
now apply to individuals only.461 The criticism also largely relates to the use of a 
monetary threshold, and not the commercialisation limitation as such. 
By contrast, Fletcher and colleagues point out that the low actual or perceived 
value of time spent making purchasing decisions as well as the weak bargaining 
position of smaller businesses is more the result of the size of the transaction than the 
455 S G Corones The Australian Consumer Law (2011) at 85. A second and third edition have been 
published, the latter in May 2016. I could however not obtain access to the latest edition in time. 
456 Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council op cit note 35; Standing Committee of 
Officials of Consumer Affairs op cit note 429 at 65. The Standing Committee questioned the use of 
the monetary threshold and pointed out that if it is retained, the value must be reviewed, since it has 
been in place, unchanged, since 1995. See the discussion of the legislative history of the threshold in 
Malbon & Nottage op cit note 366 at 42. The relevance of the monetary threshold is one of the issues 
which will be debated in the current review of the Australian Consumer Law (see Consumer Affairs 
Australia and New Zealand op cit note 36 at 11). 
457 See s 4B(1) of the Trade Practices Act, 1974.  
458 Nottage ‘Consumer law reform’ op cit note 429 at 122. 
459 Ibid at 131.  
460 Rares op cit note 263 para 42.  
461 See the discussion in note 429 above. The fact that there are separate definitions of ‘consumer’ 
makes for a ‘definitional morass’, which ‘creates practical, commercial and legal problems for 
someone who deals with more than one of the three different defined classes of “consumer”’. See 
Rares op cit note 263 para 53; Jacqueline Downes ‘The Australian Consumer law - is it really a new 
era of consumer protection’ (2011) 19 AJCCL 5 at 12. 
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size of the juristic person.462 In other words, when the transaction is small, 
businesses are less likely to invest time in ensuring that they make the right decision 
(e.g. do comparative shopping), thoroughly determine the quality of the goods, or 
negotiate terms. This is reflected in the fact that the procurement procedures (such as 
getting more than one quote or requiring managerial supervision) of most businesses 
will also be triggered by the size of the transaction. The Law Commission of 
England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission have recommended that 
juristic persons should not be protected against unfair contract terms in respect of 
contracts with a value of more than £500 000.463 They admitted that ‘[t]his 
transaction limit proposal is likely to present the parties with problems of 
ascertainability and predictability similar to those presented by the employee 
numbers test for business size’.464 In some cases, the price will not be known in 
advance, as will often be the case with contracts for services where the price is 
determined by the ultimate frequency of the use of the services, or for building 
contracts where the amount of materials will not be known in advance.  
However, in most cases, the price will be known. That being said, the 
determination of a threshold is often arbitrary (as is the case with any threshold) and 
can lead to illogical results. For example, big businesses concluding small 
transactions will be protected, while small businesses concluding large transactions 
will not. A small business buying an expensive product will have no protection, 
despite the fact that it stands to lose more than would have been the case if the 
product were inexpensive. 
If certainty is the litmus test, however, the value of the transaction seems to be the 
‘lesser of all evils’ because, in most cases, the value of the transaction is known to 
462 Fletcher, Karatzas & Kreutzmann-Gallasch op cit note 343 at 18; Hesselink op cit note 387 at 8.  
463 Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 348 para 5.59. This value 
is relatively high because it is primarily aimed at ensuring that finance businesses who have relatively 
few employees, but deal with sophisticated, high-value transactions, are not classified and protected 
as small businesses (para 5.56). It is also designed to ensure that small businesses that are vulnerable 
due to the fact that they have only one large customer are still protected (para 5.57). Lastly, it was felt 
that even small businesses could be expected to seek legal advice in respect of transactions of a value 
higher than £500 000 (para 5.58).  
464 Ibid at para 5.62.  
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the parties at the time of conclusion. In practice, suppliers are free not to investigate 
if it is too expensive or complex, and to treat all their customers as consumers.465 
3.4.5. Recommendations regarding imposing limitations on the 
definition of ‘consumer’ 
In summary, it is recommended that: 
a) the CPA should apply to all natural persons, regardless of the purpose for
which they buy the goods; and
b) the CPA should also apply to juristic persons, except if the transaction value
is above the prescribed threshold or the products are bought for resale or for
transformation into a product for resale, will be used up or transformed in the
course of production or manufacture, or are used up or transformed in the
course of repairing or treating other goods or fixtures on land.
This means that individuals will be protected, regardless of the transaction value 
or the purpose for which the goods were bought. If the buyer is a juristic person, and 
the transaction value is higher than the threshold value, the buyer will not be 
protected, regardless of the purpose for which the goods were bought. If the buyer is 
a juristic person who purchases the goods for commercial reasons, the buyer will not 
be protected, regardless of the transaction value. The most controversial scenario 
created by this proposal is that if the transaction value is below the threshold, juristic 
persons will be protected, regardless of their size; if they buy the goods for 
commercialisation, however, they will not be protected. It is submitted that the 
application of the commercialisation limitation mitigates the fact that large juristic 
persons will also be protected. 
It is submitted that the threshold for transaction value should be low in order to 
minimise the impact of the inclusion of juristic persons in the definition of 
‘consumer’. It is suggested that it be set in the region of R15 000. This amount can 
always be increased over time.  
465 Due to space constraints, how the transaction value must be calculated has not been discussed. 
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Admittedly, this solution is not perfect and will not be popular among suppliers, 
who will have to ascertain the purpose for which the goods are bought in order to 
escape liability.466 It may also be criticised on the ground that it lacks clarity and 
simplicity. The counterargument is that it is simple when it matters most, namely 
when the buyer is an individual. The complexity is only introduced in relation to 
juristic persons where the transaction value is lower than the threshold value. 
In the next section, the question of whether the burden on suppliers can be 
alleviated through an adjustment to the burden of proof will be investigated. 
3.5. Who must establish whether the buyer is a consumer? 
The adoption of the above recommendations raises an important question: Who must 
establish whether the buyer is a consumer? Put differently, to what extent should 
consumers be responsible to identify themselves?467 The CPA is silent on the issue. 
This means that ‘in-court’ ordinary rules regarding onus will apply. In general, this 
implies that the party who relies on a cause of action must prove it.468 In consumer 
cases in general, therefore, it will be the consumer who must prove that he/she is a 
consumer. However, the question of how a buyer’s consumer status should be 
confirmed is not only relevant when a formal complaint is made, but also at the time 
of the transaction, as this is when the supplier has to determine whether or not the 
CPA applies to the transaction. Requiring suppliers to establish when consumer 
protection rules do or do not apply may be unfair, particularly where the qualifying 
criteria are difficult to ascertain (in other words, where it will take significant effort 
to gather the information necessary to apply the criteria). The ‘cost of investigation’ 
(or ‘transaction cost’) may become disproportionate where a supplier deals with a 
high-transaction volume, yet individual transactions are of a relatively low value (as 
is often the case with typical consumer goods). The burden on the supplier can be 
alleviated by creating an assumption that the buyer is a consumer under certain 
circumstances. 
In this context, the National Credit Act contains an interesting provision. In terms 
of this legislation, its application to juristic persons (this aspect is discussed below) 
466 The supplier will always know the value of the transaction.  
467 Hondius ‘The notion of consumer’ op cit note 44 at 95. 
468 The locus classicus in this regard is Pillay v Krishna 1946 AD 946. 
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is determined by asset value or annual turnover. Requiring that suppliers investigate 
this in respect of each transaction is a considerable burden. In response to this 
concern, s 4(2)(a) of the National Credit Act provides that ‘the asset value or annual 
turnover of a juristic person at the time a credit agreement is made, is the value 
stated as such by the juristic person at the time it applies for or enters into that 
agreement’. This is similar to the position of the European Commission, which 
recommended that the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises must 
provide that ‘it is appropriate to allow enterprises to use solemn declarations to 
certify certain of their characteristics’.469 This approach is open to criticism. In this 
context, it is important to remember that the consumer protection rules suggested by 
the CPA are mandatory — consumers are not able to waive this protection.470 Any 
solution that would require consumers to identify themselves and that holds them to 
such a declaration runs the risk of undoing this protection and inviting ‘avoidance 
behaviour’. For instance, suppliers will be encouraged to include ‘a little box that 
says, “Tick. I am using this product for resale or manufacture” and that will be open 
to abuse’.471 
The Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission 
state that when a supplier  
‘is dealing with a small-medium sized business whose status is in doubt, the 
other party may require as a term of the contract a “warranty” that the small-
medium business is of a particular size. Such a statement provides protection 
provided the other party has relied upon it when entering the contract. If the 
other party knew it was incorrect, there would be no protection as that party 
would not have entered into the contract in reliance on the statement’.472 
The Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission 
did not comment on why this would be any less open to abuse than an approach 
allowing binding declarations. Currently, asking buyers to warrant that they are or 
are not consumers (whatever the definition may be) is tempting, as it creates 
certainty, but the clause may be classified as a term that ‘directly or indirectly 
469 Op cit note 438 recital 14 and art 3(5). However, this legislation is not aimed at consumer 
protection.  
470 Section 51. 
471 The same argument has been made in the context of the definition of ‘consumer’ in the Australian 
Consumer Law (Senate Economics Legislation Committee (Australia) Report on the Trade Practices 
Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No.2) (2010) at 28). Also see Law Commission & 
Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 347 para 5.48.  
472 See Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 348 para 5.49. 
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purports to set aside or override the effect’ of the Act, rendering it void under s 51. 
Even if it is not void, it is ‘an acknowledgment of fact’ for purposes of s 49 and must 
therefore meet the requirements of s 49(3) to (5). The supplier must also bring the 
fact, nature and effect of the declaration to the attention of the consumer. In this case, 
the effect of the clause would be to exclude the application of the Act, and to 
preclude the juristic person from relying on the fact that the declaration was incorrect 
— in other words, that the juristic person was in fact a consumer at the time of the 
transaction. 
It is submitted that suppliers should be able to rely on a declaration by a buyer 
who is a juristic person that it purchased the product for resale or manufacturing 
purposes. However, this must take the form of a voluntary, positive statement, and 
not a ‘default’ statement of fact in the supplier’s terms and conditions. It must 
require the customer to tick a box or make a statement to that effect. The 
consequences of the statement must also be explained to the customer. Section 49 of 
the CPA already requires that ‘an acknowledgement of any fact by the consumer’ 
must be written in plain language, and that ‘the fact, nature and effect of the 
provision’ must be brought to the attention of the consumer.473  
What happens in the case of transactions with juristic persons where (for 
whatever reason) no declaration was made? It is submitted that the onus should be on 
the juristic person. The reasoning behind this recommendation is to alleviate the 
compliance burden on the supplier in respect of small, high-volume transactions.  
In the case of natural persons, the declaration referred to above should not be 
valid. In other words, it should not preclude a natural person from later asserting that 
he or she is a consumer. 
Where should the onus lie in the case of natural persons? The United Kingdom 
Unfair Contract Terms Act (before it was amended by the Consumer Rights Act) 
provided that ‘it is for those claiming that a party does not deal as a consumer to 
show that he does not’.474 Ordinarily, it will be the seller who will attempt to escape 
liability on this basis. Therefore, it is not surprising that the UK SoGA provides that 
473 Section 49(2)(d) read with s 49(3)-(5). 
474 Section 12(3).  
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‘the onus of proving that a contract is not to be regarded as a consumer contract shall 
lie on the seller’.475 Similarly, the Consumer Rights Act provides that ‘[a] trader 
claiming that an individual was not acting for purposes wholly or mainly outside the 
individual’s trade, business, craft or profession must prove it’.476 In Australia, 
s 3(10) of the Competition and Consumer Act provides as follows:  
‘If it is alleged in any proceeding under this Schedule, or in any other 
proceeding in respect of a matter arising under this Schedule, that a person was 
a consumer in relation to particular goods or services, it is presumed, unless the 
contrary is established, that the person was a consumer in relation to those 
goods or services.’ 
It is submitted that where the consumer is a natural person, the supplier must bear 
the onus of proving that the transaction does not fall within the scope of the CPA. 
3.6. Definition of ‘supplier’ 
The definition of supplier also determines the scope of the application of the CPA. 
At first glance, the definition on its own is unremarkable. It provides that a supplier 
‘means a person who markets any goods or services’. ‘Market’ in turn refers to 
‘promote’ and ‘supply’, which are also defined. When those definitions are 
considered, two requirements emerge to qualify as a supplier: The promotion or 
supply must take place in the ‘ordinary course of business’, and it must be ‘for 
consideration’.477 These two requirements will be discussed in this section. In 
addition, there are instances in the CPA where liability is not limited to the party 
who supplied the goods to the ‘consumer’, but when it is extended to the entire 
supply chain, thereby giving the consumer a direct claim against any member of the 
supply chain.  The considerations for and against allowing a direct claim against the 
entire supply chain, and the right of redress between the members of the supply 
chain, will be discussed.   
475 Section 61(1)(b). Recital 21 of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive provides that ‘[w]hile it 
is for national law to determine the burden of proof, it is appropriate to enable courts and 
administrative authorities to require traders to produce evidence as to the accuracy of factual claims 
they have made’.  
476 Section 2(4).  
477 Section 1. The phrase ‘in the ordinary course of business’ appears repeatedly in relation to the 
application of the Act. It appears not only in the definition of ‘transaction’, but also in the definition 
of ‘supply’ and ‘promote’, as well as in the definitions of all the different supplier categories 
(‘producer’, ‘importer’, ‘distributor’ and ‘retailer’). 
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3.6.1. Is ‘in the ordinary course of business’ too limited? 
How regularly must a transaction take place before it becomes the supplier’s 
‘ordinary business’? Must the supplier in question sell the particular goods or 
services frequently, or is it enough that the sale was made by a business, even if it 
was a ‘once-off transaction’?  
‘Business’ is defined as ‘the continual marketing of any goods or services’.478
This suggests that the transaction in question should take place regularly, and that the 
Act will not apply to ‘once-off transactions’.479 In addition, the Act provides that the 
supply or promotion must also be in the ordinary course of that business, which 
means that it must be commonplace.480 This interpretation is consistent with the 
dictionary definition of ‘continual’, which is ‘forming a sequence in which the same 
action or event is repeated frequently’. 481  
Other pieces of legislation use similar requirements.482 A discussion of these 
statutes is unnecessary, as their policy underpinnings and purposes are inconsistent 
with those of the CPA.483 The most analogous is the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 29 
of 1942.484 The phrase ‘in the course of the business’ has been interpreted to include 
‘even a single, isolated activity, enterprise or pursuit’.485 Not surprisingly, the phrase 
is given as wide an interpretation as possible in order to extend as much protection as 
possible to the insured. This is reminiscent of s 4(3) of the CPA, which provides that 
where a section is capable of more than one meaning, the meaning that ‘best 
promotes the spirit and purposes’ of the Act must be preferred. However, in the case 
of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, this interpretation was made easier by the 
omission of the qualifier ‘ordinary’. In addition, it will be difficult to extend this 
478 Section 1. ‘Market’, in turn, is defined as the promotion or supply of any goods or services. Note 
that ‘promote’ and ‘supply’ are also defined in s 1. 
479 W Jacobs, P Stoop & R van Niekerk ‘Fundamental consumer rights under the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008: A critical overview and analysis’ (2010) 13(3) Potchefstroom Electronic 
LJ 302 at 312.   
480 Ordinary is defined as ‘what is commonplace or standard’ (Oxford Dictionaries Online ‘Ordinary’ 
available at http://oxforddictionaries.com, accessed on 12 April 2010). 
481 Oxford Dictionaries Online ‘Continual’ available at http://oxforddictionaries.com, accessed on 12 
April 2010. 
482 Section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962; s 15(6) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 
1984; s 34(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.  
483 For a discussion of these statutes and the case law, see Elizabeth de Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé & 
Eiselen (eds) op cit note 4 para 41.  
484 Section 11(1). 
485 AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Biddulph 1976 (1) SA 725 (A) 739B-C. 
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interpretation to the CPA, given its definition of ‘business’. The argument has also 
been raised that if the revenue generated by the activity is taxable, it is in the 
ordinary course of business’.486 If this argument is followed, most, if not all, 
transactions will be in the ordinary course of business. This argument also ignores 
the definition of ‘business’. 
Thus, while the definition of ‘consumer’ in the CPA is overly broad, it would 
seem that the definition of ‘supplier’ is too narrow. The scope of this limitation is 
uncertain, and it is arguably not necessary to go quite this far in excluding suppliers 
who engage in once-off or ‘atypical contracts’ (contracts concluded outside the 
supplier’s usual field of business) from the application of the Act. The crux of the 
problem lies in the fact that the CPA refers to the ‘ordinary course of the supplier’s 
business’ and defines ‘business’ as ‘the continual marketing of any goods or 
services’. The inclusion of the word ‘ordinary’, the definition of ‘business’, and the 
fact that the definition refers to ‘the supplier’s’ business (as opposed to just ‘a’ 
business)487 all support the argument that the transaction must occur with a measure 
of regularity before it will be in the ordinary course of the supplier’s business.  
The implication seems to be that if a supplier does not sell a particular product 
regularly, the supplier does not benefit from information asymmetry,488 cannot 
increase the quality of the goods,489 is not necessarily able to avoid the risk490 and is 
not as dominant as it would normally be.491 However, a consumer who concludes a 
transaction with a supplier may not know whether the transaction is in the course of 
the supplier’s ordinary business and will be no less vulnerable, as many disparities in 
bargaining power still exist.492 In addition, the uncertainty regarding the 
486 Tjakie Naudé ‘The consumer’s right to safe, good quality goods and the implied warranty of 
quality under sections 55 and 56 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2011) 23(3) SA Merc 
LJ 336 at 338. 
487 See Christian Twigg-Flesner & Robert Bradgate ‘The E.C. Directive on Certain Aspects of the 
Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees — all talk and no do?’ (2000) 2 Web Journal of 
Current Legal Issues 1 at 3. They make the argument that the formulation ‘a business’ is wider than 
saying that the particular transaction must be in the course of the ‘supplier’s business’.  
488 This was discussed in chapter 2, para 2.4.2. 
489 This was discussed in chapter 2, para 2.4.3. If the goods are not those usually sold by the supplier, 
it is unlikely that the supplier would invest in the quality of the goods, as it would not benefit from 
that investment.  
490 This was discussed in chapter 2, para 2.4.6.  
491 Inequality of economic power was discussed in chapter 2, para 2.4.1. 
492 This is particularly true in the case of online shopping on platforms such as eBay or Gumtree. See 
Chris Monaghan ‘The status of the seller in the age of eBay’ (June 2011) 20(2) Information & 
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interpretation of this limitation is likely to count against consumers, as it will give 
suppliers a ground on which to escape or, at least, delay liability. 
The Consumer Sales Directive applies to a seller or trader who sells consumer 
goods ‘in the course of his trade, business or profession’.493 Here, the question is 
asked again: ‘What about a business selling a business asset of a type in which it 
does not normally deal, such as a solicitor selling off a surplus computer?’494 Even 
here, ‘[i]t is not clear whether “in the course of business” should be given a wide 
reading to encompass all transactions made by a business or whether this should be 
interpreted narrowly to require some degree of regularity of similar transactions, or 
something else’.495 According to Twigg-Flesner and Bradgate, the fact that the 
Directive refers to ‘the course of his trade’ as opposed to ‘in the course of a 
business’ means that the interpretation must be relatively narrow.496 The solicitor 
referred to above would for instance not have to comply with the Consumer Sales 
Directive. 
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the Consumer Rights Directive apply to 
a seller who sells consumer goods or ‘for purposes relating to his trade, business, 
craft or profession’.497 According to Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, it is clear that ‘in 
the course of’ requires a closer relationship than ‘in relation to’, and that the former 
requires ‘some close connection between [the transaction and the seller’s business], 
or some degree of regularity of similar transactions’.498 
Communications Technology Law 103 at 107. He describes the distinction between business and 
private sellers as ‘perverse’. 
493 Article 1(2)(c) of the Consumer Sales Directive. 
494 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner Blackstone’s Guide op cit note 234 at 20. 
495 Ibid.  
496 Twigg-Flesner & Bradgate The E.C. Directive op cit note 487 at 3. 
497 Article 2(2) of the Consumer Rights Directive. The Consumer Rights Directive replaced Directive 
85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away 
from business premises Official Journal L 372/31, 31/12/1985 (the Distance Selling Directive). In the 
Distance Selling Directive, ‘trader’ is defined as ‘a natural or legal person who, for the transactions in 
question, acts in his commercial or professional capacity’ (art 2). This definition is much broader than 
those discussed above because it is not necessary to show that the transaction relates to the trader’s 
trade. In the Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, two options were suggested in 
relation to the definition of ‘professional’. Option 1 adopts the ‘for purposes relating to their trade, 
business and profession’ formulation, while option 2 amends the formulation to include ‘purposes 
falling primarily within their trade, business and profession’ (op cit note 17 at 16). The less strict 
option 1 was ultimately adopted in the Consumer Rights Directive.   
498 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner Blackstone’s Guide op cit note 234 at 21. 
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Section 14(2) of the UK SoGA provided that ‘[w]here the seller sells goods in the 
course of a business, there is an implied term that the goods supplied under the 
contract are of a satisfactory quality’.499 In Stevenson v Rogers, it was pointed out 
that 
‘in the field of consumer protection three broad categories have been developed 
to identify whether a sale is made “in the course of a business,” namely (a) a 
sale in a once-off venture in the nature of a trade carried through with a view to 
profit; (b) a sale which is an integral part of the business carried on; (c) a sale 
which is merely incidental to the business carried on but which is undertaken 
with a degree of regularity’.500 
In that case, it was held that ‘only purely private sales outside the confines of a 
business’ are not made in the course of a business.501 In other words, ‘habitual 
dealing in the type of goods is not required’.502 Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner reach 
the same conclusion by arguing that the use of the phrase ‘in the course of a 
business’ leads to a much wider definition than the phrase ‘in the course of his 
business’. If an attorney sells a computer, it will not be in the course of his business 
(the business of providing legal advice), but will indeed be in the course of a 
business.503  
In terms of consumer sales, the UK SoGA has now been replaced by the 
Consumer Rights Act.504 This act deals with the concept of a ‘trader’, which it 
defines as ‘a person acting for purposes relating to that person’s trade, business, craft 
or profession’.505 The wider formulation in the Consumer Rights Directive has 
therefore been adopted.  
This formulation can be criticised on the basis that it unfairly increases the 
compliance burden on suppliers in respect of sales that are not their core business. 
The extension of liability is not ‘fair’, as they are not benefiting from information 
asymmetry or inequality of bargaining power to the same extent as in respect of their 
499 The phrase ‘in the course of a business’ also appears in s 12 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act.   
500 Stevenson v Rogers supra note 426 at 1033; Bridge op cit note 333 at 568; John De Lacy ‘Selling 
in the course of a business under the Sale of Goods Act 1979’ (1999) 62(5) Modern Law Review 776. 
501 Stevenson v Rogers supra note 426 at 1039. 
502 John N Adams & Hector MacQueen Atiyah’s Sale of Goods 12 ed (2010) 160.  
503 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner Blackstone’s Guide op cit note 234 at 21; Woodroffe, Geoffrey and 
Lowe, Robert Woodroffe and Lowe’s Consumer Law and Practice 7 ed (2007) 44. Woodroffe and 
Lowe come to the same conclusion based on the example of a dentist who sells a private car.  
504 When the sections of the Consumer Rights Act relating to goods apply, the UK SoGA is excluded 
(see s 14(9) of the UK SoGA, as amended).  
505 Section 2(2).  
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core products, nor do they have the same ability to avoid the risk of post-purchase 
quality issues.506 However, placing a limitation on the application of consumer 
protection legislation based on whether a transaction was ordinary or not, creates 
more uncertainty than it is worth.507 It will give unscrupulous suppliers one more 
ground on which they can try to avoid or delay liability. In addition, it will not often 
be easy for consumers to gauge whether a supplier acts in the ordinary course of 
business, or how regularly a business concludes a particular type of transaction.  
In other jurisdictions, the requirement is relaxed even further. The Australian 
Competition and Consumer Act refers to goods that are supplied ‘in trade or 
commerce’, which is defined as including ‘any business or professional activity 
(whether or not carried on for profit)’.508 There appears to be conflicting 
interpretations of this requirement. It is described as ‘less onerous’ than the UK 
SoGA because ‘there is no requirement that the goods sold be of a kind which it was 
in the course of the seller’s business to supply’.509 However, the use of the word ‘in’ 
trade of commerce 
‘has been interpreted to mean that the conduct must itself be trading or 
commercial in nature and that it is not sufficient for it to be merely connected 
with, or incidental, to trade or commerce. In other words, the trade or 
commerce requirement is not satisfied merely because the conduct occurred as 
part of some overall commercial or trading activity; rather, the very conduct 
itself must be for that character. Although it is easy to state, the courts have 
acknowledged that drawing this distinction can, in practice, be very difficult 
and that there may be a “fine line” between conduct that is “in” trade or 
commerce and that which is merely connected to it’.510 
It is recommended that only truly private sales ought to fall outside the scope of 
the CPA. In order to achieve this, all references to ‘in the ordinary course of 
business’ must be replaced with ‘in the course of a business’, and the definition of 
‘business’ must be deleted. The result of this reformulation is that only truly ‘private 
sales’ will be excluded. If this is applied to an attorney who sells a computer for the 
benefit of his business, the CPA will still apply. If, however, the attorney were to sell 
506 These rationales for legislative intervention were discussed in chapter 2.  
507 It is important to remember that these ‘private sales’ by businesses will by definition be few and 
far between.  
508 Section 2(1) of schedule 2, chapter 3, part 3-2, of the Competition and Consumer Act. 
509 Corones op cit note 455 at 343; Corones & Clarke op cit note 398 at 62. 
510 Corones & Clarke op cit note 398 at 55. 
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his home computer (in other words, a computer not owned by the firm), he would 
not be considered a supplier.511  
3.6.2. The consideration requirement 
The CPA also requires that the transaction must be for ‘consideration’. The term is 
defined in extremely broad terms, including ‘anything of value given and accepted in 
exchange for goods or services’. It includes 
‘(a) money, property, a cheque or other negotiable instrument, a token, a ticket, 
electronic credit, credit, debit or electronic chip or similar object; (b) labour, 
barter or other goods or services; (c) loyalty credit, coupon or other right to 
assert a claim; (d) any other thing, undertaking, promise, agreement or 
assurance’. 
This definition extends beyond traditional monetary consideration and barter, to 
include intangible promises also. It expressly provides that the consideration does 
not have to be based on the intrinsic value of the goods or services (and can therefore 
be nominal) and is expressly extended to consideration that is paid indirectly or 
involves third parties.512 This definition is so broad that it will be present in most 
cases, with only pure gratuitous transactions being excluded.  
The requirement has its origins in English law and was included in the CPA 
despite not having been a part of South African law for almost a century.513 
Ironically, the consideration requirement in English sales law is limited to ‘monetary 
consideration’.514 Monetary consideration remains a requirement in terms of the 
Consumer Rights Act.515 That act does not apply to ‘gratuitous contract[s]’ in 
511 Of course, in the case of unincorporated or sole proprietorship, private and business sales will be 
harder to distinguish.  
512 Section 1 provides expressly that the consideration’s ‘apparent or intrinsic value’ is irrelevant in 
determining whether consideration was given. After listing examples of forms of consideration, the 
section provides that their classification as forms of consideration is not dependent on ‘whether it is 
transferred directly or indirectly, or involves only the supplier and the consumer or other parties in 
addition to the supplier and consumer’. 
513 Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279; McCullogh v Fernwood Estate Ltd 1920 AD 204; Adams v SA 
Motor Industry Employers Association 1981 (3) SA 1189 (A). In Adams, the appellate division held 
that ‘continued reference to the English law can only lead to confusion. We are not encumbered by 
the technicalities of the doctrine of consideration’ (at 1198H).  
514 Section 2(1) of the UK SoGA. This is narrower than the requirement in English contract law 
(Monaghan op cit note 492 at 104).  
515 Section 5 defines ‘sales contracts’. A ‘monetary price’ remains a requirement. See ‘Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 (c. 15): Explanatory Notes’ op cit note 392 at 14. 
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Scotland.516 This was included because consideration is not a requirement in Scottish 
sales law.517   
The ‘consideration’ requirement has no place in South African law, and its inclusion 
creates too much confusion. Instead, the CPA should include an additional exception 
that the Act will not apply to gratuitous contracts, as there are obvious policy reasons 
not to burden charities with compliance. In this context, ‘gratuitous’ is to be given its 
ordinary meaning, namely ‘given or done free of charge’.518 In order for the 
exception to apply, no counter-performance must be required from the consumer. 
This is not limited to the payment of money. The existing definition of 
‘consideration’ in s 1 is sufficiently broad to encompass any form of counter-
performance, but it should be renamed ‘counter-performance’, as the mere reference 
to ‘consideration’ risks creating confusion. However, this exception should not apply 
in respect of ‘product liability’ claims for harm caused by defective or unsafe 
goods.519 Even suppliers in gratuitous contracts should be liable if the goods they 
supplied caused the consumer harm. 
3.6.3. The extension of liability to the entire supply chain 
3.6.3.1. Direct liability and the right of redress in terms of the CPA 
Sections 29 (general standards for marketing of goods or services), 56 (claims for 
refunds, replacements or repairs in terms of the implied warranty of quality) and 61 
(liability for harm caused by goods, or ‘product liability’ claims) refer to ‘the 
producer or importer, the distributor and the retailer’.520 Therefore, liability is 
516 Section 3(3)(e). 
517 ‘Consumer Rights Act 2015 (c. 15): Explanatory Notes’ op cit note 392 at 9. 
518 Oxford Dictionaries Online ‘Gratuitous’ available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
english/gratuitous, accessed on 9 May 2016. 
519 ‘Product liability’ claims refer to claims for compensation for harm caused by defective or unsafe 
goods in terms of s 61. This must be distinguished from claims for refunds (in whole or in part), 
repairs or substitution of the compromised goods in terms of s 56. These rights should not be 
extended in the case of gratuitous agreements.  
520 ‘Supply chain’ is defined in s 1 as ‘the collectivity of all who directly or indirectly contribute in 
turn to the ultimate supply of those goods or services to a consumer, whether as producer, importer, 
distributor or retailer of goods, or as a service provider’. This phrase is not used anywhere else in the 
Act, save for s 59, which deals with the disposal of certain types of waste. The terms ‘producer’, 
‘importer’, ‘distributor’ and ‘retailer’ are also defined. The ‘producer’ is the ‘person who (a) grows, 
nurtures, harvests, mines, generates, refines, creates, manufactures or otherwise produces the goods 
within the Republic, or causes any of those things to be done, with the intention of making them 
available for supply in the ordinary course of business; or (b) by applying a personal or business 
name, trade mark, trade description or other visual representation on or in relation to the goods, has 
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extended beyond the party who had a direct contractual relationship with the 
consumer.521 While a discussion of liability for ‘services’ is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it is worth noting that the activities listed in the definition of ‘services’ are 
services ‘irrespective of whether the person promoting, offering or providing the 
services participates in, supervises or engages directly or indirectly in the service’.522  
It has been argued that the use of the conjunction ‘or’ between ‘producer’ and 
‘importer’ means that either of these parties is liable in terms of the implied warranty 
of quality, but not both.523 If there is an ‘importer’, the ‘producer’ will not be a South 
African company. The inclusion of ‘importer’ is probably aimed at preventing a 
situation where the consumer has to pursue a claim against a foreign company, along 
with all the complications that arise in such cases. It is not clear why the conjunction 
‘or’ was used, as consumers should still have this right, no matter how difficult, but 
in principle, it should not preclude them from still pursuing a claim against the 
created or established a reasonable expectation that the person is a person contemplated in paragraph 
(a)’. ‘Importer’ is defined as ‘a person who brings those goods, or causes them to be brought, from 
outside the Republic into the Republic, with the intention of making them available for supply in the 
ordinary course of business’. ‘Distributor’ is defined as ‘a person who, in the ordinary course of 
business (a) is supplied with those goods by a producer, importer or other distributor; and (b) in turn, 
supplies those goods to either another distributor or to a retailer’. ‘Retailer’ is defined as ‘a person 
who, in the ordinary course of business, supplies those goods to a consumer’.  
521 In the bulk of the remainder of the CPA, liability is assumed by the ‘supplier’ of the goods. This is 
defined as the person who markets the goods or services. The definition of ‘market’ refers to both 
supply and promote. In relation to goods, supply ‘includes sell, rent, exchange and hire in the ordinary 
course of business for consideration’. The definition of ‘promote’ also seems to be limited to the 
person who does the advertising, makes the representations or induces the consumer to buy a product. 
There are some obligations dealing with the display of goods that refer to the ‘retailer’ specifically (s 
23(3) on the obligation to display the price, and s 24(3) on selling goods with misleading trade 
descriptions).  
522 See the definition of services in s 1. This is consistent with the definition of ‘supply’ in the context 
of services, which provides that supply includes services that are ‘caused to be performed’, and the 
definition of ‘transaction’, which includes services performed by or ‘at the direction of’ the supplier 
(para (b) of the definition of ‘supply’ in s 1). The effect is that a person who promotes a service, but 
does not participate directly in its provision, is still liable as a service provider in terms of the Act. For 
example, a travel agency that promotes and sells hotel accommodation would be liable as a service 
provider in respect of that accommodation, even where the actual provision of the hotel room was 
undertaken by an entirely different entity. This approach is not unheard of. In Europe, the travel 
industry is regulated by Directive 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing 
Council Directive 90/314 Official Journal L 326, 11/12/2015 P. 001 – 033 (‘the Package Travel 
Directive’). The definition of ‘organiser’ in art 3(8) provides that ‘“organiser” means a trader who 
combines and sells or offers for sale packages, either directly or through another trader or together 
with another trader …’ (my emphasis). 
523 Jacobs, Stoop & Van Niekerk op cit note 477 at 371. 
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importer. It is submitted that the ‘or’ conjunction should be deleted in the event that 
direct liability in the supply chain is retained.524  
Section 61(3) provides that ‘[i]f, in a particular case, more than one person is 
liable in terms of this section, their liability is joint and several’. There is no 
equivalent provision in s 29 (liability for misleading marketing) or s 56 (liability for 
the quality of goods). This means that retailers who are unable to negotiate 
preferential terms with producers may have to assume responsibility for defective 
goods, even though it has no control over the manufacturing process and cannot 
effectively ‘quality-control’ the products.525 This potentially undermines the fairness 
of the legislation.526  
The defences available to the different members of the supply chain are also 
controversial. If a consumer brings a direct claim against a distributor or producer in 
terms of the CPA for a refund or the replacement or repair of the defective products, 
the distributor or producer will be able to escape liability ‘to the extent that goods 
have been altered contrary to the instructions, or after leaving the control’ of the 
producer or distributor.527 This gives rise to two potential defences against a claim 
brought under s 56(1). First, the supplier will not be held liable where the goods 
were altered by the consumer contrary to instructions given by the supplier. This is 
another application of the defence that the consumer used the goods in an unusual or 
unreasonable manner. The second defence is where the consumer or another supplier 
in the supply chain alters the goods after the goods have left the control of the 
supplier. Given the use of the adjunct ‘or’ instead of ‘and’, this is interpreted as a 
second defence, and not simply as a second requirement for the first defence 
discussed above. This means that the supplier could escape liability even where the 
alteration was not ‘contrary to instructions’, as long as it took place after the goods 
left the supplier’s control. The supplier’s liability is only excluded ‘to the extent that’ 
the alterations were done. This means that the supplier’s liability is only excluded 
insofar as the breach of the implied warranty is attributable to the alterations. If the 
524 This is discussed in paragraph 3.6.3.2 
525 If the retailer is small enough (having an asset value or annual turnover of less than R2 million), it 
will qualify as a consumer, and the manufacturer will not be able to contract out of liability. In other 
instances, the retailer will have a large market share, which will strengthen its bargaining position in 
relation to the producer (which means that the retailer will be able to dictate terms).  
526 This criterion for the evaluation of legislation was discussed in chapter 2, paragraph 2.5.1. 
527 Section 56(1).  
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breach is still attributable to an unaltered characteristic or a defect unrelated to the 
alterations, a supplier may not escape liability. 
Retailers and distributors are given defences against claims brought for harm 
caused by defective goods in terms of s 61, which are not available when the 
consumer is demanding a refund or the repair or replacement of the goods. In 
particular, s 61(4)(c) provides that retailers and distributors will not be liable under 
that section if ‘it is reasonable to expect the distributor or retailer to have discovered 
the unsafe product characteristic, failure, defect or hazard, having regard to that 
person’s role in marketing the goods to consumers’. The defences available in terms 
of s 61 will not be available to a distributor or producer faced with a direct claim in 
terms of s 56, unless it as accepted that s 61 also applies to claims in respect of the 
goods that breach the implied warranty of quality. The relationship between s 56 and 
s 61 is problematic, as there appears to be some overlap. Loubser and Reid comment 
that the harm referred to in s 61(5) could also include the defective product itself, 
which means ‘apparently, that a juristic person which does not qualify as a 
“consumer”, such as a company operating a large retail chain, will nevertheless be 
entitled to rely on the strict liability provisions in s 61 to claim compensation from a 
supplier for defects in the goods themselves’.528 Even if there were no overlap, it is 
unclear why there should be different defences depending on whether the claim is for 
harm to the goods themselves or for harm caused by the goods.  
Three aspects of this direct liability for members of the supply chain will be 
discussed: the desirability of direct liability for the entire supply chain, the members 
of the supply chain’s ability to obtain redress from one another, and whether 
members in the supply chain ought to have defences against claims from consumers 
or other members of the supply chain. 
3.6.3.2. ‘Direct claim’ against other members of the supply chain 
A full discussion of the theoretical merits of a direct claim in respect of all types of 
actions is not included in the scope of this thesis.529 However, it is fairly unusual for 
528 See Max Loubser & Elspeth Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 98. 
529 Theories such as ‘network liability’ will for instance not be discussed (Christian Twigg-Flesner 
‘Network liability for manufacturers’ guarantees — remedying legislative shortcomings with a legal 
jigsaw’ 1999 Journal of Business Law 568; Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op 
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a direct claim for a refund or the repair or replacement of defective goods to be 
extended beyond the seller, and as such, the decision made by the legislature to do so 
in respect of the CPA merits at least a cursory review against the criteria for the 
evaluation of legislative interventions developed in chapter 2.530  
Article 2(1) of the Consumer Sales Directive provides that it is only the ‘seller’ 
who must deliver goods that are in conformity with the contract of sale. ‘Seller’ is 
defined as ‘any natural or legal person who, under a contract, sells consumer goods 
in the course of his trade, business or profession’. The consumer does not have a 
direct claim against the other members of the supply chain, including the 
producer.531 The issue of the possible introduction of a ‘direct claim’ into the 
Consumer Sales Directive was contentious. The European Commission was in 
favour of the introduction of such a claim (the liability was to be joint and several) 
even before the Consumer Sales Directive came into effect, and have pointed out that 
there is no logical reason why the final seller should be the only party who is 
exposed to claims from consumers.532 The approach was ultimately rejected, but 
recital 23 states that the producer’s direct liability for defects may be revisited in 
future. In addition, art 12 provides that the producer’s direct liability was to be 
reported on by the Commission by 2006. This was done in 2007.533 Of the 
cit note 196 from 366). In addition, this section was drafted predominantly aimed at claims for the 
defective goods themselves in terms of the implied warranty of quality (claims for refunds, 
replacements or repairs), although some reference is made to product liability claims.  
530 See para 2.5.  
531 This is referred to as the ‘traditional contract model’. See Martin Ebers, André Janssen & Olaf 
Meyer (eds) European Perspectives on Producers’ Liability: Direct Producers’ Liability for Non-
conformity and the Sellers’ Right of Redress (2009) 3. The Product Liability Directive (Directive 
1985/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products Official Journal 
L 210,07/08/1985) establishes liability against the producer and importer (art 3(1) and (2)). What if 
the consumer cannot identify the producer and approaches the point of sale instead? Article 3(3) 
provides that ‘[w]here the producer of the product cannot be identified, each supplier of the product 
shall be treated as its producer unless he informs the injured person, within a reasonable time, of the 
identity of the producer or of the person who supplied him with the product’. 
532 The Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-Sales Services Official Journal C 
338, 15/12/1993 initially proposed joint and several liability between the retailer and the producer. It 
was not included in the first drafts of the Directive. The only reason offered for this is that it is ‘the 
traditional solution enshrined in the legal order of the Member States’. See recital 9 of the Consumer 
Sales Directive. Also see Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 
346; Christian Twigg-Flesner ‘The EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods 
and Associated Guarantees’ (1999) 7 Consumer Law Journal 177 at 190. The Commission recognised 
that the extent of the manufacturer’s liability still needed clarification.  
533 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament The 
implementation of Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 
1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees including analysis 
of the case for introducing direct producers’ liability COM (2007) final. 
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respondents, Belgium, Finland, Latvia, Portugal, Spain and Sweden have introduced 
some form of direct producer’s liability.534 The Commission observed that 
‘[a] majority of the Member States and a number of stakeholders consider that 
the DPL [Direct Producers’ Liability] actually or potentially increases 
consumer protection. In their opinion, the DPL provides redress for the 
consumer in case the seller is not able (or willing) to resolve consumer 
complaints. It constitutes an important “safety net” for consumers. Some 
Member States consider the producer to be often better placed than the seller to 
bring goods into conformity with the contract. To the contrary, a minority of 
Member States and stakeholders consider that direct producers’ liability would 
not increase consumer protection but rather cause uncertainty as to the 
applicable law and delay the resolution of consumer complaints’.535 
So-called ‘frontline seller liability’ (where the seller alone is liable)536 is found in 
the Consumer Sales Directive and many European jurisdictions.537 The rationale for 
frontline liability is that 
‘[t]he seller who supplied the product, traditionally based in the local High 
Street, will usually be geographically more accessible to the consumer than is 
the manufacturer. Moreover, the seller is likely to be well equipped to deal with 
consumer complaints, with staff trained in dealing with customers, and maybe a 
dedicated customer service team to deal with complaints. Above all, the seller 
acts as an identifiable conduit by which the complaint, and liability for the 
defect, can be channelled back up the distribution chain to the ultimate 
manufacturer or producer’.538 
The justification for frontline liability is largely centred on whether the legislative 
intervention provides improved consumer redress.539 However, the last sentence of 
the above extract reveals a circuity of actions; instead of claiming directly against the 
party who is responsible for the defect, the consumer claims against the retailer, who 
must then institute another action against his seller, who will in turn do the same, 
534 Ibid at 11. 
535 Ibid.  
536 The term is used by Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 346. 
537 See for instance the UK SoGA and Consumer Rights Act, both of which are based on the principle 
of privity of contract and are thus limited to a claim against the seller. The doctrine of privity was 
modified by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999 (c. 13), but this will rarely cause the 
consumer to have a claim against any other members of the supply chain (see Bradgate & Twigg-
Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 347). In the context of product liability claims, 
the UK consumer has a claim against the ‘producer’ (s 1(2)(b)). The definition of ‘seller’ (which also 
limits liability to the direct seller) in the Consumer Sales Directive was adopted in Belgium, Cyprus, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (Schulte-
Nölke (ed) op cit note 333 at 416). However, direct claims are allowed in France and Belgium (it was 
developed by the courts under the Civil Code). The result is that ‘[a]ll the parties are jointly liable 
towards the buyer, but there is a possibility for the seller actually sued to seek an indemnity from the 
party actually responsible for the loss’. See Schulte-Nölke (ed) op cit note 333 at 441. 
538 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 351.  
539 This is one of the criteria against which legislative measures are measured. This was discussed in 
chapter 2, paragraph 2.5.6. 
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until the appropriate party is held responsible.540 In addition, ‘in the context of 
increasing consumer mobility and the growth of distance selling, a system of retailer-
only liability may pose practical difficulties for the consumer’. In other words, 
buyers’ ability to return goods or remember where they bought goods (particularly in 
the case of e-commerce transactions) mitigates against retailer-only liability.541 
Therefore, the justification for frontline liability is predicated on the traditional sale 
scenario and cannot keep up with the new challenges relating to access created by e-
commerce.542 
The introduction of a scheme where the retailer and producer are jointly and 
severally liable is supported by some authors.543 According to the European 
Consumer Law Group,544 
‘any legislative reform must reflect the fundamental changes in manufacturing, 
distributing and marketing of goods in the modern economy, the radical 
modification of the roles of the economic actors (manufacturer, distributor, and 
retailer) and the importance of technological sophistication and the durability of 
consumer goods. In particular, the predominant role of the manufacturer who 
designs and manufactures the product, who builds up specific distribution 
systems and who defines the marketing strategy, and the correspondingly 
diminished role of the retailer who has become a pure distributor has to be 
taken into account by the legislator. Legislation that focuses only or mainly on 
the seller-consumer relationship is a partial answer to the needs of consumers 
on the market; it is blind to the realities of a modern economic system of 
production and distribution’. 
A direct claim is fairer, because the retailer will often have no control over the 
quality of the goods or the accuracy of statements made during marketing campaigns 
and/or will not be able to pass the claim on to the manufacturer if the supply 
agreement contains an exclusion of liability.545 It is rational because it mirrors the 
540 This is an example of ‘inefficiency’, which is also a criterion discussed in chapter 2, paragraph 
2.5.4. 
541 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 361. 
542 Ibid at 354. 
543 Ibid at 360; Oughton & Willett op cit note 23 at 307.  
544 European Consumer Law Group ‘Opinion on the proposal for a directive on the sale of goods and 
associated guarantees’ (1998) 21 Journal of Consumer Policy 91 at 92; Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner 
Expanding the boundaries op cit note 196 at 352. 
545 According to Oughton ‘[t]he producer tends to construct the distribution system and determine the 
marketing strategy, and it is likely to be the producer on whom the consumer principally relies in 
choosing products and who the consumer would reasonably expect to be legally responsible if the 
products are defective.’ See Oughton & Willett op cit note 23 at 307. Also see Bradgate & Twigg-
Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 353. It may be that even if a direct claim is 
made possible, suppliers will still be able to exclude liability. This is discussed in the next section.  
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manufacturer’s liability in the context of product liability.546 It conforms to consumer 
expectations, as it is the ‘common understanding’ that the manufacturer is 
responsible for the quality of the goods. This ‘common understanding’ is ‘reinforced 
in several ways by the facts of contemporary life’:547 first, by the fact that modern 
advertising in many cases promotes the manufacturer more so than the particular 
retail outlet (or, at least, equally so);548 secondly, by the fact that the manufacturer 
will often give an express warranty in relation to the quality of the goods.549 
However, it is ill-advised to underplay the role of the retailer in all instances. 
Modern retail outlets can also have a lot of power over manufacturers and control 
over the product.550 This is because of the existence of large retailers who not only 
control the supply chain, but also the quality of products and apply their brand name 
to them.551 When measured in terms of market share, the South African retail sector 
is dominated by ‘major retailers’.552 On the opposite side of the spectrum are 
retailers who are independent (not part of a chain or franchise) and often small to 
medium-sized businesses who may themselves be consumers, but for the fact that 
546 If manufacturers are liable for harm caused by a defect, there is no reason why they ought not be 
liable to return, replace or repair the goods themselves (Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the 
boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 356).  
547 Jolowicz (op cit note 193 at 2) asks whether lawyers should not ‘open [their] minds to the 
possibility that the doctrine of privity of contract, so beloved of the common law, is a distorting factor 
in the law of consumer protection and that the contractual relationship which exists between buyer 
and seller … is a less important element than the present structure of the law makes it out to be?’ He 
concludes (at 18) that ‘in a field which touches everyone as closely as does consumer law, there is 
something to be said for a re-examination of the law in the light of what it is popularly, if erroneously, 
supposed to be’. Also see Oughton & Willett op cit note 23 at 307. 
548 Jolowicz op cit note 193 at 5. He writes of ‘modern advertising’ in 1969. It is suggested that in 
2016, several permutations are possible: First, there are those instances where a particular type of 
advertising can be aimed at promoting the retailer exclusively. This is particularly true of 
advertisements for goods that have been branded by the particular retailer and are sold at lower prices 
in order to attract consumers. The manufacturer of those goods never becomes known to the audience. 
Secondly, there are advertisements that promote both the retailer and the manufacturer. Thirdly, there 
are advertisements that promote a particular manufacturer without even mentioning the retailer.  
549 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 357. 
550 Ibid at 353. 
551 In terms of the CPA, such retailers may actually fall within the definition of ‘producer’. 
Paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘producer’ in s 1 of the CPA includes a person who ‘by applying a 
personal or business name, trade mark, trade description or other visual representation on or in 
relation to the goods, has created or established a reasonable expectation that the person is a person 
contemplated in paragraph (a)’. Paragraph (a) provides that a producer is a person who ‘grows, 
nurtures, harvests, minus, generates, refines, creates, manufactures or otherwise produces the goods 
within the Republic, or causes any of those things to be done, with the intention of making them 
available for supply …’. What is referred to here is what is often referred to as ‘house brands’.  
552 Gauteng Provincial Treasury Department The Retail Industry on the Rise in South Africa (April-
June 2012) available at http://www.treasury.gpg.gov.za/Documents/QB1%20The%20Retail%20 
Industry%20on%20the% 20Rise.pdf, accessed on 12 May 2016 at 5. 
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they buy products for resale.553 These retailers are closer to the economically passive 
and vulnerable retailers referred to in the rest of this section. They will often not be 
able to pass liability back up the supply chain.  
There is no policy reason to deviate from the decision of the South African 
legislature to extend liability for post-purchase quality problems to the rest of the 
supply chain. The consumer can always elect to pursue a claim against the retailer, 
regardless of the retailer’s complicity in the defect, and the retailer cannot escape this 
by referring the consumer to the manufacturer. Put differently, the direct claim is 
supplemental to instead of a substitute for frontline liability. 
In order to ensure that this rule does not operate unfairly against the retailer 
(particularly small retailers), a strong right of redress should be established. This 
need becomes even more acute given that the recommendations regarding the 
formulation of the definition of ‘consumer’ in paragraph 3.4.5 above exclude juristic 
persons who acquire goods for resale purposes. This will be discussed in the section 
following immediately below. There are also instances where the direct claim may 
operate unfairly against the producer or distributor. This can be remedied by 
including defences against a direct claim. This will be discussed in paragraph 
3.6.3.4.  
3.6.3.3. Right of redress between parties in the supply chain 
The need for a clear right of redress can arise, whether a direct claim is allowed or 
not. In the case of frontline liability, the retailer may want to pass liability back up 
the supply chain. However, even where consumers are allowed to claim against the 
producer directly, they may not necessarily do so. Instead, they will often return to 
the point of sale. 
The CPA contains no express reference to the liability of the members of the 
supply chain among themselves in respect of claims for the breach of the implied 
warranty of quality or for misleading marketing, but does provide for it in the 
553 See para 3.4.5 above, where it is recommended that ‘the CPA should also apply to juristic persons, 
except if the transaction value is above the prescribed threshold or the products are bought for resale 
or for transformation into a product for resale, will be used up or transformed in the course of 
production or manufacture, or are used up or transformed in the course of repairing or treating other 
goods or fixtures on land’. 
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context of product liability claims. It has been argued that s 61 includes claims for 
harm caused to the products themselves, although that argument is tenuous at best.554 
This means that it could be argued that all members of the supply chain are jointly 
and severally liable, even though this right of redress is not referred to in s 56. In 
addition, s 5(5) extends the application of s 61 to all buyers (even large juristic 
persons), and it could be argued that, as a result, this right cannot be excluded 
contractually — thereby creating a right of redress that is inalienable.555 Though 
tenable, this interpretation of s 61 is complicated and may prove to be incorrect. The 
heart of the matter is that the position under the CPA is at best unclear. 
However, retailers will not always have contractual relationships with the 
producer of the goods; there may be an interceding supplier. According to Bradgate 
and Twigg-Flesner, the nature of the producer’s ‘right of indemnity’ becomes 
difficult to conceptualise in cases where there is no direct contractual relationship 
between the retailer and producer. According to them, ‘the problem could be 
resolved by allowing the producer to claim a contribution or indemnity under 
relevant procedural rules’. It is not clear from the CPA whether a retailer will be able 
to jump the queue (assuming there is one) straight to the manufacturer, as the Act is 
silent on the matter, and the common law provides no certainty. 
Article 4 of the Consumer Sales Directive provides (albeit while only allowing a 
direct claim against the seller) that if a seller is held liable for non-conforming 
goods, ‘the final seller shall be entitled to pursue remedies against the person or 
persons liable in the contractual chain’ if the lack of conformity is the result of an act 
or omission of the other party in the supply chain.556 This means that the final seller 
‘shall be entitled to pursue remedies against the producer, a previous seller in the 
same chain of contracts or any other intermediary for an act or omission resulting in 
554 This was discussed in para 3.6.3.1. Essentially, the question is whether ‘harm’ includes the defect 
in the product, or harm caused to the product by the defect.  
555 The application of the section looks like this: ‘A retailer (as buyer) will have a claim against the 
distributor (as seller) or the producer and the distributor (as buyer) against the producer.’ Section 
51(1) provides that a transaction cannot be subject to a contractual term that ‘defeat[s] the purposes 
and policy’ of the CPA (sub-s (a)(i)) or ‘waive[s] or deprive[s] a consumer of a right’ in terms of the 
CPA. See Elizabeth de Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé & Eiselen op cit note 4 at para 40. Loubser and 
Reid believe that a right to relief (in the context of the CPA) can be based on the Apportionment of 
Damages Act 34 of 1956 (Loubser & Reid op cit note 528 at 121).  
556 Article 4. Also see Ebers, Janssen & Meyer (eds) op cit note 531 at 6; Staudenmayer op cit note 23 
at 559.  
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the lack of conformity’.557 This is different from the current wording of the CPA, 
which does not require any act or omission — the entire supply chain is ‘strictly’ 
liable in terms of the statute.  
In addition, recital 9 of the Consumer Sales Directive provides that ‘the seller 
should be free, as provided for by national law, to pursue remedies against the 
producer, a previous seller in the same chain of contracts or any other intermediary, 
unless he has renounced that entitlement’, and that ‘this Directive does not affect the 
principle of freedom of contract between the seller, the producer, a previous seller or 
any other intermediary’. This means that the right of redress remains subject to the 
rules of the law of contract, primarily those relating to business-to-business 
contracts. Therefore, by way of example, art 4 was transposed in the United 
Kingdom to mean that the retailer’s right to claim up the chain can be limited 
contractually, as long as the requirement of reasonableness in s 6 of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act is adhered to.558 In the alternative, art 4 has been interpreted to 
give the retailer an absolute right to claim against the party responsible for the 
quality defect, and the retailer would only be able to renounce this right by taking 
‘active steps’ or an ‘express renouncement’; a term in the producer’s standard terms 
and conditions would probably not be enough.559  
Product liability claims are generally brought against the producer or the importer 
of the goods.560 However, ‘[w]here the producer of the product cannot be identified, 
each supplier of the product shall be treated as its producer unless he informs the 
injured person, within a reasonable time, of the identity of the producer or of the 
person who supplied him with the product’.561  
It is recommended that there should be an explicit right of redress for retailers, 
distributors and importers against the manufacturer of the goods, unless the defect 
557 Reich, Micklitz & Rott op cit note 39 at 179. 
558 Act 1977 (c. 50). See Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 
358; Reich, Micklitz & Rott op cit note 39 at 180. The Consumer Rights Act has not changed this 
position in respect of juristic persons.  
559 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 359; Reich, Micklitz & 
Rott op cit note 39 at 180. According to Krummel and D’Sa, ‘it may well be possible for previous 
sellers (in the chain) only to sell goods to the (final) seller on the condition that he waives his right of 
redress against them’ (Krummel & D’Sa op cit note 23 at 320). 
560 Article 3(1) of the Product Liability Directive.  
561 Article 3(2). The UK Consumer Protection Act 1987 (c. 43) contains a similar provision in s 2. 
Both instruments provide for joint and several liability in the event that more than one party is liable. 
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was caused by another member of the supply chain (e.g. if the goods were not 
properly stored). Given that the retailer obtains the goods from the manufacturer for 
purposes of reselling them, the retailer will not be protected as a consumer.562  
In order to ensure that the retailer is not liable for the claim made by the 
consumer, it is also recommended that producers or importers to the supply chain 
should be unable to contract out of liability in terms of this right of redress. Put 
differently, the manufacturer (for instance) should not be able to insert an indemnity 
against claims from consumers in its contract with the retailer, unless the defect was 
caused by the retailer (e.g. if the goods were not properly stored). While limiting the 
freedom of contract in this way will undoubtedly be controversial, this will satisfy 
the requirements of fairness and rationality, while retaining the better level of redress 
ensured by allowing consumers to claim directly from any party in the supply chain. 
In addition, it will protect smaller retailers, who are not in an equal bargaining 
position, against being burdened with liability. Lastly, it ensures that the 
manufacturer and, to a lesser extent, the importer remain motivated to ensure that 
their goods are of a high quality.563  
3.6.3.4. Defences to ‘direct claims’ 
The last question to be considered relates to what defences, if any, should be 
available to members of the supply chain. The current position in terms of the CPA 
was discussed in paragraph 3.6.3.1. A full discussion of the possible defences falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. The aim of this section is to illustrate that the 
defences discussed below will protect manufacturers against any unfairness that may 
ensue as a result of direct liability for the entire supply chain and an inalienable right 
to obtain redress. 
For instance, according to Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner, the producer ought to be 
able to raise (and prove) the defence that the goods were not defective when they left 
the producer’s control.564 That same defence is open to the producer in terms of 
s 61(4)(b)(i) of the CPA, which provides that ‘[l]iability of a particular person in 
562 See the recommendations made in para 3.4.5. 
563 The counterargument is that it restricts their ability to freely allocate risk in a commercial 
transaction.  
564 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 361. 
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terms of this section does not arise if … (b) the alleged unsafe product characteristic, 
failure, defect or hazard (i) did not exist in the goods at the time it was supplied by 
that person to another person alleged to be liable’. This is also the case in terms of 
s 4 of the UK Consumer Protection Act565 and the Product Liability Directive.566 
Including this defence satisfies the criterion of fairness, as the legal responsibility for 
the defect follows the actual responsibility. It is submitted that if this defence is 
available to producers in respect of the harm caused by defective goods, there is no 
reason why it should not be extended to claims for the replacement, repair or return 
of the defective product itself. 
There is also concern over liability that arises as a result of the content of the 
dealings between the consumer and the retailer. In other words, the producer should 
not be held liable in cases where the claim is the result of representations made by 
the retailer.567 Article 2(2) of the Consumer Sales Directive provides that goods must 
‘show the quality and performance which are normal in goods of the same type and 
which the consumer can reasonably expect, given the nature of the goods and taking 
into account any public statements on the specific characteristics of the goods’. 
Article 2(4) provides that the retailer will not be liable for advertising claims made 
by other parties in the supply chain if he was unaware of the claims. It is suggested 
that the producer should also have this protection.568 
The secondary question is whether the other parties in the supply chain should be 
able to raise these defences directly against the consumer, or whether such parties 
must be held ‘strictly liable’ towards the consumer, but be able to pass liability on to 
another member of the supply chain based on these defences. The latter clearly 
provides stronger consumer protection. According to Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner,  
‘it should be borne in mind that in our proposed scheme, the producer’s liability 
is supplemental to, rather than a replacement of, that of the retail supplier.569 In 
addition, the major rationale for the imposition of liability is that the imposition 
of legal liability should follow the allocation of factual responsibility. There is 
565 Act 1987 (c. 43). 
566 Article 7(b). In Portugal, the producer can also be held liable, but the liability is subject to defences 
that are very similar to those in the Product Liability Directive (Schulte-Nölke (ed) op cit note 333 at 
442). 
567 Bradgate & Twigg-Flesner ‘Expanding the boundaries’ op cit note 196 at 363. 
568 Ibid. 
569 Ibid at 360. What is meant here is that it is not intended for the system of supplier liability to be 
replaced with a system of producer-only liability.  
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therefore a strong case for allowing the producer a defence where it can be 
shown that the defect did not exist in the goods at the time they left his 
control’.570  
The issue of strict liability versus allowing a defence to operate against the 
consumer directly also arises in the context of non-conformity relating to the 
description or the fitness of the goods for their purpose. Strict liability in this context 
would result in the producer being held liable for statements made by the retailer of 
which the producer had no knowledge. Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner are in favour of 
allowing producers this defence also.571 
It is submitted that the defence that the goods were not defective or that the 
retailer made misrepresentations unbeknown to the producer should be available to 
the producer, but that these defences should only lie against claims from the other 
parties in the supply chain, and not against the consumer. This will create a clear 
right for the consumer, which will be easier to enforce. If this is not the case, it will 
be easier for the party against whom the consumer brings the claim to employ 
dilatory tactics, such as referring the consumer to another party in the supply chain. 
Any resultant unfairness for the retailer or producer can be resolved between them 
and is not a sufficient reason to place the responsibility of finding the liable party on 
the consumer’s shoulders. 
3.7. What classes of goods should be included in the CPA? 
The application of the CPA is limited to the supply of goods or the performance of 
services. Both of these terms are defined.572 The definitions are very broad and 
encompass virtually every conceivable good, subject to some exceptions contained 
in s 5(2).573 For the most part, the definitions are broad yet unremarkable. However, 
570 Ibid at 362. 
571 Ibid at 363. 
572 Section 1.  
573 Advice and intermediary services rendered in terms of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Act 37 of 2002, as well as services rendered in terms of the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 
1998 and the Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998, were excluded. Other financial services were 
eventually excluded from the application of the CPA by the Financial Services Laws General 
Amendment Act 45 of 2013. Section 5(2) of the CPA contains a number of exemptions. First, the 
CPA does not protect the state as a consumer. Secondly, the Act does not apply to credit agreements 
(but does apply to the goods and services provided in terms of those agreements). Thirdly, employees 
are not considered suppliers. Fourthly, services provided in terms of collective bargaining agreements 
or collective agreements in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 are also excluded.  
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three classes of goods are controversial: immovable goods, intangible goods and 
second-hand goods.  
Paragraph (d) of the definition of ‘goods’ states that goods include ‘a legal 
interest in land or any other immovable property, other than an interest that falls 
within the definition of “service”’. The definition of ‘service’ includes the provision 
of ‘access to or use of any premises or other property in terms of a rental’,574 or any 
other ‘right of occupancy of, or power or privilege over or in connection with any 
land or other immovable property’.575 Save for a sale of immovable property, it 
would therefore appear that the supply of all other rights in immovable property will 
constitute a service rather than a good.576  
Paragraph (c) of the definition relates to intangible products, along with any 
licence to use such an intangible product. Literature, music, photographs, motion 
pictures, games, information, data, software and code are specifically listed. While a 
discussion of the substantive provisions of the CPA does not fall within the scope of 
this thesis, it is worth noting that the provisions relating to the quality of goods do 
not apply to goods bought on auction (regardless of whether the goods are second-
hand or new, or whether the consumer had the opportunity to attend the auction).577 
This departs from current European Community law, where the definition of 
‘goods’ for purposes of consumer protection measures is much more limited. The 
Consumer Rights and Consumer Sales Directives limit the definition of ‘consumer 
574 Paragraph (e)(v) of the definition of ‘services’ in s 1. Note that ‘rental’ is defined as ‘an agreement 
for consideration in the ordinary course of business, in terms of which temporary possession of any 
premises or other property is delivered, at the direction of, or to the consumer, or the right to use any 
premises or other property is granted, at the direction of, or to the consumer, but does not include a 
lease within the meaning of the National Credit Act’.  
575 Paragraph (f) of the definition of ‘services’ in s 1. 
576 While it is clear that granting access to immovable property in terms of a ‘rental’ is a service, 
granting temporary access to movable property through a ‘rental’ is harder to classify. The use of 
‘supply’ in relation to goods includes ‘rent’ and ‘hire’, which creates the impression that the ‘renting’ 
of movable property will be classified as goods, even though it is not referred to directly in the 
definition of goods. However, the definition of ‘services’ explicitly includes ‘access to or use of any 
premises or other property in terms of a rental’ (my emphasis). The argument that movable property 
provided through a rental is a service is marginally stronger, given the reference to ‘other property’ in 
the definition of ‘services’, whereas the definition of ‘goods’ is silent on the issue. Van Eeden 
(Consumer Protection Law op cit note 271 at 48) also believes that the renting of movable property is 
a service. However, he does not refer to the confusing definition given to ‘supply’ in the context of 
goods. This ambiguity should be addressed by the legislature.  
577 Section 55(1). 
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goods’ to ‘tangible movable item[s]’,578 while the Product Liability Directive is 
simply limited to ‘all movables’, subject to certain very specific exclusions.579 The 
UK SoGA is also confined to goods that are ‘at once tangible, movable and 
visible’.580 This definition was retained in the Consumer Rights Act.581 This 
exclusion is particularly important given the prolific and increasing rate at which 
digital products such as software, music and literature are consumed. 
This is not to say that digital content is not regulated in the EU. The Consumer 
Rights Directive contains some regulations that are applicable to digital content 
products.582 This is also true of the CESL. The distinction between tangible and 
intangible goods for purposes of delineating the scope of consumer protection has 
become increasingly strained and ‘is riddled with potential anomalies’, as it largely 
depends on how the goods are supplied. For example, if software is delivered on a 
compact disc, it is considered a good, but not if it is downloaded via the internet.583 
That the CPA includes intangible goods is commendable, but it is likely that the 
substantive regulations will have to evolve over time to address the unique problems 
related to, in particular, digital products.  
Should immovable property be included in consumer protection legislation? On 
face value, one feels that the answer should be ‘yes’ because the price of these goods 
makes consumers more vulnerable. On the other hand, it can be argued that the price 
of the goods justifies placing a bigger responsibility on consumers to protect 
themselves. The problem with immovable goods is that the remedies of which 
consumers must avail themselves in cases of non-conformity (for instance) are more 
limited, since immovable goods cannot easily be replaced, and the return of the 
goods is not easy due to the manner in which ownership is passed and the fact that 
the transactions are generally financed. However, this is not significant enough to 
578 Article 1(2) in both Directives.  
579 Article 2. 
580 Section 61(1). Bridge op cit note 333 at 69; Adams & MacQueen op cit note 502 at 74. 
581 Section 2(8).  
582 Article 2(11) of the Consumer Rights Directive defines ‘digital content’ as ‘data which are 
produced and supplied in digital form’. European Commission ‘Better protection for EU consumers 
downloading games, e-books, videos and music’ available at http://europa.eu/ rapid/press-
release_IP-13-937_en.htm, accessed on 20 October 2013. 
583 Bradgate op cit note 229 at 14; Adams & MacQueen op cit note 502 at 77. Adams and MacQueen 
reject the approach that makes the classification of goods dependent on the medium by which they are 
conveyed. Instead, lawmakers should consider what remedies they want to impose on the makers of 
the product (e.g. whether they should be strictly liable for defects, or whether negligence should be 
required).  
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restrict the scope of the CPA. In any event, remedies such as repairing the goods or 
reducing the purchase price do not present the same challenges.  
The definition of ‘goods’ makes no mention of second-hand goods, but given the 
wide definition, they are included. The UK Consumer Rights Act excludes second-
hand goods bought at an auction that the consumer had the opportunity to attend.584 
In the case of the Consumer Sales Directive, member states were given the option to 
exclude this class of good from the definition of ‘consumer goods’.585 It was also 
acknowledged in the recital to the Consumer Sales Directive that second-hand goods 
would present different substantive problems than new goods — in particular, it was 
pointed out that second-hand goods could not be replaced, and that there should be a 
shortened period of liability.586  
It is submitted that the difficulties described above in respect of second-hand and 
immovable property are not severe enough to merit depriving consumers of the 
protection provided by the CPA. The limitations placed on the definition of 
‘consumer’ and ‘supplier’ are sufficient to preserve the fairness of the legislation.587  
3.8. Summary of recommendations made in this chapter 
The recommendations made in this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
a) The definition of ‘consumer’ should include both natural and juristic
persons.588
b) The protection of juristic persons should not be unqualified. They should not
be protected if the value of the transaction exceeds the prescribed threshold
of R15 000 or if the goods are bought for resale or for transformation into a
product for resale, will be used up or transformed in the course of production
584 Section 2(5). This was also the case in the Consumer Sales Directive (art 1(3)) and the previous 
definition of ‘dealing as a consumer’ in the Unfair Contract Terms Act (s 12(2)). The Law 
Commission and Scottish Law Commission recommended the retention of the exception (Law 
Commission & Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms op cit note 348 para 3.29). Section 55(1) of 
the CPA does exclude goods bought at an auction from the ‘good quality’ requirement.  
585 Article 1(3). 
586 Recital 16 of the Consumer Sales Directive.  
587 For instance, the fact that the CPA will not apply to juristic persons who purchase goods for 
commercial reasons, or to private sales.  
588 Paragraph 3.3. 
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or manufacture, or are used up or transformed in the course of repairing or 
treating other goods or fixtures on land.589 
c) A supplier should be able to rely on a positive, voluntary and clear
declaration by a buyer who is a juristic person that the goods are bought for
commercial purposes. The effect of the statement should be explained in
plain language.590 Any such declaration made by a natural person will not
have any force.
d) Where no such declaration is made and the consumer is a juristic person, the
onus of proving that the buyer is not a consumer should be on the juristic
person.591
e) Only truly private sales ought to fall outside the scope of the CPA. In order to
achieve this, all references to ‘in the ordinary course of business’ must be
replaced with ‘in the course of a business’, and the definition of ‘business’
must be deleted. The result of this reformulation is that only truly ‘private
sales’ will be excluded.592
f) The ‘consideration’ requirement also has no place in South African law, and
its inclusion creates too much confusion. Instead, the CPA should include an
additional exception that the Act (with the exception of s 61 on product
liability) will not apply to gratuitous contracts, as there are obvious policy
reasons not to burden charities with compliance.593
g) There is no policy reason to deviate from the decision of the South African
legislature to extend liability for post-purchase quality problems to the rest of
the supply chain. The consumer can always elect to pursue a claim against
the retailer, regardless of the retailer’s complicity in the defect, and the
retailer cannot escape this by referring the consumer to the manufacturer. Put
589 Paragraph 3.4.5. 
590 Paragraph 3.5. 
591 Ibid. 
592 Paragraph 3.6.1. 
593 Paragraph 3.6.2. 
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differently, the direct claim is supplemental to instead of a substitute for 
frontline liability.594 
h) There should be an explicit right of redress for retailers, distributors and
importers against the producer of the goods, unless the defect was caused by
another member of the supply chain (e.g. if the goods were not properly
stored). Given that the retailer obtains the goods from the manufacturer for
purposes of reselling them, the retailer will not be protected as a consumer. In
order to ensure that the retailer is not rendered liable for the claim made by
the consumer, it is also recommended that parties to the producer should be
unable to contract out of liability for defective goods in relation to one
another. Put differently, the manufacturer (for instance) should not be able to
insert an indemnity against claims from consumers in its contract with the
retailer.595
i) The defence that the goods were not defective or that the retailer made
misrepresentations unbeknown to the producer should be available to the
producer, but these defences should only lie against claims from the other
parties in the supply chain, and not against the consumer. This will create a
clear right for the consumer, which will be easier to enforce. If this is not the
case, it will be easier for the party against whom the consumer brings the
claim to employ dilatory tactics, such as referring the consumer to another
party in the supply chain. Any resultant unfairness for the retailer or producer
can be resolved between them and is not a sufficient reason to place the
responsibility of finding the liable party on the consumer’s shoulders.596
j) The difficulties described above in respect of second-hand and immovable
property are not severe enough to merit depriving consumers of the
protection provided by the CPA. The limitations placed on the definition of
‘consumer’ and ‘supplier’ are sufficient to preserve the fairness of the
legislation.597
594 Paragraph 3.6.3.2. 
595 Paragraph 3.6.3.3. 
596 Paragraph 3.6.3.4. 
597 Paragraph 3.7.  
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The changes to the wording of the CPA required to effect these recommendations 
will be discussed in the final chapter.  
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4. Chapter 4: Conclusion and suggested wording
4.1. The issues addressed in this thesis 
The current formulation of the definition sections as well as ss 5 and 56 of the CPA 
gave rise to the following questions:  
a) The definition of ‘consumer’ in the CPA includes small ‘juristic persons’.
Should juristic persons be protected? If so, should the protection be extended
to all juristic persons or only small juristic persona, and how should size be
determined?
b) The CPA does not exclude transactions concluded for business purposes.
This relates to the fact that ‘juristic persons’ are also protected. Should the
CPA apply to transactions taking place for business purposes?
c) A complex definition of ‘consumer’ creates questions regarding the onus of
proof. Who will be burdened with proving whether a customer is a
consumer?
d) The definition of ‘supplier’ is limited to suppliers acting in the ‘ordinary
course of business’. Does this mean that suppliers are not responsible for
‘atypical’ transactions that do not form part of their core business? If so,
should that be the case?
e) The CPA requires that a transaction must be ‘for consideration’. Should this
requirement be introduced into South African law?
f) Liability flows up the supply chain in many instances. Are the definitions
establishing this clear enough? Does this impose unreasonable liability on
suppliers?
g) Should all goods be included in the scope of the legislation? The inclusion of
immovable, second-hand and intangible goods has been particularly
controversial.
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These questions were addressed in chapter 3 by comparing the regime created by 
the CPA to consumer protection legislation in the European Union, the United 
Kingdom and Australia. This was done against the backdrop of the discussion of 
theoretic underpinnings and rationales for consumer protection in chapter 2. The 
existing protection was evaluated and recommendations were made by applying the 
criteria of fairness, rationality, clarity, efficiency, the reasonable expectations of 
honest men, and the improvement of consumer redress.  
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to suggesting alternative 
formulations based on the recommendations made in chapter 3.  
4.2. The definition of ‘consumer’ 
It has been recommended that the CPA should apply to all natural persons, 
regardless of the purpose for which they buy the goods.598 Where the buyer is a 
juristic person, the CPA should only apply if the goods will not be commercialised 
and the transaction value is below the prescribed threshold.  
Implementing this recommendation will require an amendment to s 5(2)(b). The 
subsection should be replaced with the following:  
‘(2) This Act does not apply to any transaction— 
(a) …
(b) in terms of which the consumer is a juristic person—
(i) if the amount paid or payable for the goods exceeds a
threshold value determined by the Minister; or
(ii) if the goods are bought for resale or for transformation
into a product for resale, or will be used up or
transformed in the course of production or
manufacture; or
(iii) if the goods are used up or transformed in the course of
repairing or treating other goods or fixtures on land.’
A threshold value of R15 000 has been recommended.599 This amount is relatively 
low so as to limit the impact of the extension of protection to juristic persons.  
598 This was discussed in chapter 3, paragraph 3.2. 
599 Paragraph 3.4.5. 
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Of course, this raises the question of whether this definition of ‘consumer’ should 
apply to all parts of the CPA. As things stand, the definition of ‘consumer’ is 
different in respect of product liability claims (all juristic persons are consumers),600 
fixed-term contracts (the CPA only applies to transactions between juristic persons 
and individuals),601 and the list of contract terms presumed to be fair and reasonable 
(it only applies to ‘a supplier operating on a for-profit basis and acting wholly or 
mainly for purposes related to his or her business or profession and an individual 
consumer or individual consumers who entered into it for purposes wholly or mainly 
unrelated to his or her business or profession’).602 Considering specific departures 
from the general definition is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is 
submitted that the rules relating to the right to return, repair or replace defective 
goods, and the claim for harm caused by defective goods, should be the same. In 
order to achieve this, s 5(5) should be deleted, as it extends the right to claim for 
harm caused by defective goods to all juristic persons.  
4.3. The onus of proving that the buyer is a consumer 
It has been recommended that there should be a distinction between juristic and 
natural persons for purposes of allocating the onus of proof.603 If the buyer is a 
juristic person, the onus of proving that a particular transaction falls within the scope 
of the CPA will be on the buyer. In addition, the supplier will be entitled to ask the 
juristic person to declare whether the goods are bought for commercialisation, as 
long as the request for the declaration complies with the provisions of s 49. If the 
buyer is a natural person, the onus of proving that a particular transaction does not 
fall within the scope of the CPA will be on the supplier.  
This can be achieved by including the following subsection in s 5: 
‘(9)  In respect of transactions between suppliers and juristic persons— 
(a) a supplier may rely on a declaration that the goods are bought
for resale or for transformation into a product for resale, will
be used up or transformed in the course of production or
manufacture, or are used up or transformed in the course of
repairing or treating other goods or fixtures on land, as long as
600 Section 5(5).  
601 Section 14(1).  
602 Regulation 44(1). 
603 Paragraph 3.5. 
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the request for such a declaration complies with the 
requirements in section 49(3) to (5); or 
(b) the onus of proving that this Act applies to the transaction
shall be on the juristic person in the absence of a declaration
in terms of subsection (a)’.
4.4. The ‘definition’ of supplier 
4.4.1. The ‘ordinary course of business’ requirement 
It has been recommended that only truly private sales should be excluded from the 
scope of the Act. To achieve this, all references to ‘in the ordinary course of 
business’ should be replaced with ‘in the course of a business’. In addition, the 
definition of ‘business’ should be deleted.  
4.4.2. The consideration requirement 
All references to the ‘consideration’ requirement should be removed, as this has no 
place in South African law. Gratuitous contracts should be excluded in s 5(2) by 
adding that the CPA does not apply to any transaction 
‘(h) in terms of which goods or services are provided free of charge or 
other forms of counter-performance, with the exception of section 61’. 
The inclusion of the phrase ‘or other forms of counter-performance’ is intended to 
prevent suppliers from circumventing the CPA by requiring other forms of counter-
performance. The current definition in s 1 is sufficiently broad to prevent abuse, but 
the term ‘consideration’ should be substituted with ‘counter-performance’.   
While there are obvious policy reasons why charities that provide goods for free 
ought not to be burdened with compliance, consumers of these goods should have 
the right to claim for harm caused should those goods be defective or unsafe. To be 
clear, the consumer will not have a claim for a refund or for the repair or 
replacement of the goods themselves.  
4.4.3. Direct claim against all members of the supply chain 
Sections 29 (general standards for marketing of goods or services), 56 (claims for 
refunds, replacements or repairs) and 61 (liability for harm caused by goods, or 
‘product liability’ claims) provide that ‘the producer or importer, the distributor and 
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the retailer’ are liable in terms of these sections. The ‘or’ conjunction in these 
sections should be deleted to ensure that the consumer has the unfettered discretion 
to select against whom to bring the claim.  
There is no policy reason to deviate from the decision of the South African 
legislature to extend liability for post-purchase quality problems to the rest of the 
supply chain. 
It is recommended that there should be an explicit right of redress for retailers, 
distributors and importers against the producer of the goods, unless the defect was 
caused by another member of the supply chain (e.g. if the goods were not properly 
stored), and that this liability must be joint and several. This can be achieved by 
adding the following clause to ss 29, 56 and s 61: 
‘Retailers, distributors and importers have a right of redress against the 
producer of the goods in the event that the retailer, distributor or importer is 
held liable by a consumer in terms of this section.’ 
It is also recommended that parties to the producer or importer should be unable 
to contract out of liability in relation to the rest of the supply chain for claims 
brought in terms of ss 29, 56 or 61 of the CPA. This can be achieved by adding the 
following subsection after s 51(1): 
‘(2) A producer or importer must not make a supply agreement with another 
member of the supply chain subject to an exclusion of liability for 
claims brought by consumers in terms of section 29, section 56 or 
section 61.’ 
It is submitted that the defence that the goods were not defective when it left the 
producer’s control or that the retailer made misrepresentations unbeknown to the 
producer should be available to the producer, but that these defences should only lie 
against claims from the other parties in the supply chain, and not against the 
consumer. 
The first defence already exists in respect of s 61(4)(b)(i), which provides that 
‘[l]iability of a particular person in terms of this section does not arise if— 
(a) ….
(b) the alleged unsafe product characteristic, failure, defect or hazard—
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(i) did not exist in the goods at the time it was supplied by that
person to another person alleged to be liable’.
This defence should be added to s 56, with the omission of references to ‘unsafe 
product characteristic’, ‘failure’ and ‘hazard’. 
In addition, members of the supply chain should not be held liable for statements 
made by other members of the supply chain. This should be included in ss 29, 56 and 
61: 
‘The supplier shall not be bound by public statements made by other members 
of the supply chain if the supplier— 
(a) was not, and could not reasonably have been, aware of the statements
in question;
(b) shows that the statement had been corrected by the time the
transaction was concluded;
(c) shows that the decision to buy the consumer goods could not have
been influenced by the statement.’
4.5. The classes of goods that should be included in the CPA 
There are no convincing policy considerations in favour of excluding intangible, 
immovable and second-hand goods from the application of the CPA.  
4.6. Conclusion 
In the context of comparing the application of the CPA with the general approach 
to limiting consumer protection in the European Union and Australia, some have 
argued that the South African approach is ‘groundbreaking’.604 Despite the criticism 
levelled at the application sections of the CPA in this thesis, this praise is not entirely 
unjustified. In particular, the attempt at also protecting juristic persons is progressive 
and laudable. The recommendations made for reform reflect that, on a principled 
level, the CPA is a step in the right direction, even though the execution has at times 
been lacking when measured against the criteria of fairness, rationality, clarity, 
coherence, improved consumer redress, and reflecting the expectations of reasonable 
men.  
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